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Previous CAE Risk-Management Activity
The Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAE) has had a long-
standing interest and involvement in risk-management issues.
In its first major project leading to the August 1991 publica-
tion, Lifelines in Earthquakes: Wellington Case Study, engi-
neering-risk management issues were an important consid-
eration in relation to the ongoing functioning of essential in-
frastructure and services following a major earthquake.  The
subsequent multi-hazard Christchurch Engineering Lifelines
Project, in which CAE was also involved, led to the November 1997 publication enti-
tled Risks and Realities.  Another early CAE publication in October 1992 , Risk Assess-
ment of Industrial and Natural Hazards, was edited by the late Mr John Gardenier and
by Professor Roger Keey with contributions from 16 practitioners.
Other CAE publications, where risk-management issues in engineering have been an
important consideration, have included:
• Waste Landfill Engineering Guidelines;
• Treatment of Hazardous Waste;
• Reliability of Electricity Supply; and
• Fire Engineering Design Guide.
In March 1997, CAE organised a very successful two-day conference in Wellington on
Integrated Risk Management followed up by a one-day conference in Auckland in
November that year, leading to the publication, Owning the Future, launched at Parlia-
ment in September 1998.
Further information on CAE is given in Appendix C.
Background to the Production of this Publication
The original idea for a book on Management of Engineering Risk came from my at-
tendance at a February 1996 NZ Geotechnical Society conference in Hamilton on
“Geotechnical Issues in Land Development”.  I represented IPENZ at that conference
to present proposals then being mooted for the establishment of Practice Colleges within
the Institution.  Several times during discussions at the conference, the 1983/84 IPENZ
publication on Engineering Risk was mentioned by people who had found it to be help-
ful in their professional practice.
At the time of its release, this 1983/84 publication was distributed free of charge to all
members of the Institution and I remembered that I still had a copy on my bookshelf.
On my return home I re-examined it and reached the conclusion that the production of
a revised and updated version would be an appropriate project for CAE.
I then approached both IPENZ and the Consulting Engineers Advancement Society
(CEAS) who had supported the original 1983/84 publication, with the proposal of us-
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ing it as the basis for a new updated publication on engineering-risk management.  Both
organisations offered support and financial assistance for the project.
Professor Roger Keey of the University  of Canterbury was then approached, and after
discussions extending over several months leading to the development of a proposed
scope for the project, he agreed to prepare a draft text of such a publication for review.
The first draft was produced in September 1998.  The review was then carried out by
both IPENZ and CEAS.  Subsequently Mr Geraint Bermingham was engaged by CAE
as principal reviewer. He has provided most valuable assistance in the preparation of
the final text and his contribution is gratefully acknowledged.
The publication of the Australian/New Zealand Standard on Risk Management (AS/
NZS 4360: 1995) and its reissue in revised form in 1999 was also an influencing factor
in the preparation of this publication, which can be seen as an engineering-related “com-
panion volume” to the Australian/New Zealand Standard.
Recent Major Incidents
The February 1997 collapse in a flood during construction of the Opuha Dam in South
Canterbury, followed a year later in February 1998 by the Auckland CBD electricity
crisis helped to raise general awareness within the profession in New Zealand of the
importance of understanding issues in engineering-risk management.  Soon after, there
were two major incidents in Australia; quality problems with drinking water in Sydney
and an explosion leading to a state-wide disruption to the natural gas supply in Victoria.
This again raised awareness and highlighted the importance in all engineering activity
of implementing good risk-management procedures to help prevent such incidents hap-
pening in the future, with consequent inconvenience to the public and adverse public-
ity. The continued functioning of a modern society has become highly dependent on
technology.
Such incidents emphasise the importance to many professional engineers of im-
plementing appropriate risk-management procedures on projects for which they
are responsible, even if the impact and scale of a potential failure is of a much
lower order than the incidents described above.  I hope that many members of the
profession will find this publication to be helpful to them in handling risk-man-
agement issues in their everyday working lives.
Appreciation
I would like to express my own personal appreciation to Professor Roger Keey for the
tireless application of his own professional knowledge and skill over several years to
bringing this project to a successful completion, with the assistance of a number of
individuals and organisations whose help is also gratefully acknowledged.
John Blakeley
CAE Executive Director (1988-2000)
Past-President of IPENZ (1997-1998)
April  2000
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Introduction
Preface
Most of us will live longer, healthier and safer lives than
our parents or grandparents.  Yet we still worry about
threats to our well-being.  The public awareness of engi-
neering risk has been raised recently by several major
incidents in both New Zealand and Australia.  We expect
better reliability in our modern technological society.
Eric Ireland, on becoming President of the Institution of Professional Engi-
neers New Zealand (IPENZ) in 1983, set up a task committee to study the sub-
ject of engineering uncertainties and risks and to prepare a publication on the
subject that would be a suitable reference for the engineering profession and
those associated with it.  The incentive for such a work was summarised in a
quotation from a collection of essays on “Engineering and Society” (Hayward
1982):
“Throughout the centuries our standards of living and quality of
life have been profoundly influenced by engineering endeavour.
The irony is that with each accomplishment, society’s expectations
have been raised and its perceptions of human welfare altered.”
Since the publication of the book Engineering Risk by the task committee
(Strachan et al. 1983), the commercial, professional and statutory environment
in which professional engineers must work has changed considerably. While
the 1983 book was well received by the engineering profession, clearly its con-
tents have now been overtaken by subsequent events.  In March 1996, IPENZ
accepted a proposal that the 1983 book should be updated in a joint publication
with the Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAE) at the University of Canter-
bury.  The Consulting Engineers’ Advancement Society (CEAS) generously
offered sponsorship towards the cost of the publication and provided advice on
the content of the revision.
The original work was written by a number of contributors, but it was decided
that the revised work should have the greater coherence provided through a
single authorship.  Professor Roger Keey, whose book “Safety and Reliability
in the Process Industries” had already been published earlier by the Institution
in 1987, was approached to do this revision.  He also had been a member of an
Australian/New Zealand Standards Committee which had developed a generic
standard on risk management (AS/NZS 4360:1995).
To ensure an adequate perspective in the revised work, the text was initially
read by representatives of CEAS and  IPENZ, and reviewed by Geraint
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Bermingham, a specialist in engineering-risk management.  After the first draft
was prepared, and after consultation with both IPENZ and CEAS, it was de-
cided to change the focus from a revision of the 1983 work to a new work,
being more of a guide for the members of the engineering profession to the
template of AS/NZS 4360:1999, which should be seen as the definitive docu-
ment for managing risk in Australia and New Zealand.  At the same time, in
early 1999, IPENZ issued a policy statement entitled “Risk and Prudence” on
risk and governance in public and private organisations that rely intensively on
engineering and technology in their activities or business (see Appendix B).
Geraint Bermingham was appointed by CAE to provide a peer review of the
new work. He also substantially prepared the writing of a new chapter on an
overview of engineering-risk management, the framework for a chapter on
workplace risk, and provided material for other chapters. Don Houchen of Aon
Risk Services Group kindly provided text for the chapter on risk insurance.
The author is grateful for the constructive comments in the various reviews in
the attempt to achieve a balanced, introductory work for use by engineers, engi-
neering managers and their associates.  His viewpoint is from one who now has
a degree of detachment from the workface of engineering-risk management.
Others may see the same topic from different aspects. Furthermore, a greater
maturity of understanding about the nature of engineering risk since the publi-
cation of the 1983 report of the IPENZ task committee has not always led to
greater consensus, as illustrated in the Report of the Study Group commis-
sioned by the Royal Society of London in 1991, to update its own 1983 Report
on Risk Assessment which was more straightforward in describing risk assess-
ment.
A fairly short book on the subject cannot be comprehensive (the literature is
advancing at the rate of 500 major publications per year), nor it is designed to
be a prescriptive handbook on engineering-risk assessment, nor a detailed manual
for risk management.  However, the book does provide an overview of the
strategy and techniques of engineering-risk management, while a selected range
of references enables the reader to follow up particular aspects in greater detail
and gain some insight into the benefits of this approach  Thus, it is hoped that
this new work will be useful to the engineering profession and others wishing
to implement a risk-management approach within their own organisation or
project, as a “companion volume” in providing an introduction to the applica-
tion of the Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360:1999, and a first
guide to engineering risk, its perception, identification and evaluation, which
forms a basis for the prudent management of engineering assets and operations.
Roger B Keey
Christchurch
December 1999
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1Introduction
Engineering risk arises from uncertainty.  This may be due to incomplete knowl-
edge or understanding, to the appearance of unforeseen events that may be of
commercial, political or social origin, or to an inability to control a developing
situation.  Such events, if they happen, may result in loss or harm to people,
property and the environment. Even when risks are reduced, avoided or trans-
ferred, there is always some residual chance that things may go wrong, occa-
sionally badly wrong.
We normally think of a risk being the chance that some adverse thing might
happen of the consequence should it do so.  Specifically, with engineering risk,
we mean the practical likelihood of a specific hazard being realised through
engineering activity given the actual workplace practices, management priori-
ties, constraints and pressures1.  Taking risks, however, may lead to gain, and
this anticipated gain is normally the incentive for undertaking risky ventures.
Indeed, absolute safety is an impossible dream.  Even doing nothing is risky.
Many lives were lost in fording New Zealand rivers before they were bridged.
Yet our attempts to overcome such risks often bring others we may not have
considered.  Bridges can and do fail.  Further, we cannot even say that the only
perfectly safe bridge is the one that has not been used.  The collapse of the
Westgate box-girder bridge under construction at Melbourne, and the destruc-
tion by fire of an Apollo spacecraft on the launching pad both illustrate that
failures can occur before things are used for their designed purpose.  The man-
agement of risks throughout the complete lifespan of a project from initial con-
ception onwards is thus an important aspect of modern business and engineer-
ing enterprises.
Although a lack of safety can lead to tragedy, there is sometimes a comic side to
relieve its seriousness. Smith2 relates the story of a sphere which normally held
liquid propane and was being filled with water to expel any oil vapours.  Unfor-
tunately, the supporting legs could not stand the weight, water being heavier
than oil, and the sphere fell over.  A mobile crane was brought to raise the
sphere, but the crane’s jib could not withstand the load, and collapsed sideways
over the sphere, causing further extensive damage.
Considerable effort has been expended in recent decades to devise ways of
assessing and monitoring risks to put a measure on their real value, so that we
can minimise or avoid the major ones,  leaving untreated the minor ones of
little consequence that we may be prepared to live with, at least for the time
being.  While such techniques have yielded demonstrable progress in a reduc-
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tion of accidents and increase in safety, perceptions often remain that techno-
logical risks are too great and increasing.
The reality of a risk does not derive simply from  such so-called “objective”
measures.  Newby3, in his address for the 1997 Jubilee Lecture of the Institu-
tion of Chemical Engineers in London, quotes the word of an American social
psychologist, W I Thomas:
“Things which are perceived as real will be real in their
  consequences”
We perceive risk through the accumulated wisdom of our forebears and our
own experience and those of the society in which we live.  Such informal meas-
ures were adequate when society was relatively static and new experiences
were rare.  While there is little doubt that the world is a healthier and safer place
for most of its inhabitants than a century ago, there is more uncertainty through
seemingly ever-increasing rates of political, social and technological change.
These changes, noted Newby3, have left individuals feeling threatened with a
sense of greater unpredictability and increased vulnerability.  The past is no
longer a simple template for the future.  Moreover, few in society unquestion-
ingly believe that our pursuit of new knowledge and gain of new skills will
bring about human progress and happiness.  This loss of confidence has its
expression in an enhanced perception of risk and a suspicion of expert opinion,
with the rise of independent groups presenting alternative viewpoints.
The perception of risk is a social belief.  A proposed medium-density fibre-
board plant in the Dunedin area did not gain a resource consent because of the
perceived risks of emissions, even though the quantitative assessment showed
these risks to be minor and their long-term environmental impacts to be negli-
gible.  The thing that was perceived to be real  was real in its consequence.
Real are the perceptions of the risks of living near high-tension power lines, of
irradiating food, of the introduction of genetically-modified organisms, or even
of the visits of nuclear-powered warships. Such perceptions do influence politi-
cal and social policy, and ultimately shape the pattern and pace of technological
change, regardless of technical measures of risk.  Today, the communication of
risks can be as important to a successful outcome of an engineering project as
the treatment of the actual risks.
Within business and commerce, risks usually will be measured in monetary
terms.  Even here the perception of risk and the perceived effect of failure on
the corporate image can be as important as financial estimates.
Just as individuals and organisations set themselves personal thresholds of tol-
erable risk, so too communities develop informal but real perceptions of thresh-
olds of societal risk4.  Accidents and failures that cause large-scale damage or
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multiple fatalities are almost always followed by a public outcry, often leading
to some kind of inquiry into the cause  and the steps needed to prevent a re-
occurrence.  We are risk-averse, particularly whenever the risky venture is out-
side our control.  As a society, we appear to seek the elimination of high-sever-
ity risks that might be experienced in an average lifetime.
Risk perception involves a range of social and cultural values and attitudes
towards hazards and their benefits.  Different people will perceive a given risk
differently, depending on their value systems they hold and the benefits they
derive, and view it within different contexts.  Thus it is impossible to reduce the
perceived risk into a single objective function, such as  a mean probable fatality
rate, or some product of likelihood and consequence.  The human condition is
of wider compass.
This does not mean that quantitative measures of engineering risk are useless,
and the assessment and control of hazards should be left to adversarial debate
in resource consent hearings or the judgement of the Environment Court. Rather,
the reality of  so-called “objective” risk assessments has to be set alongside the
reality of perceived risk in formulating policy. Engineering-risk assessments
play a vital role in the wise use of resources and in the development of a project
from its conception to its “death”. Only by quantitative measures can we as-
cribe priority to alternative risk-reduction strategies or monitor improvements
in safety, health and the environment.
Elms5 has written:
“Engineering is goal-oriented, rather than truth-oriented ... in that
it has an end in mind.”
Engineering has often regarded the end in providing for society’s perceived
needs as justifying the means, but no longer is that the case.  The IPENZ Code
of Ethics now looks towards sustainable management and care for the environ-
ment with minimal adverse side-effects.  Consideration of means and the evalu-
ation of associated risks at all stages of a project are thus essential components
of engineering endeavour.
The incentive for writing the original IPENZ book was a growing concern for
the liability of engineers in an increasingly critical and litigious world.  The
then President of the Institution, Eric Ireland (1983-4), noting that some spec-
tacular failures had figured prominently in newspapers or had been featured on
television, appointed a task committee to study the subject of engineering un-
certainties and risks and prepare a publication that might be used as a reference
for the engineering profession and those associated with it. Their work set out
to review the nature of engineering risk.  To address the particular concern with
liability, the publication contained several appendices dealing with matters of
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law and insurance which were prepared by professional advisers to the editorial
committee.
Since the publication of that book, as noted in the Preface, the commercial,
professional and statutory environment in which professional engineers work
has changed considerably.  The aggregated body of engineering expertise within
the former Ministry of Works and Development has been dispersed; the corpo-
rate heirs of the old NZ Electricity Department and Post Office have much
leaner in-house infrastructures.  The Building Act (1991) and its Regulations
(1992) are an example of newer legislation that is outcome-driven, rather than
prescriptive in content.  The Resource Management Act (1991) has introduced
the concept of sustainable management of resources and placed a duty on both
principals and employees to avoid, eliminate or mitigate “effects” on the envi-
ronment.  The definition of effects is very wide in the Act, covering both acute
and long-term impacts, whether remote or not and whether of short duration or
not.  Subsequent legislation, such as the Health and Safety in Employment Act
(1992) and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (1996), with the
setting up of the Environmental Risk Management Authority in 1998, now pro-
vide a new statutory framework for engineering activity beyond the traditional
obligation of an engineer to practise her or his profession with reasonable and
proper care and skill.
A number of recent infrastructural failures in New Zealand and Australia has
also raised concerns about the prudent management of engineering assets and
operations.  In early 1999, the President of IPENZ, Sir Ron Carter, issued a
policy statement entitled, Risk and Prudence, on behalf of the Institution (see
Appendix B).  This statement provides guidelines for organisations that rely
intensively on engineering and technology and for which engineering-related
risks are a significant proportion of the total risk of conducting business.  It
recommended that organisations should ideally have at least one Board Mem-
ber with a recognised professional engineering background.  In executive man-
agement, there should be a person or persons (as appropriate) having clear re-
sponsibility and accountability for engineering and technology matters, with
engineering risks being properly evaluated and considered in assessing the overall
business risk.  Within an organisation’s business activity, there should be a regular
audit of performance of its engineering policies, including those applying to
engineering personnel, measured against industry’s “best-practice” standards.
The statement concludes by noting that adherence to the proposed policy would
help those with responsibilities for governance to show that they have acted
prudently in managing the engineering resources entrusted to them.
The 1983 report of the IPENZ President’s task committee set out  a number of
conclusions and recommendations, many dealing with aspects of engineering
liability.  The thrust of these earlier conclusions reflected the concerns of the
task committee, with its engineering members drawn from the ranks of consult-
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ing and public works engineers. Subsequently, the Institution has declared, within
its revised Code of Ethics, that its members’ concern for risk has a wider com-
pass.  Engineers have a duty of care to protect life and safeguard people.  Spe-
cifically, members are required to:
1. Give priority to the safety and wellbeing of the community and have
regard to this principle in assessing duty to clients and colleagues;
2. Be responsible for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to mini-
mise the risk of loss of life, injury or suffering which may result from
the work or the effects of a member’s work;
3. Draw attention of those affected to the level of significance of risk as-
sociated with the work;
4. Assess and minimise potential dangers involved in the construction,
manufacture and use of a member’s products or projects.
The Code also specifies that members shall be committed to the need for sus-
tainable management of resources and seek to minimise adverse environmental
impacts of engineering works or applications of technology for both present
and future generations.
At the same time, there has been a greater awareness of the need for integrated
risk management, in many fields besides engineering, culminating, for exam-
ple, with the publication of the Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS
4360:1995, and its reissue in revised form in 1999.  Further examples of the
increasing importance placed on this approach to management include the hold-
ing of the Wellington conference in March 1997 on Integrated Risk Manage-
ment under the auspices of the Centre for Advanced Engineering and the issu-
ing of a statement of policy on Risk and Prudence in engineering governance
by the IPENZ Board, which has been already referred to. It seems appropriate,
then, in this book to provide both an overview of the management of engineer-
ing risk as well as a more detailed treatment than its predecessor on the nature
of engineering risk, its identification, analysis, evaluation and treatment, in-
cluding the impact of recent legislation on professional engineering practice as
a result of  political and social perception of  risks to persons and the environ-
ment from engineering works.  The book is thus more of a first guide to the
topic of managing engineering risk, written to the template of the revised Risk
Management Standard AS/NZS4360:1999, rather than a review of the liability
of engineers from the risks they run in the exercise of their profession.
Engineering-risk management is concerned with mechanisms of recognising
and facing threats to a technology-based organisation before they have a chance
to inflict expensive and possibly irreparable damage.  These threats may have a
technical origin, but normally the prime cause is poor management of engineer-
ing processes and facilities.
6Management of Engineering Risk
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Management Overview*2
Risk-based Approach
Engineering activities involve uncertainties of various kinds.  Risk manage-
ment is concerned with coping with these future uncertainties, by planning for
the unintended outcome, through avoidance or mitigation should it happen,
thereby reducing future losses.  Indeed, loss prevention is the term sometimes
employed for risk management.
Elms1 distinguishes between management of risk and the management with
risk.  The management of risk is concerned with reducing the risks faced by an
organisation and maintaining them within acceptable limits.  For this, one needs
to understand methods of risk reduction; the risks may not need to be quantified
precisely, but ranked in priority for treatment.  Management with risk, on the
other hand,  typically is associated with business risks.  For a company to grow,
investments must be made, and there always is a risk associated with them.
Proper management quantifies this risk as precisely as possible so that the ven-
ture can proceed with confidence. Engineering risks normally encompass both
kinds of risk management.
Risk management does not imply constrained management, for an organisa-
tion that does not take risks is probably at higher risk of ultimate failure than
one that seizes opportunities despite the attendant risks.  Innovation normally
involves risks, and sometimes leads to spectacular failures.  In the late 1940s,
the first Comet commercial jet airliners were designed without full knowledge
of fatigue-stress development.  Failures in service had  high costs in human and
material terms.  However, a process of systematic risk identification and as-
sessment allows organisations to understand the risks inherent in a course of
action, to be informed of potential failures and to have a basis to prepare con-
tingency plans, thereby reducing the consequences of any mishaps.  This proc-
ess requires the active involvement of senior executive management of techno-
logical enterprises, who should ensure that engineering risks are properly con-
sidered in evaluating their business risks. The following chapters outline some
of the risk-management tools which can be used by those concerned with the
built environment and with the development and use of technology.
Driving Forces
There are a number of factors that are leading to the rapid adoption of risk-
based management.  There is an increasing awareness of its benefits as a means
* based on original text by Geraint Bermingham
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of reducing future losses, while achieving a balance between the risk of failure
and the reward of success. Managers are working in an increasingly complex
and global environment, under rapidly changing conditions, and the risk of
business activity is a central element of corporate governance.
Societies have increasing expectations regarding their own wellbeing as well
as of corporate responsibilities.  As noted in Chapter 1, recent well-publicised
failures of engineering services and works has led the Board of IPENZ to issue
guidelines on governance of organisations that rely on engineering and tech-
nology.
The enhanced expectations are reflected in recent legislation. The Consumer
Guarantees Act 1993 sets out the responsibilities of those providing goods and
services. Both the Commerce Act and the Health & Safety in Employment Act
1992, place statutory requirements for compliance with legislation to show that
managers have acted prudently and have followed best practice, to reflect soci-
ety’s expectations of wellbeing and corporate responsibilities.  The Building
Act 1991 focuses on the risk to users of buildings and those involved in emer-
gency actions following incidents within them.  As a result, the Building Indus-
try Authority has commissioned a number of risk studies as well as a generic
risk-model. This model requires all risk projects carried out by or for the Au-
thority to conform to a set framework and to meet certain criteria and
standards.
Another recent development has been the setting up of the Environmental Risk
Management Authority (ERMA).  For all applications under the Hazardous
Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, each type of hazard, which could
arise from the introduction of a hazardous substance or new organism, will be
assessed for the type and level of risk posed.
At local level, the granting of resource consents under the Resource Manage-
ment Act 1991 increasingly require the applicants to carry out a formal risk
assessment of the undertaking in question to determine its likely effect on the
environment.  Although consenting authorities appear to be moving towards
the use of risk-based standards of performance, there are no formal criteria for
deciding what is safe.  Authorities have tended to bring down conservative
decisions influenced by earlier deterministic requirements, as the history of the
consent processes for liquefied natural gas storage facilities has illustrated.  The
full benefits of the use of  risk-based standards has yet to be obtained.
Business Issues
Risk is often conceived as the flip side of opportunity or gain.  In business, this
is often true, although these two aspects of a course of action are often not
directly linked.  Armed with a good understanding of risks, it is usually possi-
ble to reduce these without restricting the available opportunities.  Even a sim-
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ple awareness of all the risks can be enough to contain and reduce them, and
thus tip the balance of an activity towards reward.  Risk management is a key
element of any organisation.  Failure to put in place some appropriate form of
risk-management protocols and procedures within the organisation is now
viewed negatively within business circles and by investors.
Organisations tend to hide unpleasant news, with the causes of failure obscured
by management.  Investigations need to delve deeply, particularly when the
risks seem to be high or uncertain.  Companies have often paid dearly after
suffering an incident they were not prepared for or had not put appropriate
resources into mitigating.  The costs of not carrying out a formal systematic
review of one’s risks and then implementing suitable risk-reduction policies
and procedures can be high.
On the other hand, large savings can be achieved, as claimed by one Califor-
nian brewing company that implemented a risk-reduction programme prior to
the incidence of a large earthquake which would have resulted in a substantial
loss if no action had been taken2.  The company is reported to have saved over
US$750 million as a result of spending US$17 million on a risk reduction pro-
gramme implemented before the 1994 Northridge earthquake. No major inju-
ries were suffered by their employees and they were, unlike the surrounding
industry, back in full production within seven days.
Formal Risk Management
All those in positions of management, whether they are aware of it or not, are
making qualitative risk-based judgements every day.  Without formal risk train-
ing, most of these decisions will be skewed towards avoidance of incidents of
high consequence or those likely to be known or have been seen.  The extent of
risk-taking would depend upon a person’s natural level of aversion and phi-
losophy.
However, it is now possible to be systematic and consistent, thus improving the
chance of identifying the unexpected.  Being consistent allows rational deci-
sion-making over time and across an organisation’s structure.  For large organi-
sations, with a number of sub-structures, this last point is important as many
aspects of risk, such as technical, financial, insurance and political issues, need
to be considered.
Risk management is an ongoing aspect of good management and needs to be
integrated into the activities of the organisation.  The management of risks
should not be seen as a simple one-off activity in which some risk consultants
come in, set up a risk register, quote from some standard or text, and then de-
part.  Effective risk management takes continual effort in developing a culture
in which people are trained to think about risk in making decisions; the risk
analysis must be thorough, responses to events and crises need to worked out,
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and standard emergency and contingency plans need to be put in place.  An
organisation’s risk profile will change over time, so the risk management needs
to be live, ongoing and aware of developments, often under the guidance of a
risk committee. Case Study 2.1 describes an example of effective risk manage-
ment. (An analogous series of events occurred in the failures of the electricity
supply to Auckland’s central business district in early 1998.)
Case Study 2.1 Reliability of a Power Supply (Bermingham, 1999 pers. comm.)
A failure of one of a number of important power supplies to a large industrial site led
to a meeting of the site’s risk management committee.  Based on the high risks associ-
ated with further failures and the yet-unknown causes, it was decided that, despite the
significant disruption to customers and the attendant risks, all other supplies would be
limited to 80% full load.  This was considered necessary as, until investigations proved
otherwise, the root cause of the failure could be common to all the supplies.
In the event, the root cause of failure was soon found to be associated with a new type
of overload trip fitted to most of the supply transformers, which could not cope with a
recent long period of unusually warm weather.  Transformers fitted with the older type
of trip were immediately cleared for full-load operation, and the others only after
modification and testing.
In the absence of knowledge coming from earlier formal risk studies and appropriate
emergency operating procedures for this type of event, the site’s management might
have decided to maintain full load on the other supplies. This policy would have been
dictated by the requirement to meet the customer’s immediate needs, thus increasing
the chance that these units would have failed subsequently with the progressive degra-
dation of the whole system. A lack of understanding would have hindered the manage-
ment of the event.
This example demonstrates that a risk-based approach to management can reduce the
risks associated with failures by forearming the operators and decision-makers with
the knowledge to react correctly to failures, as well as to mitigate to prevent them.
Consultants do have a role in bringing fresh eyes into an organisation, and help-
ing update current risk-management structures.  They are good for auditing
peer-review roles, as well as being involved in novel and one-off studies.  How-
ever, when they leave, the organisation needs to have an ongoing structure flex-
ible enough to serve for the years to come in a rapidly changing business envi-
ronment.
Risk management, like any tool, can be abused.  It is not a matter of measuring
risk, using a formula to decide whether something is safe or not, of slavishly
obeying a prescription.  There is no such thing as absolute assurance or safety.
Things can and do go wrong; losses will be suffered.  The future cannot be
predicted, but bets can be hedged.
Risk Identification, Assessment and Treatment
An organisation cannot seek assurance through ignorance, on the grounds that
11
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it is better to be unaware of risks than to treat them.  Ignorance is no defence
and the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 requires employers to en-
sure that there are effective methods for systematically identifying, assessing
and reducing hazards in the workplace.  Moreover, the Resource Management
Act 1991 requires that organisations put in place good environmental practices,
which demand the identification and treatment of risks.
Any organisation is constrained by available resources.  A proper risk assess-
ment, however, enable the risks to be systematically ranked, and tackled in a
logical order to drive down the total risk as quickly and as effectively as possi-
ble.  The goal is to achieve continuous improvement in risk identification, as-
sessment and treatment.
If the organisation has a risk-management plan and is implementing it within
all practical limitations, then this is a suitable defence if an accident does hap-
pen. The principle, As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP), is now the ac-
cepted underpinning of much legislation.
Standards
The Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management
provides a generic guide for the establishment and implementation of a risk-
management process.  This involves establishing the context and identifica-
tions of the risks, their analysis, evaluation, treatment, communication and on-
going monitoring.  Risk management is recognised by the Standard as an inte-
gral part of good management practice.  It is an iterative process consisting of
steps, which, when undertaken in sequence, enable a continual improvement in
decision-making to take place.  The whole process of risk management, then,
can be depicted within quadrants of risk identification, analysis, evaluation and
treatment, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Another view, Figure 2.2, illustrates that risk communication is central to this
process and takes place in all stages. The advantage of this generic Australian/
New Zealand Standard is that it provides a structure that all professions can
relate to.  Those interested in finance, insurance, the environment or technol-
ogy within a given organisation must speak the same language and work within
a common reference frame which enhances communication.  Use of this Stand-
ard as a template for management enables this to be done.
The publication of the AS/NZ 4360 in revised form in 1999 was predated by the
appearance of AS/NZS 3931:1998 Risk analysis of technological systems - Ap-
plications Guide, the object of which is to provide guidelines for selecting and
implementing risk-analysis techniques.  It also gives a useful summary of the
established tools relating to technical safety and reliability analysis, but does
not give detailed prescriptions of how such analyses should be carried out.
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Figure 2.1:  The “seven seas” of engineering-risk management
(after Beer 1998, pers. comm., with modification)
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Figure 2.2: The centrality of risk communication
(Bermingham, 1999 pers. comm.)
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At the time of writing in late 1999, an Environmental Risk Management Guide
was being prepared by a joint Australian/New Zealand Standards Committee to
provide an explanation of how the generic Standard can be applied to develop
environmental risk-management policies.  This Guide notes that environmental
risks can be grouped into two types: the risk to the environment from the activi-
ties of an organisation; and the risk to the organisation from environment-re-
lated issues, including the risks of non-compliance with existing or future leg-
islation.  Both aspects are covered by this Guide.
General guidelines to establish good occupational health and safety systems in
the workplace are given in the joint Australasian Standard AS/NZS 4804:1997
Occupational health and safety management systems - General guidelines on
principles, systems and supporting techniques.  Conforming to this Standard
requires an organisation not only to take account of legal requirements under
the 1992 Act, but also it has a programme of “continual improvement”.  Since
there are differences in the Australian and New Zealand legislative and regula-
tory frameworks, a new standard has been published as a New Zealand Stand-
ard only: NZS 4801 (Int): 1999 Occupational health and safety management
systems - Specification with guidance for use.  This Standard provides an audit
tool so organisations can have their system certified against a recognised stand-
ard or it may be used as an internal check on current practices and procedures.
Workplace-risk management is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
There are a number of international standards and guides.  The joint Australa-
sian standard has its counterpart in the Canadian Standards Association’s pub-
lication Risk Management: Guideline for Decision-Makers CAN/CSA-
Q850:1997.  The British Standard BS 8800 gives a guide to occupational health
and safety-management systems.  It builds on the earlier standards such as BS
5750:1987 on the principles of quality assurance and BS 7750:1992 Specifica-
tion for Environmental Management Systems.  These have their international
counterparts in AS/NZS ISO 9001 on quality and AS/NZS ISO 14001 on envi-
ronmental management, respectively.  A further international standard, ISO
14971, deals with the application of risk analysis in the management of medical
devices.
A number of bodies in the United States produce a significant amount of infor-
mation and guidance in fields relating to risk.  In particular, the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency (USEPA) is often cited in works relating to environ-
mental effects and associated health risks.  Unfortunately, the American use of
a number of terms such as “risk assessment” differs from that in the joint Aus-
tralasian Standard and many other international standards, and confusion can
arise if US-based procedures are employed, which invariably adopt American
terminology that is different from local usage.  This book follows AS/NZS
4360:1999 in its use of language.
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Overview of AS/NZS 4360
An overview of the main elements of the risk-management process, as set out
in AS/NZS 4360, is shown in Figure 2.3, and elaborated in Figure 2.4 .
From Figures 2.3 and 2.4, it can be seen that the risk-management process
consists of establishing the context; identifying, analysing, evaluating and treat-
ing the risks;  monitoring and reviewing the performance of the management
system and changes that may affect it.  The Standard notes that it is vital to
communicate and consult with both internal and external stakeholders, as ap-
propriate at each stage, as well as concerning the process as a whole.  This
process can be applied at many levels in an organisation, to its strategy as well
as its operations, and can be tailored in detail to a given organisational scale.  It
may be applied to specific projects or in the management of recognised specific
areas of risk.
1 Establishing the context.  The initial step is establishing the strategic con-
text, the relationship between the organisation and its environment, through
identifying the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and
threats.  This context includes all aspects of the organisation’s functions,
not merely its engineering or technological aspects.  At this stage, the vari-
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Figure 2.3: Risk-management overview (AS/NZS 4360: 1999)
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Figure 2.4: Risk-management process (AS/NZS 4360: 1999)
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ous interested and affected parties or “stakeholders”, both internal and
external to the organisation, would be identified and policies to communi-
cate with them developed.  Successful communication demands that each
participant understands what the other is saying and there is goodwill to
achieve an agreed outcome.  The organisational context should be estab-
lished, to understand the organisation’s mode of operation and capabili-
ties, as well as its strategic goals.  Failure to meet the specific objects of
the proposed activity or project should be one of the set of risks to be
managed.  Organisational policy will define the criteria for setting risk
targets, whether a given risk is acceptable or not, and forms the basis of
risk-treatment options.  Finally, the activity or project would be divided
into a set of elements to provide a logical framework for later identifica-
tion and analysis of risks.
The scope of a risk study can be visualised in terms of an input/output
diagram, as shown in Figure. 2.5.  The inputs are the range of hazards to be
defined, while the outputs are the types of risks that are of interest.
RISK STUDY
Loss of image/standing
Legal liability
Other risks
Natural hazards
Political factors
Other hazards
Technical hazards
Human activities
Business uncertainties
Technical risks
Environmental risks
Financial risks
Figure. 2.5: Establishing the scope
(after Bermingham 1999, pers. comm., with modification)
2 Risk identification, analysis and evaluation.  These aspects are considered
in greater detail in Chapters 4 to 6.  It is important to adopt a well-struc-
tured systematic process for the identification of risks, since an unidenti-
fied potential risk is excluded from any analysis.  The survey should in-
clude all risks, whether under the control of the organisation or not.  The
aim is to generate a list of events that might affect each part of the activity
or project, their possible causes and scenarios.
Once the set of risks has been identified, the next stage is to rank the risks,
to determine those that can be tolerated and those that must be treated.
The analyses would consider the likelihood and consequences of an event
should it happen, in the context of existing controls or mitigating meas-
ures.  Sources of information for this work include past records and expe-
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rience, engineering or other models, expert judgments and failure databanks.
The analysis may be undertaken to various degrees of refinement, depend-
ing upon the risk data available and the significance of the identified risk.
Such analyses may thus range from simple qualitative assessments to de-
tailed quantitative estimates based on engineering-failure models.  Since
some of the estimates made in such quantitative analyses are imprecise, a
sensitivity analysis should be carried out to test the effects of changes of
assumptions and data.  Finally, the risks are evaluated in terms of the ear-
lier-set criteria or targets.
In analysing risk, it is useful to bring together people with differing back-
grounds at this stage, each viewing the world in differing ways.  Our life
and professional experiences shape the way we think.  In many cases, it is
person-to-person communication, person-to-machine and person-to-envi-
ronment interaction, which provide the commonest sources of risk.  Or-
ganisational hierarchies can attenuate knowledge of the actual operating
conditions, with higher levels of the organisation being unaware of risks,
while organisational change can cause a loss of corporate/institutional
memory.
A good example of a lack of knowledge about the risks of operation as
decision-makers became progressively removed from day-to-day opera-
tions is provided by the Presidential Commission established to inquire
into the cause of the space-shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986. (The de-
tailed background to the failure is given in Case Study 2.2.)  The Commis-
sion concluded that the decision to launch was flawed because those who
made the decisions were unaware of the history of problems with unreli-
able seals in the booster rocket, as well as the contractor’s advice not to
launch at low ambient temperatures.  Even the contractor’s technical man-
agers appeared to lack a full understanding of the likelihood of failure,
which was known only at the technician level amongst those assembling
the booster rocket.
The multilevel management structure, in which the highest levels were
removed from the workface, is illustrated in Figure. 2.6. The cause of this
lack of knowledge of management, both at Levels I and II, about the risks
of the operation was found to be the tenuous management structures.
The likelihood of risks can be conveniently plotted on a graph with loga-
rithmic axes, as shown in Figure 2.7, which is often called the risk profile.
This representation greatly simplifies the visualisation of relative risks,
and the setting of boundaries between intolerable ones and those that might
be considered negligible.  There is a broad band where risks fall in a region
that risks might be considered tolerable for the time being, but where the
organisation is obliged to reduce these to “as low as reasonably possible”,
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Case Study 2.2 Failure of Risk Communication: the Challenger Disaster
(a) Summary of Events
The cause of the tragic Challenger accident on 28 January 1986, when a space-shuttle rocket
booster exploded after lift-off, was systematically traced to a faulty design of an O-ring seal.
The flight began in the late morning (11.38 am) and ended 73 seconds later in an explosive
burn of hydrogen and oxygen propellants that destroyed the external fuel tank and exposed
the space-shuttle to severe aerodynamic forces that caused complete structural break-up. All
seven crew members perished.
The explosion was found to have been caused by hot combustion gases that escaped from a
booster via a failed field-joint seal. The joint design included two O-rings that did not func-
tion correctly at launch due to the low ambient temperature that prevented them from re-
sponding correctly to the rising pressure after ignition and movement (rotation) within the
joint.
Engineers had held concerns regarding the behaviour of the seals at low temperatures for a
number of years prior to the tragedy occurring and low temperatures were forecast for the
morning of the launch. As noted by Pinkus et al.3, analysis of the records showed that of the
previous 23 launches in which the field-joints had been examined following booster recov-
ery and where data was held, seven showed damage to the O-ring seals. This damage had
only occurred at ambient temperatures below 24˚C and it occurred in all cases where the
temperature was below 18˚C. The lowest temperature recorded was 12˚C.  However, vari-
ous factors, including the management structure of the project, and ultimately time pres-
sures to maintain the space-shuttle programme, created a situation where launch proceeded
despite technical advice to the contrary and at an ambient temperature near to freezing (where
seal damage was very likely to occur).
(b) Technical and Managerial Reasons for the Failure
(Information from the Presidential Commission report, Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.)
Technical Details
The technical cause of the accident was traced to hot gas escaping (known as blow-by)
following the failure of the O-ring pressure seal in a joint of the casing of the booster.  The
failure was due to a faulty design, unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors including,
the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of the seal materials, as well
as the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading. The Shuttle’s solid rocket boosters were
made up of several sub-assemblies; the nose cone, solid rocket motor, and the nozzle assem-
bly. Marshall Space Flight Center was responsible for the solid rocket boosters, while Morton
Thiokol was the contractor for the solid rocket motors.  The boosters are one of a set of
‘elements’ that make up the complete craft.
Each solid rocket motor case is made up of 11 individual weld-free thick-walled steel sec-
tions about 3.5 metres in diameter joined together.  When assembled they form a casing tube
35 metres long.  After partial assembly the propellent is poured (cast) within the casing.
Within each joint two O-ring seals, protected by high-temperature putty, act to contain the
pressure caused during flight by the rapidly burning solid propellent.
The Decision to Launch (refer Figure 2.6)
Although as stated above, the technical cause of the Challenger’s explosion was the result of
a failed O-ring seal, the Presidential Commission tasked with investigating the disaster found
that the underlying cause was rooted in organisational failures and poor communication.
Prior to the launch of this flight, the procedures of the Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR)
were carried out in accordance with normal procedures.  However, concerns of Level III
NASA personnel, and element contractors, regarding the joint seals of the Solid Rocket
Motors were not adequately communicated to the NASA Level I and II management re-
sponsible for the launch. The Level I and Level II managers were unaware that the O-rings
had been designated a “Criticality 1” feature – a term denoting a failure point, without back-
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up, that could cause a loss of life or vehicle if the component fails. This component had
previously been designated “Criticality 1R” – the R implying redundancy.  The R was re-
moved when it became understood that the secondary O-ring was unlikely to seal if the
primary O-ring failed.
The Level I and Level II managers were also unaware that since July 1985 a launch con-
straint had been imposed and then for six consecutive flights waived.  The crucial factor
seems to have been that neither the management of Thiokol nor the Marshall Level III
manager believed that the O-ring blow-by and erosion risk was critical.  The testimony and
contemporary correspondence show that Level III believed there was ample margin to fly
with the extent of O-ring erosion that was being experienced, provided the leak check was
performed at an increased pressure.  The fact that the increased test pressure was a contribu-
tor to the increased failure rate in service seems not to have been recognised.  What is clear
is that the NASA Level III managers, and Thiokol management, had no such understanding,
or at least had a different perspective of the failure mechanism to that held by Thiokol’s
engineers.
The Mission Management Team (MMT) postponed the launch scheduled for 27 January
due to high crosswinds.  The MMT met again at 2.00 pm on that day and concerns were
raised about the effect of the forecast low temperatures on such facilities as drains, eye wash
and shower water, and fire suppression systems, but not about the O-rings. When the situa-
tion was relayed to the engineers at Morton Thiokol they were adamant about their concerns
over the low temperature – “….. way below our database and we were way below what we
qualified for …..”.  They contacted Morton Thiokol’s liaison officer at the Kennedy Space
Center, expressed their concern, and requested more forecast temperature data.  He recog-
nised the significance of the concerns and ensured that a teleconference was set up.  This
was in turn followed by a second.
At the second teleconference Morton Thiokol engineers presented the history of O-ring
erosion and blow-by.  Their recommendation was not to launch until the O-ring temperature
reached 53˚F (12˚ C).  A long, detailed, and reportedly not acrimonious discussion fol-
lowed.  Thiokol’s Vice President of Engineering was asked for a recommendation and he
replied that he could not recommend launch.  The Deputy Director, Science and Engineer-
ing at Marshall, was reported to have said he was “appalled” at the recommendation not to
launch. The Manager SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) Project at Marshall was said to have
asked, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?”.  Under this pres-
sure, Thiokol management asked for a recess to consider their recommendation further and
a Thiokol management-level discussion took place.  One of the managers is said to have
remarked that he “took off his engineering hat and put on his management hat”.  The Thiokol
managers seem to have concluded that, although blow-by and erosion was to be expected,
there was no evidence to predict joint failure.  In the lack of such evidence Thiokol with-
drew their recommendation not to launch.  As one of the Thiokol engineers described it,
“This was a meeting where the determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove
beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so.  This is in total reverse to what the
position usually is in a pre-flight conversation or a flight readiness review”.
The launch subsequently took place, with fatal results.
Conclusion
The Presidential Commission concluded that the communication failings that contributed to
the disaster were caused by the complex and ill-conceived management structure in place at
the time (Figure 2.6).  Although a complex programme such as the shuttle will inevitably
involve a complex organisation to manage it, the actual set-up was made unnecessarily com-
plex in response to the lobbying of individual states involved in the US space programme for
their “share of the action”. The Commission found that the management structure led to the
project managers of the various elements of the Shuttle programme feeling more account-
able to their centre management (Institutional Chain in Figure 2.6) than to the Shuttle pro-
gramme organisation (Program Chain in Figure 2.6).  Funding, work package definition and
vital programme information frequently bypassed the Program Manager (Level II).
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Level I
Level II
Level III Level III
Level IVLevel IV
Johnson
NASA Center
Marshall
NASA Center
Institutional Chain
Program Chain
Level I
The associate administrator for Space Flight Oversees budgets for
Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy NASA centers. Responsible for policy,
budgetary and top level technical matters for Shuttle program.
Level II
Manager, National Space Transportation Program. Responsible for
overall supervision of Shuttle program. Provides technical oversight
on behalf of Level I.
Level III
Program managers for Orbiter, Solid Rocket Booster, External Tank and
Space Shuttle Main Engine. Responsible for development, testing and
delivery of hardware to launch site.
Level IV
Contractors for Shuttle elements. Responsible for design and production
of hardware.
(Adapted from Presidential Commission report,
Bermingham 1999, pers. comm.)
Figure 2.6: Management structure for the Shuttle program.
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Figure 2.7:  The  tolerability of risk
the so-called ALARP region.  The risk profile also shows that the greater
the chance of something happening, the less severe is the likely conse-
quence.  This observation leads to two other limits: failures that have a
maximum acceptable frequency of occurrence (because they may fore-
shadow something worse or simply soak up resources), but also there is a
maximum acceptable severity irrespective of the remoteness of the risk.
For both a risk manager dealing with risk in general terms, or a project
engineer investigating specific risks in detail, this process greatly simpli-
fies understanding of the significance of risks. The various boundaries and
limits are shown qualitatively because their values reflect society’s con-
cerns and individual philosophies.  Some of the various suggestions for
setting these limits are considered further in Chapter 6, as well as the back-
ground to the development of the risk profile.
Normally, the frequency or likelihood is measured in terms of the number
of events over a stated period.  In some cases of rare engineering failure,
this time period can be very long for a single event to be witnessed at a
particular site (in hundreds or thousands of years).  The remoteness of
such failures can be obtained by aggregating experience over a number of
sites.
The scale of severity of consequence may relate to harm to persons, facili-
ties, the environment or even business reputation.  One simple scale is
illustrated in Table 2.1
A significant problem faced by management during the evaluation of risks
is the selection of the appropriate next step.  As noted before, some risks
will be clearly unacceptable to an organisation or society, whilst others
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Table 2.1:  A simple severity scale
Event Code Level Value/Harm
Major business
collapse A V 100 000
Major loss of
business B IV 10 000
Major disruption,
customer
dissatisfaction
C III 1000
Disruption to
output,  visible to
public
D II 100
Minor disruption to
output, not visible
to public
E I 10
Minor incident no
direct cost F 0 1
Notes: The scale of cost or harm may be in monetary terms or represent
the magnitude of the effect.
See Case Study 2.3 for the use of such a scale.
will be so small as to be of no concern.  Those that fall in between, in the
so-called ALARP region, will require further analysis and consideration.
Even the sum of individual tolerable risks after treatment may be intoler-
able.  An organisation having a very low risk of failure to an individual
Case Study 2.3  Manufacturing Plant Fire Risk
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy, New Zealand Pharmaceuticals Ltd)
The pharmaceuticals company was considering the fire-protection arrangements at their
plant in Palmerston North.  A risk-based review was seen as offering the best way of
identifying the optimum allocation of resources.
For analysis purposes, the manufacturing site was split into areas (fire cells) and an
inspection of each was carried out by a qualified fire engineer.  The likelihood of a fire
starting in each area was judged and the various fire protection options for each cell or
area identified.  The likelihood assessment was based upon experience as well as pub-
lished fire data.  The company’s Board was separately asked to assess the consequence
on their business should each identified element of the manufacturing plant be either
damaged or destroyed by fire.  This assessment was made against a previously defined
consequence scale similar to Table 2.1.
Despite its relative simplicity and low cost, the study allowed the company to focus
their intended fire protection expenditure in terms of the protection afforded to the busi-
ness.  This is as opposed to a more standard and less systematic assessment of immedi-
ate effect on each asset.
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Step 2
Develop the Organisational Policy
Step 1
Support of Senior Management
Step 3
Communicate the Policy
Step 4
Manage Risks at the Organisational Level
Step 6
Monitor and Review
Step 5
Manage Risks at the Programme, Project
and Team Levels
Figure 2.8: Steps in developing and implementing a risk-management
programme (AS/NZS 4360:1999)
facility or asset may have a frequent incidence of failures if the number of
facilities or assets is large.  The organisation might therefore find itself
defending its operations frequently, at a significant distraction and cost.
3 Risk treatment. Once the range of unacceptable risks has been identified
through the foregoing steps, the various options for treating the remainder
are considered.  These include reducing the likelihood of the risk, or re-
ducing its consequence, or transferring it in full or part.  In engineering
work, the opportunities for simple risk transference are limited.  (One ex-
ample is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to find landfill sites be-
cause of strong public opposition to locating sites “in my back yard”.)
However, the risk may often be avoided altogether by choosing a more
prudent solution to the original problem.
Whenever there are a number of risk-treatment options, the alternatives
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are assessed on the basis of the extent of risk reduction and the additional
benefits or opportunities created, if any.  Responsibility for the implemen-
tation of the selected option should be borne be those best able to control
the risk.  Should there remain a residual risk after treatment, a decision has
to be made whether to accept this risk or consider further risk-reduction
measures.  Since there is societal expectation of ever-increasing standards
of performance and safety, it is most likely that such risk reduction will be
an ongoing process of stepwise improvement.
4 Monitoring and review.  Few risks remain static.  It is necessary to monitor
the residual risks and the effectiveness of the control measures, as well as
the management system set up to supervise the implementation of them.
Risks can change, and control measures can become degraded or anti-
quated with time.  Ongoing review is essential to ensure that the risk-man-
agement plan remains relevant.
The Australian/New Zealand Standard suggests a six-step programme to
implement a risk-management programme, as set out in Figure. 2.8.
5 Communication and consultation.  The Australian/New Zealand Standard
emphasises the need for communication and consultation at all steps in the
risk-management process, with a plan in place at the earliest possible stage
in the process. Perceptions of risks can vary according to differences in
concepts and desires among the various stakeholders. The Standard rec-
ommends that both perceptions of risks and perceptions of benefits be iden-
tified and documented, so that the underlying reasons for them is under-
stood and addressed.
Ongoing Risk Management
The Australian/New Zealand Standard emphasises that risk management is an
ongoing aspect of an organisation’s operations.  Appropriate risk management
is concerned with preventing future loss.  Lack of such management can lead to
sudden and very public failures, with attendant loss of goodwill and costs to the
organisation, as recent major incidents in both Australia and New Zealand have
shown.
Risk management is not an established discipline.  It requires education and
training in techniques, some of which are outlined in the remainder of this book.
Risk management is exercised at all levels in an organisation.  All managers
inherently manage risk in their day-to-day work, so all are responsible at their
own level.  Every decision, at whatever level, whether made by committees or
individuals, carry risk.  Consideration of risk needs to be a natural part of the
decision-making process.  In time, it should become instinctive.
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The world is changing.  This has always been so, but the pace has quickened
and now is more perceptible.  Even when no specific decisions have been made,
the organisation’s risk profile will have changed with time: some risks will fade
away, while others will develop in significance.  The management of risks needs
to be planned, proactive and permanent, whether there exists a specific com-
mittee with particular responsibilities or these are incorporated in other man-
agement groupings.
Risk Analysis as an Engineering Management Tool
The following generic example in Case Study 2.4 demonstrates ways in which
a risk-management programme at the working level can reduce future losses
within an organisation.
As noted by Peet and Ryan4 in their description of the risk-management system
for a rail network, from a business perspective, one of the main purposes of
integrated risk management is that it provides a framework for making difficult
decisions.  Such a management process provides opportunities for improve-
ment and for minimising potential failures.  Rail networks are subject to exter-
nal threats, such as those from storm and earthquake, as well as more controlla-
ble internal failures of people, systems and equipment.
Case Study 2.4  A Risk Management System for a Rail Network
Peet and Ryan4 cite three case studies of risk assessment that formed part of developing
the overall risk management of the network for Tranz Rail.
1. Collision between trains.  Both the signalling system and the people involved in the
operation of the railway are key parts of the safety systems that prevent collisions be-
tween trains.  The commonest approach to controlling train movements is to use col-
oured-light signals that instruct the train driver: red to stop, yellow for caution and
green to proceed.  On lower-trafficked lines, no colour signals are used, as authority to
occupy a section of the line is given by warrants transmitted by radio or line phone by a
train controller.  A verification procedure is used to control the risks of wrong commu-
nication.  While automatic line systems have interlocking capability to prevent dual
authority to enter a given section, they do not give the train controller any ability to
change the signal-light setting.  Centralised train-control systems have computer-aided
checks to ensure that conflicting warrants to occupy lines are not given.  The network is
a complex interactive system involving drivers on opposite or overtaking trains, the
train controller and physical systems such as signalling equipment and vigilance de-
vices in locomotive cabs.  Equipment may fail to operate correctly due to technical
defects or be overridden, while the operating staff can fail due to fatigue, distraction,
sickness or poor judgment.
To assess what was important and what was not, the risk assessment was broken down
into two parts: the understanding of the risks of running trains, and determining which
of those risks were affected by different signalling systems.  This evaluation was under-
taken by bringing together a group of people with a varied experience of the working of
26
Management of Engineering Risk
the railway.  The next stage was the development of a risk matrix of likelihood and
consequence.  In assessing the likelihood of events, it is often hard for experienced staff
and lay persons alike to make a judgment and to compare different descriptions of re-
moteness.  The greatest value of a risk matrix is to sort risks into broad bands of risk
level. In this case, the matrix approach was able to illustrate the relative significance of
the risks; but, due to the coarseness of the method, it was not useful for understanding
any differences in signalling systems.  However, the method was entirely adequate as a
scoping study to compare drivers’ risks as part of a wider study of risks borne by all
employees.
A more detailed study required modelling the fault and failure-propagation process with
techniques such as fault-tree analysis.  Such methods are outlined in Chapter 5.  These
methods involve determining the structure of incidents and looking how the various
components interrelate and interact, whether human, systemic or hardware-related.  A
fault tree can be developed at various levels of detail, enabling the quality of the safety
procedures to be ascertained.  Historic data on failure rates of components and experi-
ence of human reliability can then used with the fault-propagation model to estimate the
likely frequency of the particular event of concern, in this case, the chance of a collision
of two trains.  The answer could be checked by “benchmarking” intermediate failure
events with actual known rates from incident databases.
2. Transport of hazardous goods.  In this case, a study was undertaken to gain a general
understanding of those parts of the network that handles hazardous materials and the
types and quantities of goods transported.  The study was to describe the main hazards
presented in this traffic, and thus make preliminary recommendations for its risk man-
agement.  The work was broken down into five parts: classifying the types of goods
handled; identifying accident scenarios; defining the range of impacts from possible
incidents; assessing the pathways and consequences of these incidents; and finally, as-
sessing the relative risk level.  The focus was on leak or loss of containment.  Generic
kinds of accidents were identified, such as derailment or collision, and then the failure
modes by which these events might take place, like track or point failure.  The failure
modes were further broken down to find the prime causes.  Three different scales were
developed, with each scale assigned a range from 1 to 6.  The first scale was one of
likely frequency based on experience; the second was a scale of consequence to people,
the environment and property and the third assessed the likely magnitude of cumulative
effects for accidents that happened repetitively.  The total risk or outcome was assessed
by multiplying the likelihood and consequence scores and adding the cumulative effect
score.  The sensitivity of the result was tested by using different weightings on the input
scores.
The results were used to assign priority for follow-up action.  The proposed measures
included a review of incident-reporting systems to enhance the quality of information;
refresher training for operating staff in handling and administration of hazardous goods;
and a safety audit of the handling of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from loading to
empty return of railtanks to customers.  The risk-management strategy focussed on en-
suring compliance with all aspects of approved procedures.
3. Single-manning risks.  At the time when electric locomotives were being introduced
on the North Island Main Trunk (NIMT) between Palmerston North and Hamilton in
the mid-1980’s, it was decided to assess the risk of changing from two-man crews to
single manning.  The accidents to a driver include collisions, overturning and derail-
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Tranz Rail has used formal risk-assessment techniques for over a decade to
develop a culture of risk awareness within the company.  Experience gained
from the various projects have included the following:
• Pulling together small groups of respected staff and specialist experts un-
der the leadership of a risk-assessment manager has been a powerful means
of raising this awareness.
• The scoping phase of a risk assessment is often enough to rank and prioritise
the allocation of resources efficiently for alternative courses of action within
given risk targets.
• Quantification of issues reduces emotion from discussions and can be a
powerful decision-making aid for management, especially whenever the
results are combined with the cost consequences of various actions.
• Quantified risk assessments show the various contributors to the risk and
their interaction.  While sensitivity studies can be done on some of the
more critical elements to understand better the range of likely outcomes,
the use of extreme values for component reliability, in an attempt to show
the robustness of the model, leads to unnecessarily lengthy explanations to
gain a balanced perspective.
• Development of failure-propagation models, such as fault trees, requires
considerable work to ensure that all possible sources of risk are accounted
for.  Data for the fault trees require considerable research and are often not
in the right form or lack consistency or completeness.
• It is likely that at some stage, given enough time, a significant accident
will occur that is likely to draw media attention.  Communicating, under-
standing and use of the results of risk assessments by third parties remain
a problem.  Risk-assessment techniques alone are no substitute for sound
management practice involving quality assurance of the existing systems
needed to control the operation.
ments.  Not only are there risks while driving but there are external risks in breakdowns
or emergencies, particularly as a significant number of services were run at night.  For
each kind of accident, a fault tree was developed that incorporated mechanical, proce-
dural and human-failure elements.  Data were generated from experience, estimation,
sampling, surveys and expert opinion, including industrial psychologists.  Rough rela-
tive comparisons could be made with other industries by comparing fatal accident rates
(FAR), as described in Chapter 6.  The results suggested that the risk level to train
drivers was lower than many occupational groups in the company and in other indus-
tries.  It was considered  that the risk assessment was a significant factor in the company
being able to negotiate an industrial agreement incorporating single manning of loco-
motives.
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Case Study 2.5  Setting of an Environmental Risk Bond
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy Watercare Services Ltd and the
Auckland Regional Council)
The resource consents associated with the major upgrade of the Mangere wastewater
treatment plant in Auckland were extensive.  Amongst the conditions was the require-
ment that an environmental risk evaluation be undertaken to determine the level of bond
to be lodged in favour of the Auckland Regional Council.  The plant owners, Watercare
Services Ltd, commissioned a risk evaluation both to aid environmental management of
the plant and to establish the level of environmental risk in financial terms.
The particular requirements of the consent were:
a) Identification of the potential environmental risks arising from any failure to com-
ply with the condition of consent;
b) Measurement of those risks;
c) The costs of remedying or mitigating any adverse environmental effects which may
arise from such failure; and
d) Evaluation of an appropriate sum to adequately provide for such remediation of
those risks.
Due to the size and complexity of the waste-treatment plant, the risk evaluation used a
“bottom-up” approach.  This ensured that all sources of risk were identified.  A quanti-
tative methodology was developed that allowed each fault sequence to be analysed and
the associated costs of repair and environmental clean-up to be calculated.  Due to the
different nature of the risks during construction and operation, two separate but related
studies were completed for these phases in the project.
The risk model was designed to allow differing conditions and assumptions to be con-
sidered and to enable a sensitivity analysis to be undertaken.  The model outputs in-
cluded the
• Repair and clean-up costs of the each incident,
• identification of the highest cost incidents,
• a quantification of the risks associated with each incident,
• the total environmental risk expressed in dollars per year.
Where the effects could compound, the associated events were combined to ensure that
the calculated costs would include all remedial actions.  In additional an allowance was
included to cover other costs such as post-clean-up monitoring to confirm the effective-
ness of remedial actions.
Watercare Services Ltd and the Regional Council initially started the exercise with sig-
nificantly differing expectations of the appropriate level of a bond.  However, the study
enabled the two parties to quickly negotiate a bond value that was based upon the as-
sessed environmental risk, as opposed to any previously perceived but unquantified
level of risk.
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Nature of Risk3
The Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard describes risk as the
chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is
measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.  It may be an event, action
or lack of action. Risk stems largely from uncertainty, as noted in Chapter 1.
With financial risk, this uncertainty arises out of the unknowable future with
the vagaries of the market and political change.  With technical risk, this uncer-
tainty relates to the probabilistic nature of certain failure sequences happening.
The outcome is nearly always unwelcome or unwanted.  Yet risk adds spice to
life.  The risk of things going wrong focuses our minds and spurs us to plan
with greater forethought.  On the other hand, things may go right, and we may
benefit beyond our wildest dreams.
The above definition of risk is consistent with much current international prac-
tice and is broad enough to encompass most sectors and professions.  There are
many other variants.  McNamee and Selim1 give five different interpretations,
and from the viewpoint of auditors decided on the following definition: risk is
a concept used to express uncertainty about events and/or their outcomes that
could have a material effect on the goals of the organisation.
According to Elms2, risk has three aspects:
• the chance of the undesired event happening;
• the consequence should it do so, and
• the context in which the hazard might be realised.
There may be a chance of rain; the effect on us depends upon the standard of
rainwear we have, and whether we are indoors or outside at the time it is rain-
ing.  These three aspects govern the risk that we will get wet.
The Australian/New Zealand Standard recommends that the context in which a
risk occurs should be established before the risks are identified and assessed.
This consideration defines the framework within which the risk is to be man-
aged and provides guidance for later more detailed risk-management studies,
as noted in the previous Chapter.  Too narrow a scope would result in hazards
and their risks being overlooked, while one too wide or ill-defined would waste
resources and detract from the core issues.
We differentiate between a hazard and its associated risk.  A logging truck in
the forest may be regarded as a hazard, since there is a possibility that the truck
will overturn, spilling its load.  A hazard is thus a situation that in particular
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circumstances will lead to harm; it is the source of the risk.  Before we can say
anything about the risk of such an incident, we need to know something about
the frequency (likely rate) of spills and the possible consequences (the harm
and cost of damage) should they happen. Therefore, the risk of a particular
hazard happening is a function of frequency and consequence, that is:
risk = f (frequency, consequence)hazard
The lack of differentiation between a hazard and the risk of its appearance can
lead to a wrong analysis.  For example, corrosion of a pipe may be considered
to be a hazard in the containment of a fluid, but the consequential appearance of
a hole is not; this is the resultant event.  Listing “hole-in-pipe” as a hazard
would amount to double counting in this case.
Safety may be regarded as the inverse of risk; that is:
safety = 1/ (risk).
For this reason, a safety analysis is often concerned with determining the level
of risk. A thing is safe if the risk is very small.  Risk is never zero, neither is
safety perfect. Safety measures reduce the risk by diminishing the likelihood of
the hazard occurring and/or by interposing blocking or mitigating features to
decrease the potential impact of the hazard.  One needs to maintain a perspec-
tive.  Excessive obsession with eliminating risk can make us nervous wrecks,
and hinder development and opportunity.  Like Hamlet: do we rather bear those
ills we have than fly to others that we know not of?
The risk function is not a simple one.  If the consequence is small, we often
disregard the risk as being negligible.  However, even if the frequency is very
small, but the consequence very large, we often still consider the situation to
pose a threat, or have a large risk.  The debate on the safety of nuclear-powered
warship visits to New Zealand ports focused on this issue, between those who
pointed to the multiple safeguards and the extremely remote likelihood of a
major incident happening and those who pointed to the far-reaching and disas-
trous consequences should it do so.
These definitions are given qualitatively, since we have no absolute standards
of what is large or what is small; there is no standard yardstick against which to
measure risk.  We can, nevertheless, compare risk levels and rank hazards, and
the development of suitable risk criteria is considered in Chapter 6.
Risks can take many forms.  Some of these aspects that an engineer may face
will now be examined.
Technical Risk
Technical risk is a major but not the sole component of engineering risk, which
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includes other aspects such as commercial, organisational, political and social
factors. It arises because of the likelihood of failure in the design, construction
and operation of engineering systems and their components.  All systems have
some probability of failure, and a prime objective of engineers, when consider-
ing reliability, is  the reduction in the incidence and impact of failures to levels
that society appears to tolerate and businesses can bear.
The pace of modern industrial growth and technological development has
brought problems which have given rise to debate and conflict on issues such
as environmental degradation, resource and energy use, and the impact of toxic
substances3.  Developments are on a larger scale than hitherto, and economic
considerations can often limit the full evaluation of possible effects of new
work.  The probability of fire in an industrial building increases with the size4.
The complexity of projects, involving numerous teams and subcontractors, di-
lutes individual responsibility and increases the difficulty of monitoring by public
inspectorates.  There are many ways in which something can go wrong, but
there is usually only one way that is right, and it is difficult to foresee all the
potential problems before commencing a large project.
Problems and projects are becoming more complex, yet there are fewer techni-
cal staff to cope with them than formerly. Workers have been reduced in number
to the minimum to look after and operate increasingly sophisticated equipment.
Hard-pressed engineers may have difficulty in keeping abreast of the technical
literature in their speciality, and their managers must be aware of developments
over an even wider field.  The chance of a mistake slipping though would seem
to be greater.  There is some evidence of this.  A 1990 survey5 of losses in the
chemical and petroleum industries noted that the eight large losses recorded in
the previous year were about 2.5 times the average of 87 other losses recorded
over the years from 1960 to 1987, when measured in inflation-adjusted dollar
values.
The basic technical risks of a project not only relate to the incorporation of new
ideas and technology that have not been fully tried and tested for the particular
application; they also hinge on the limitations of strength and resistance of
embodied materials and structures to withstand the environmental and operat-
ing conditions, as well as the ability to cope with the unforeseen or unknowable
deviations that may arise from time to time.  A numerical estimate may be made
regarding such risks.  A structure built to a particular specification will have a
calculable chance of collapse in an earthquake of given intensity.  A high-pres-
sure storage vessel for a flammable liquid will have a computable chance of
failure in an engulfing fire for a given set of safety features and construction
standards.  Whether such technical risks of failure will be realised in practice
depends upon various human factors: the accuracy of the specification, the quality
of fabrication of the vessel and care in the installation, maintenance and opera-
tion of it thereafter.  In this sense, the fundamental technical risk represents the
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best that can be hoped for.  The realised technical risk will always be somewhat
greater because of these human factors.
A better understanding of engineering fundamentals, with enhanced and more
precise design methods, have enabled engineers to work within ever-closer tol-
erances.  Failures are then more likely to be sudden, with little warning.  We
need to know what margin of error we have, and have some quantitative “feel”
for the remoteness of the embodied hazards. Methods for estimating technical
risks are outlined in Chapter 5.
In some cases, investigation of past failures, such as those of box-girder bridges6,
provides an understanding of modes of failure.  In general, the potential for
grave consequences as a result from engineering mishaps is sufficiently great
for it to be unacceptable to wait to gain information from disasters. The less
commonly-observed failures are thus estimated from more frequently witnessed
breakdowns and upsets by synthesising possible pathways to failure.  When-
ever there are a large number of triggering events, the uncertainty in the esti-
mate of the ultimate outcome is relatively small: whereas, whenever a large
number of mitigating or protective features are introduced to reduce the inci-
dence of a hazard, the calculation of the outcome is relatively uncertain (al-
though it may be remote)7.  By the nature of things, we can only be very certain
about events when they happen frequently.
Computer-related Risks
Computer-related risks produce particular kinds of technical risk.  Increasingly,
and in some cases exclusively, engineers rely on computer software to under-
take their design calculations as well as to control systems.  The power of these
design tools can easily seduce practitioners to make estimates beyond the range
of variables and conditions for which the software has been derived. Moreover,
such embedded limitations may not be explicit or clear in the documentation,
even if still available to the engineer.  The numerical calculations may be lengthy,
and impracticable to confirm by alternative hand calculations.  It is often diffi-
cult for an inexperienced engineer to know whether an obtained answer is real-
istic or not.  In the case of new technology or the analysis of infrequent events,
there may not be corporate experience (or institutional memory) either.  Some
common sources of error in the computer-aided design of process plants is given
by the Institution of Chemical Engineers in their 1987 guide to the responsibil-
ity of engineers for their computer-based decisions.
Intelligent and computer-aided systems for control and monitoring are almost
universal in engineered plant and facilities.  Such systems may involve com-
plex network arrangements and remote sensing of equipment status, with the
minimum opportunity for manual intervention.  Errors can arise if the software
engineer does not fully understand the plant or process, or the practising engi-
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neer is unfamiliar with the program and its diagnostic tools because of their
complexity.  In-house programs, being familiar to their originators, can often
suffer from inadequate documentation for others to follow, with attendant risk
of misinterpretation of the designer’s intent.
Kletz8 relates one amusing incident involving computer control: one night, at
the end of summer time, a process operator put back the clock on the plant’s
computer one hour.  The computer then shut down the plant for an hour until
the clock caught up with the program!
Even highly-developed, safety-critical software can fail. A board of inquiry
into the loss of an early Arian 5 rocket, which was traced to a simple software
error, ruled that all software should be assumed to be faulty unless proven oth-
erwise (New Scientist, 28 July 1996).
Even elementary errors can creep in.  A review board, in the release of its find-
ings into the break-up of the first interplanetary weather satellite in the Martian
atmosphere, attributed the loss to a “systems-engineering failure” (The
Christchurch Press, 2 October 1999).  Apparently, in making a key change to
the spacecraft’s trajectory, one team used Imperial measurement units and an-
other the SI system!
System and Management-related Risks
Often in inquiries set up to determine the technical reason for an accident, the
underlying cause of the incident is some management or system breakdown.
• On an offshore gas platform in the North Sea (Piper Alpha), the failure of
one shift to inform the following shift that some maintenance was being
done led to a sequence of failures causing a gas explosion which ultimately
resulted in the complete destruction of the platform itself.
• At Seaview near Wellington, a weakness in engineering infrastructure
resulted in a lack of understanding of the hazards of heating together two
immiscible liquids in an oil re-refining process.  Oil and water separated in
a vessel after a shut-down, resulting in a steam explosion which caused a
fire that gutted the whole works.
• The failure of a viewing platform at Cave Creek on the West Coast was
as much a management-system failure as a serious deficiency in the engi-
neering design and construction procedures.
Management-related risks are seldom obvious to managers.  Over the last dec-
ade, there have been significant changes in management structure, with smaller
in-house engineering teams.  No longer are there large Government depart-
ments within which there is retained significant engineering experience built
up over a long period. The changes have brought about a corporate (or institu-
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tional) memory loss that has not been entirely replaced by external consulting
services or through computerised records.  Only people have active memories,
and when they move on or out, they take this knowledge and their experience
with them.
However, the “memory” of an organisation may be improved, as Kletz9 sug-
gests, by using formal information systems to remind operating staff of poten-
tial hazards in their work and to record the past history of equipment operabil-
ity for the benefit of maintenance crews. To warn us of problems, the loss of
corporate/institutional memory means that we must now depend more heavily
on adequate formal records and the reliability of automatic monitoring and
surveillance systems.  There is less direct human insight.  Yet, at the same time,
stricter planning and safety controls insist on minimal risk to the environment
and to people.
Moreover, our systems have become more complex and interdependent.  Econo-
mies of scale have seen huge increases in production rates at single facilities.
The growth of dairy factories from many small farmers’ co-operative enter-
prises to a few large milk-processing plants is an example of this trend.  Milk is
transported (at some risk) over many kilometres by tanker-trailers by road to
these huge plants in which several megalitres of milk are converted daily into a
range of products involving advanced process technology.  Milk-powder plants,
for instance, were formerly operated at relatively low temperatures with single-
stage dryers.  Today, much higher inlet-air temperatures are used, fine powder
is recirculated to get larger particles, and the drying is undertaken in two or
three stages with the partially dried powder being conveyed in warm air.  The
risk of a serious dust explosion is much enhanced, requiring greater skill in the
design and operation of the plant than before to maintain safe working condi-
tions.
Environmental and Ecological Risk
Environmental risk refers to threats to the world surrounding a particular activ-
ity or facility. Ecological risk refers to threats to particular ecosystems.  When
developments were small, ill effects were only local in impact.  There was al-
ways an escape to an unsullied environment.  Indeed, the belching chimney and
the waste tip were once viewed as a sign of industrial progress!  Today, our
activities are on such a scale that ill effects cross national boundaries:
• the fall-out from a fractured nuclear power station in the Ukraine rained
over much of Europe;
• the gas-borne pollutants from Britain’s coal-fired power stations land in
Scandinavia;
• the smoke from forest fires in Indonesia spread throughout South-East Asia.
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Indeed, there are now substantial worries that increasing worldwide industrial
activity may even be causing significant climatic changes with far-reaching
consequences for life itself on earth.
Although the effects of fires and large-scale accidents (such as toxic releases)
can be evaluated, it is more difficult to assess the impact of frequent but small-
scale events that ultimately may do more damage to the environment.  The slow
dribble may do more long-term harm than a massive single leak.  Monitoring,
when the problem is evident, may be too late.
Since environmental impacts may be wide-ranging and long-lasting, some au-
thorities10 prefer to speak of ecological risk in which the effects on whole ecosys-
tems are considered, rather than the impacts on aspects of the built environment
or particular parts of the natural world that are prized by people.  Unresolved in
many cases is the precise thing to be protected; and even when that is defined, it is
not easy to find a useful means of measuring or monitoring the effects.
Modern concepts of inherently safe plants and cleaner processes imply that the
environmental risk is much diminished if these principles are embodied in ac-
tual facilities.  Loss prevention and waste management require corporate com-
mitment, but this policy can bring rewards in greater profitability and easier
acceptance of development plans by consent authorities.
Environmental risk is sometimes used in the narrower sense of the risks to
management of legal sanctions from failure to meet and/or contraventions of
statutory requirements under environmental legislation such as the Resource
Management Act 1991.
Commercial and Business Risks
Engineering services meet human needs, real or perceived. In many cases, and
increasingly so, these services are undertaken within a commercial framework.
That a project is a technical success is in itself no guarantee that it will not be a
commercial failure.  Some significant innovative processes, such as the Taranaki
gas-to-gasoline plant and the Glenbrook ironsands-reduction mill are highly
successful in the technical sense, but their operations have been overshadowed
by changes in the commercial climate since the projects were conceived in the
“Think Big” era of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Multipurpose facilities can respond more easily than single-stream production
units to changing market requirements.  However, the former often sacrifice
efficiency for flexibility, with lower business risks, and the capital costs will be
higher than plant designed for one product.
Most business risks are entered into for financial gain.  The provision of ven-
ture finance is an example of a high-risk, high-gain activity.  Gambling is an-
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other kind of high-risk venture, with the prospect of a substantial but remote
gain from the investment.  In this sense, financial risks differ from technical
risks that are sought to be eliminated, reduced or mitigated.
Risk financing refers to the business of setting aside funds to cover risks.  Large
companies often undertake a high degree of self-financing, but smaller firms
normally resort to insurers for this purpose.
Classification of Risks
The original 1983 book, Engineering Risk, of the IPENZ President’s Task Com-
mittee commented that it is difficult to classify risks suitable for shaping or
guiding policy.  Some discussion points are given by Lowrance11 in his seminal
book, “Of Acceptable Risk”, in which he provides an array of aspects which
govern peoples’ attitudes to risk.  A modified form of Lowrance’s listing is set
out in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Considerations affecting safety judgements
(after Lowrance 11, modified)
More tolerated Less tolerated
Risk assumed voluntarily Risk imposed involuntarily
Risk assumed at work Risk caused by work
Effect delayed Effect immediate
Effect temporary and reversible Effect long-lasting and irreversible
Effect known and minor Effect uncertain and life-threatening  
Exposure deemed necessary Exposure unnecessary
Common hazard Dread uncommon hazard
Affects all people Affects sensitive people
Likely to be used as intended Likely to be misused
The table highlights one important aspect of the way in which we assess risk.
“We are loath to let others do unto us what we happily do to ourselves.”
(Chauncey Starr).  Whenever the risk is apparently our own choice, then we are
prepared to undertake hazardous activities.  We climb mountains, ski down
slopes, use hand-tools without proper safeguards, smoke cigarettes, eat the veg-
etables and fruit that we ourselves have sprayed; but we do object to the cellphone
tower in our neighbourhood or the coal burners at the college next door.
This difference of regard has led many observers to comment that risks invol-
untarily thrust upon us should be treated as being more serious than those of our
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own choosing.  This line of reasoning can support the view that pursuing one’s
trade will almost invariably bring a peculiar set of risks and, moreover, that
such risks may be allowably greater than those outside the workplace.  This is a
dangerous argument.  In the mid-nineteenth century in Britain, a group of fac-
tory owners, who were called somewhat uncharitably by Dickens as “The Asso-
ciation for the Mangling of Operatives”, banded together to oppose various
laws designed to improve workplace safety, on the grounds that workers had
chosen their jobs of their own freewill in the understanding of the hazards in-
volved (i.e. the risks were voluntary).  However, the view prevailed that people,
whether at work or elsewhere, should not be exposed needlessly to hazards.
There was a duty of care.
Whether any risk is acceptable is a matter of debate.  For that reason, some
authorities prefer to speak of tolerable risk.  Following an inquiry into the sit-
ing of a nuclear power station, Sizewell B, the United Kingdom’s Health and
Safety Executive12 commented:
“Tolerability” does not mean “acceptability”.  It refers to the will-
ingness to live with a risk to secure certain benefits and in the
confidence that it is being properly controlled.  To tolerate a risk
means that we do not regard it as negligible or something we might
ignore, but rather as something we need to keep under review and
reduce still further if and as we can.
Table 3.1 illustrates that we fear the unknown hazards, particularly those that
are perceived to have lingering or life-threatening effects.  We are also averse to
situations where harm can happen to a large number of people simultaneously.
We appear to view more seriously the multiple deaths in a single air mishap
than the same number of fatalities spread over our roads in separate accidents.
The November 1979 crash of a commercial aircraft on a sightseeing overflight
in Antarctica put the whole country into mourning, even though the loss of life
was less than half that of the annual road toll.
Risk Characterisation
In a book entitled “Understanding Risk”, the National Research Council of the
United States13 notes that coping with risks can be both complex and contro-
versial.  One of the reasons the authors cite for this situation lies in the miscon-
ceptions in characterising risk.  From an engineering viewpoint, risk may be
characterised as a result of a technical analysis of likelihood and consequence,
which is then used as an aid in decision-making.  The National Research Coun-
cil, however, see risk characterisation as a wider process, in which the results
derive from both analysis and deliberation.
Therefore the aim of risk characterisation is considered to be this dual process
of describing a perceived hazard in a way that addresses the significant con-
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cerns of all interested and affected parties in a manner understandable to them.
In the language of the Risk Management Standard, a risk cannot be fully char-
acterised until it is communicated and “accepted”.  This implies that coping
with any risk requires a broad understanding of the possible consequences to
all the stakeholders.  As noted in this Standard, the final decision about a risk is
the result of a stepwise process involving consultation at the various stages
from perception to treatment.
Nevertheless, in many areas of technical safety, the public has trusted profes-
sional engineers and regulatory authorities to exercise responsible risk man-
agement with the minimum of consultation.  Earthquake engineering and air-
line safety are examples of two areas where few citizens understand and have
commented on the technologies that have reduced risk levels over the years.
Generally, public concern has concentrated on engineering activities that im-
pinge on lifestyles, such as motorway construction, and the management of
perceived risks to the environment through the release of contaminants of vari-
ous kinds.
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Risk Identification4
Risk identification needs to be a well-structured, systematic process.  The iden-
tification of a risk begins with a perception of a hazard, a threat to people and
the things they value1.  A particular hazard may pose different threats to differ-
ent people and in different contexts.  The threat may be evaluated not only in
physical terms but also by factors such the credibility and trustworthiness of
risk management and any regulatory bodies.  While an engineer may describe a
risk in numerate terms of probable incidence rates and extent of physical dam-
age should the hazard eventuate, others will use informal and social criteria to
judge the threat.
We can no longer talk with any confidence about determining objective risk.
“Social, cultural and political processes are now acknowledged as all being
involved in the formation of individual attitudes to risk”2.  All assessments of
risk involve subjectivity to a greater or lesser extent, since the process of iden-
tification depends upon subjective judgments on what constitutes a risk.  Engi-
neers and others often have the greatest difficulty in resolving disagreements
on this point.
Risk Context
The Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard states that the identi-
fication of risks must take place within a given context.  Defining this back-
ground and framework is the first step in any risk study, setting the parameters
for its scope.  The context is specified by the nature of the organisation under-
taking the risk study, its capabilities, goals and strategies, as well as the organi-
sation’s relationship with its environment.  Previous generic studies of risk and
case histories may provide a guide for defining the scope.  Appendix D of this
Standard lists generic sources of risk and areas of impact which can serve as a
starting point.  A summarised version in given in Table 4.1.
Risk Perception
Establishing the context involves awareness and knowledge of a potential haz-
ard.  Understanding that there is a potential risk includes psychological, social
and ethical aspects.  Different societies will choose different risks to be con-
cerned with, and the set of concerns will change with time.  Different people
may choose different boundaries of risk.  Gough3 cites the case of the per-
ceived hazards of a proposed LPG storage depot at Seaview near Wellington.
The company considered only the site-related hazards in its environmental im-
pact report, whereas some local residents wanted consideration of the complete
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transportation system for LPG within the metropolitan area as well.  Changing
the area of concern revealed a different set of potential hazards.
Hazards that are likely to give rise to particular concern to people are those that
pose, or seem to pose threats to their valued  cultural and social arrangements.
Examples in the New Zealand context might be possible pollution of custom-
ary fishing grounds or the disturbance of sacred sites.  Such perceived risks
cannot be explained by individual psychology, or dismissed through the quan-
titative analysis of so-called “objective” risks which tries to demonstrate that
the “real” risks are very small.
The perception of potential hazards also involves judgments about the ongoing
risk management.  Risk-management policies can alter, following corporate
restructuring and political change.  Such changes are normally carried out for
specific organisational motives and philosophies without any or with little con-
sideration of the safety implications.  Safety standards can slip.  This may hap-
pen, for instance, when a corporate change places less reliance on in-house
expertise for maintenance, on the assumption that consulting services collec-
tively have the same knowledge of the particular engineering systems.
With manufactured and processed goods, the risks change from the time of
manufacture, transport to points of sale, subsequent use and final disposal.  The
hazards of a pesticide are an example.  The risks during production in the proc-
ess plant under carefully controlled conditions are likely to be much less than
the risks while spraying in the open air, when drift and eddying of the spray
mist may occur, and operators may be tempted to work under less than ideal
conditions.  Furthermore, risks during production are different from the risks of
dumping any unwanted or unused material.  In such cases, careful considera-
tion must be given to the scope of the study to reveal all relevant risks and so
save considerable time and effort in remedial work later on.
If the precautionary principle is adopted, and hazards are assumed to exist until
Table 4.1: Generic sources of risk and their areas of impact (adapted
from Appendix D, AS/NZS 4360:1999)
Sources of Risk Principal Areas of Impact
Commercial and legal relationships Asset and resource base
Economic circumstances Revenue and entitlements
Human behaviour Costs and people
Natural events Costs and people
Political circumstances Community and operation
Engineering and technology Costs and performance
Management activities and control Costs, performance and reputation
Note: the sources of risk may impact on all areas
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proven to be absent by further knowledge, the boundaries of our concern are
clearly crucial in our risk assessment.  The question is: who and what are at
risk?  Professional engineers and others who claim expert knowledge can eas-
ily fall into the trap of believing that they instinctively understand all the risks
and their associated causes.  The use of the Australian/New Zealand Standard
and a generic checklist, such as Table 4.1, offers a very good guide to the per-
ception and identification of risks that might easily have been overlooked in the
first instance.
Case Study 4.1  Stadium Construction Risk Analysis
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy, Wellington Regional Council)
The Regional Council had agreed in principle to support the building of the WestpacTrust
Railyards Stadium by way of a substantial loan.  They considered it prudent to have an
analysis of the construction related risks carried out prior to finally committing to the
project.
As the time scale was tight, a small team of experienced engineers was assembled and a
semi-qualitative methodology applied.  Using the hazard identification approach suggested
by AS/NZS4360, and under the guidance of a risk engineer, they rapidly identified the
major sources of risk.  Local knowledge and professional experience were used to judge
the likelihood and significance of each potential event.  A simple scale was used to value
and rank these.  This listing was used to identify the higher risks and to obtain comment
and, where necessary, improved mitigation plans from the project management team.
The study identified a range of risks that had not formerly been considered and facilitated
the development of a range of mitigation measures that significantly reduced construction-
related risks.
As controls were put in place to manage each significant risk and as the overall residual
risk was considered acceptable, WRC were able to commit to the project with more
certainty that the project would meet the success criteria.
This is a good example of how even a simple risk-based approach can aid man-
agement decision-making.  In particular it shows how AS/NZS 4360 can be
effectively and quickly applied without the addition of sophisticated techniques
or in-depth research.
Accident Causes
Organisations of all kinds are increasingly being required to demonstrate, inter-
nally and externally, that they are systematically controlling occupational health
and safety hazards.  There has been recent public concern at the rate of industrial
accidents in New Zealand.  In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Com-
mission issued, in early 1999, a discussion document on proposals to introduce
a new duty on employers to investigate the cause of workplace accidents.
As equipment has become inherently more reliable and safer, attention is now
being focussed on the human causes of accidents.  Lucas4 recognises four un-
derlying ideas or paradigms of human behaviour that give rise to errors, as set
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out in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Error paradigms of human behaviour (after Lucas4)
Error paradigm Basic Assumptions Solutions
Engineering error People are the unreliable
component in the system
Remove people from the
system by automation
Individual error Poorly motivated people
commit unsafe acts
Discipline those involved
Cognitive error A mismatch between
individual capabilities and
the demands of the job
Ensure job and workload
can be done
Organisational error Poor management create
conditions that make errors
likely
Examine and audit
management systems
All of these error paradigms contain elements of truth, but the uncritical adop-
tion of one paradigm to the exclusion of others is likely to lead to root causes of
some accidents being missed.   This point is perhaps illustrated by the differ-
ences in opinion in investigating the cause of the DC10 aircraft that crashed in
Antarctica in November 1979 on a sightseeing flight.  The then Chief Inspector
of Air Accidents attributed the cause to pilot error.  The subsequent inquiry of
the Royal Commission under Mr Justice Mahon took a wider view, and consid-
ered related systemic issues, including the impact of other factors that could
have led to a dangerous situation occurring (such as lack of charts showing a
printed route).
Root Causes
As many inquiries have observed, a technical hazard is often triggered through
root causes that are non-technical in origin.  Most formal risk-identification
methods are concerned with finding technical risks, and thus it is always im-
portant to confirm that technical standards are not compromised by other fac-
tors.  A checklist of underlying or systemic errors can assist in pinpointing
possible latent parameters.
Wells5 gives a list of these deficiencies, which may be used to confirm that
adequate engineering and administrative controls are in place.  Such root causes
include:
• Deficiencies in external agencies such as contractors and emergency-re-
sponse providers;
• Deficiencies in the regulatory climate;
• Any harmful influence of economic factors and business focus;
• Lack of adequate corporate commitment to safety and emergency provision;
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• Poor management control, including responsibility for engineering mat-
ters;
• Poor site and plant facilities including site layout and the transport, storage
and disposal of materials;
• Poor communication, including safety information and incident reporting;
• Poor working practices and emergency procedures;
• Poor working environment, including welfare, supervision and support;
• Poor engineering integrity, including the quality of plant, its availability
and maintenance;
• Poor performance of workers, including aspects such as their training and
work habits.
There are numerous root causes, and systems must be set up to guard against
them and monitor safety performance.
Large organisations involved with activities of high hazard potential normally
have whole departments whose sole task is the monitoring of safety trends and
the analysis of incidents including so-called “near-misses”.  Such departments
are continually trying to identify root causes and checking whether any previ-
ous risk-assessment work  has not been compromised by environmental, opera-
tional, technical and organisational changes.  However, even small organisa-
tions should be on their guard.  Routine inspections, say monthly, checking
aspects such as equipment availability, minor defects (such as leaking valves
and indicator faults on process plants) and site tidiness comprise one such sys-
tem.  Kinsman6, from experience in the United Kingdom, reports that there can
be a twentyfold change in reliability of process plant as a result of the way in
which it is managed.
Early Hazard Identification
At the start of a engineering project, when the technical and economic evalua-
tion of the project’s feasibility is being done, and the criteria for success are
being set, an assessment of the safety, health and environmental (SHE) hazards
associated with the proposals should be undertaken.  This initial SHE study is a
core component of policy decisions such as siting and, in the case of an indus-
trial facility, the preferred manufacturing and process arrangements.  Subse-
quently, a concept hazard analysis would be done to identify areas that may
present unacceptable risks.
The initial study would consider all the organisational factors affecting the
project, including the need for and the availability of experienced workers and
technical staff in both the constructional and operational phases of the project.
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General project criteria should be set, including the codes of practice to be
followed and any regulatory standards to be met.
The concept hazard analysis would draw in appropriate specialists who would
discuss various aspects of the project at a series of meetings.  A checklist, such
as Table 4.1, could be used as a framework to enhance the chance of identifying
all significant hazards.  Various keywords might be used to stimulate discus-
sion.  In regard to human safety, Wells5 has produced a list of suitable key-
words based on information published by the British Institution of Occupa-
tional Health and Safety.  This list is reproduced in Table 4.3.
Under New Zealand conditions, one would add the keyword “earthquake”, and
each industry or engineering  activity would doubtless generate its own particu-
lar set.  The technique has been developed for a proposal which involves a
sequence of activities, as in a manufacturing or process plant, with each section
being considered in turn, but can be adapted to any kind of engineering works.
Because the technique is applied at an early stage of a project, recommended
changes can be made easily with little cost, and with potential long-term sav-
ings in avoiding the need for add-on safety measures at a later stage.
Wells5 illustrates the methodology with an example of a lifting problem.  A
container holding a dangerous material on a flatbed trolley was to be lifted by
an overhead crane over a 6m high wall into a building through a ventilation
space.  Under the keyword, drop/impact, the team decided that there was a
hazard if the container were dropped from a height greater than 5m, and recom-
mended that the wall be reduced in height, with a roller shutter to close off the
Table 4.3:  Keywords for concept hazard analysis in regard to human
safety (after Wells5)
Fall of person from height Drowning
Fall of object/material from height Excavation work
Fall of person on same level Stored energy
Manual handling Chemical / dust explosion
Mechanical lifting operations Contact with cold/hot surfaces
Compressed air Chemicals/substances
Use of machines Biological agents
Operation of vehicles Noise
Stacking  Ionising radiation
Housekeeping Non-ionising radiation
Lighting Vibration
Fire, including static electricity Handtools
Electricity Confined spaces
Adverse weather Cleaning
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larger hole in the building.  The operation would then be inherently safer.
Sometimes a preliminary hazard identification is all that is needed, as illus-
trated in Case Study 4.1.
Identification of Major Hazards
Major hazards, with potentially far-reaching impacts, are generally those which
relate to the dangerous properties of a material being made, stored or used at a
particular site and in the transport of such material.  The size of the inventory
and the state conditions of temperature and pressure will determine the conse-
quence of the release of materials and energy into the environment.  Flammable
liquids stored under pressure at temperatures above their boiling points are par-
ticularly hazardous as any released liquid will flash into vapour, with the chance
of fire and an explosion.  The same liquid, at a temperature below its boiling
point, has much lesser chance of catching fire as there is considerably less va-
pour formed when the material escapes.
Chemical hazards are not necessarily confined to the chemical-process indus-
tries.  McKay7 describes a safety audit on a large microelectronics factory in
Hong Kong which employed 2500 people and covered an area of 60 000 m2.
The facility manufactured microchips on wafers in a very clean environment
and a number of hazardous liquids and gases were handled on site.
Bretherick’s handbook8 is a source of information on reactive chemical haz-
ards.  A substance may release energy by either combustion or decomposition.
A very rapid energy release (as in a detonation) can occur if the carbon and
hydrogen in a substance can react with its own oxygen without the need for any
oxygen in the air.  The oxygen balance in a compound is an important indicator
of its stability.  This quantity OB is defined for an organic compound of formula
CxHyOz as:
OB = -1600(2x + y/2 - z)/M
where M is the molecular weight.  An unstable compound with a perfect oxy-
gen balance, yielding just carbon dioxide and water, would have an OB value of
zero, and one containing excess oxygen a positive value.  Compounds with
large positive (>240) and large negative (<-160) values are considered to have
a low energy-hazard potential9.
The heat of decomposition !Hd  is also a factor in the hazard potential.  This is
considered low should
!Hd2M < 50
where the heat of decomposition !Hd  is measured in units of MJ/kg.
One of the commonest operations in the process industries is heating a wet
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material to drive off moisture to yield a dry product.  Most products of animal
or vegetable origin are combustible, and the drying of these materials can lead
to fires and dust explosions.  The frequency of  problems in the spray drying of
milk powders triggered a review of industrial practice in New Zealand, with the
formulation of a code of practice (1987) to enhance safety.
Most household products involve hazardous materials in their manufacture;
inherently, most process chemicals are chosen because of their reactivity and
aggressive properties.  Toxic chemicals can enter the body in three ways: through
breathing, by ingestion or by external contact.  The effects of exposure may be
acute, resulting from a single exposure to a high concentration of the toxic
material, or chronic from a low-level exposure over a long period.  Some sub-
stances, such as hydrocarbon vapours have narcotic effects; some gases are
asphyxiants, displacing or blocking oxygen to the lungs; other chemicals can
induce tissue damage or induce cancers and gene changes, with different or-
gans being effected by different chemicals.  Some chemicals accumulate in the
body; others can be expelled harmlessly.  Thus it is difficult to describe the
toxicity of chemicals on some kind of common scale.  There are, however,
comprehensive accounts of toxic hazards, such as Sax’s “Dangerous Proper-
ties of Industrial Materials”10.
New Zealand has been spared a catastrophic incident like the accidental release
of methyl isocyanate at Bhopal, but the so-called Parnell fumes emergency in
1973 was an example of the far-reaching impact of an escaping toxic vapour on
an unsuspecting population.  Thirteen damaged and leaking drums containing
an unknown agricultural chemical had been offloaded from a freighter and had
been dumped overnight on a vacant section pending a decision for their dis-
posal.  Soon neighbours began to complain of sore throats and smarting eyes,
and the Fire Brigade was called; within a short time, people over a wide area
began to feel ill.  Over the five days it took to bring the emergency under con-
trol and decontaminate the site, 643 people had been admitted to hospital and
6000 persons had been evacuated.  Fortunately, there were no deaths, and most
people recovered within 12 to 24 hours11.
Lees12 summarises various screening tests that can be done to assess material-
related hazards.  There is also a range of hazard indices that have been devel-
oped: these are considered in Chapter 5 under short-cut methods of risk analysis.
OSH Method of Hazard Identification
On the introduction of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, the
Department of Labour issued a workbook, “How to Identify and Control Haz-
ards” (1992).  This guide advocated three ways to identify systematically exist-
ing hazards in the workplace:
1. By examining specific areas of the worksite and the activities carried out
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in them;
2. By analysing different occupations and their tasks;
3. By analysing the total process used to convert raw materials into the final
product for sale.
By area.  From an up-to-date plan, the worksite is divided into distinctive areas
(such as workshops, yards, stores and various production areas).  Staff familiar
with the particular areas are then asked what they consider to be the hazards or
potential hazards of those areas.  It is suggested that records of accidents and
illnesses, relevant codes of practice and any existing safety audits or environ-
mental-monitoring reports be used to assist assembling the list of hazards.
By worktype. Work that is not associated with one location is better analysed by
identifying the different occupations involved, and noting the hazards that are
faced as the work is carried out. This method is particularly relevant for trades-
people who might be required to service a range of items throughout the whole
site. It would also be suitable for analysing the hazards faced by gangs of work-
ers, as in forestry, who operate in small autonomous groups with minimal su-
pervision.  Accident records and anecdotal tales of near-misses could be used
to build the profile of hazards.
By process.  This method follows the process of production, step by step, trying
to identify the hazards at each step.  It involves listing the progress of each raw
material to the site to the points where the goods are dispatched, identifying the
places where material is transformed by physical, chemical or biological means,
and noting the hazards associated with these transformations.  The technique
differs from a hazard and operability study (Hazop), which is a detailed exami-
nation of process deviations, section by section on the plant.
Although the OSH method was developed as a technique to identify workplace
hazards,  the methodology can be more generally applied, as illustrated by the
study by Boyes13 of the risks of associated with a cargo port over its lifecycle
from construction to decommissioning.  Other categories of risk that might be
used in an OSH-type analysis includes factors such as: activities, assets and
location (both from the built and the natural environment).
Workplace-risk management is discussed further in Chapter 8.
Hazard and Operability Study (Hazop)
Hazard and operability studies (Hazop) had their origin in the chemical process
industries in the 1970s as a response to increasing problems in bringing large
process plants onstream.  In this regard, the methodology was successful.
Knowlton14 reports that over an eight-year period in which all new plants were
subject to a Hazop scrutiny, the average time between start-up and the achieve-
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ment of full output was one month, compared with three months for plants for
which no such study had been undertaken.
A hazard and operability study is suitable for any manufacturing or process
facility in which deviations from normal working conditions may occur.  It is
not a trivial undertaking, although it has gained wide acceptance from industry
because it does not require sophisticated reliability calculations.  Essentially, it
is a formal method of aggregating the experience of a number of people with
intimate knowledge of aspects of  the facility under review.
Keey11 summarises the methodology. The composition of the review team will
depend upon whether a new design or an existing plant is being considered.  In
either case, an accurate and complete process flowsheet (such as P&I diagram)
is required, because this is the basis on which the plant’s behaviour under con-
ditions away from normal will be judged. A team leader then takes the group
systematically though the plant, which is broken down into elements that have
a single function, such as a pump and associated pipework feeding a vessel
from another tank.  A series of check or guidewords are then applied to each of
these elements in turn: none; reverse; more of; less of; part of; other than.  The
first guideword, when applied to the pipeline, means no forward flow when
there should have been flow.  The team would then ask itself:
• Could there be no flow?
• If so, how could it happen?
• What are the consequences of no flow?
• Are the consequences hazardous and do they hinder effective operation?
• If so, does the size of the hazard or the operability problem justify the
expense of rectifying it?
The team then considers what happens if there is reverse flow, and so on. The
deviations triggered by various guidewords are listed in Table 4.4. The various
conclusions are recorded by the team leader, listing the points of action noted,
which  are followed up.  Because the concentration of team members can lapse
after a period, it is normally recommended that Hazop exercises are limited to
sessions of no more than two hours duration.
Although Hazop was originally conceived as a qualitative review, the results
can be quantified to some extent by simple ranking of likelihood (or frequency)
and severity (or consequence) to give a risk matrix.  Examples of such ranking
methods are considered in Chapter 5.
The effectiveness of the technique can be improved by paying attention to psy-
chological factors in the selection of participants for Hazop meetings and how
those individuals within that group perceive, remember, judge and reason.
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Leathley and Nicholls15 review aspects such as the improvement of corporate
memory, the enhancement of creativity and the retention of attention span.
Skelton16 provides a listing of the causes of some of these deviations.  For
example, no flow may be the result of a wrong routing of material, a blockage,
the incorrect insertion of a slip-plate in the line, an incorrectly-fitted non-return
valve, a large leak from a burst pipe, a valve wrongly isolating the line, a va-
pour lock, and through no material being available(!)  Clearly, the success of
any Hazop exercise is very dependent on getting together a team with sufficient
breadth of experience to foresee all the potential causes.  It is also necessary to
work from correct, up-to-date diagrams.  A Hazop study on a wrong section or
an outdated one is useless!
Lees12 gives examples of a number of Hazop exercises from the process indus-
tries, including the application to batch operations when time is an additional
factor to be taken into account.  Hazop methods have been used extensively in
New Zealand in the assessment of the safety and operability of new process
engineering facilities and other industrial plant.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) involves the consideration of
the possible outcomes from the discerned failure modes within a whole system.
It is particularly suited to electrical and mechanical systems, and can be applied
at different levels of detail or complexity.  At an initial broad level, it provides
insight into the most important or critical contributing factors that can be ana-
Table 4.4:  Deviations generated by guidewords in Hazop (after Kletz17,
with modification)
Checkword Deviation
None No flow when there should be
Reverse Reverse flow to that intended
More of More of the relevant property (flow, pressure,
temperature) than there should be
Less of Less of the relevant property (flow, pressure,
temperature) than there should be
Part of Composition different from what it should be
(components missing, proportions different)
More than More components present than there should be
(impurities, extra phase)
Other than What else can happen away from normal
working: at start-up, shut-down, low running,
overload, failure of services, during maintenance
checks
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lysed in further detail.
The method consists of identifying the failure modes, their causes and effects,
their relative importance and sequence, for the system to be evaluated, and the
way in which these failures will be detected, rectified or isolated.  As with
Hazop, a listing of effects and appropriate corrective action is produced.  The
analysis can be either function or hardware-based, and the study can be com-
bined with approximate quantitative measures of fault frequency to identify
critical components that govern the reliability of the whole system.  The method,
however, relies on the skill of the analyst in having a thorough understanding of
the workings of the system.  Wallace18 also notes that this method of analysis
may not give adequate emphasis to omissions or errors in operating procedures,
incorrect operational sequences in batch operations, or the possibility of opera-
tor’s errors.
Guidance on the use of failure mode and effect analysis is given in BS 5760
Reliability of Systems, Equipment and Components, Part 5:1991 Guide to Fail-
ure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis.  Two examples of the application
of the methods are given in that document: the analysis of the fire-protection
system of an electric locomotive and the reliability of a subsystem of a motor-
generator set.
Artificial Intelligence
The development of computer-aided design has led to consideration of the pos-
sibility that hazards might be identified through artificial intelligence tech-
niques19.  Most proposed systems developed follow a Hazop-type screening in
which the examination moves systematically though a plant, line by line.  There
is currently some scepticism about the efficacy of such software, as it is diffi-
cult to compete with human ingenuity in thinking laterally and making connec-
tions which appear obscure at first sight.  One interesting approach is the HAZID
code developed by Parmar and Lees20, in which a Hazop-type approach is used
together with generic information on fault-propagation pathways.
Other Methods of Identification
What-if analysis.  This is perhaps the oldest method of identifying a technical
hazard.  The technique consists of asking questions such as:
• What if the electrical power fails?
• What if the pump stops?
• What happens in an earthquake?
The method is used against a checklist by a team, and is useful in an initial
review of a proposal as part of a concept hazard analysis.
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Sneak analysis.  This method originated in the analysis of electrical circuits
when it was discovered that unsuspected or “sneaky” current flows to earth
sometimes occurred because of design errors in circuitry21.  There are various
kinds of sneaky faults.  A “sneaky” signal happened on the nuclear power plant
on Three Mile Island at the time of the emergency.  There was an indication of
“valve position”, which was the signal to, rather than the actual position of a
power-operated relief valve.  A “sneaky” flow can take place from one vessel at
higher pressure to another at a lower pressure through a common header that is
normally shut.  At Seaview near Wellington, there was a “sneaky” separation of
an oil-water emulsion during an atypical shut-down of a plant, which led to a
steam explosion when the plant was started up again and the mixture reheated.
A good plant engineer is always on the lookout for unusual and unintended
pathways.  The original sneak-analysis method involved decomposing an elec-
trical network into standard subcircuits for which the current flows could be
determined.  The method can be applied to a process network by analogy, by
representing the system as a series of sources and sinks with interconnecting
pathways.  An additional technique is the use of “clues” from a structured check-
list to search for misleading labels and indication of plant status and other un-
suspected equipment behaviour.
The principles of a sneak analysis may be used to enhance a Hazop exercise22.
In the reported study of a large batch plant, a number of  “sneaky” faults were
picked up, including: wrong labelling, misleading indicator lights, two major
drawing errors, drainage problems, improper coupling to the fume-extraction
system, and numerous false procedures.
The common and most important theme that comes through the various meth-
ods is that effective risk identification must be systematic.  Otherwise, when a
subsequent analysis of the risks is undertaken, the assessment will be devalued
by the failure to encompass all the hazards in the study.
Hazards of Safety Systems
Unwittingly, a designer specifying a safety device may introduce another haz-
ard.  This may arise when, for example, a trip system responds spuriously.
Kletz23 cites the case when several people nearly drowned in the deluge from
water sprays which were set off falsely inside a containment building of a nu-
clear-power plant.  Both “fail-danger” and “fail-safe” incidents have to be con-
sidered in assessing the hazard potential of any facility.  Another example of the
potential by-hazards of water sprays was the initial requirement, placed on one
metallurgical laboratory in New Zealand which housed a steel-melting furnace,
to fit overhead sprinklers for fire-safety precautions.
Modifications to equipment to meet particular deficiencies in performance can
also lead to the development of unsafe systems if the modified arrangements
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have not been assessed for possible hazards, say through a failure modes and
effects analysis.  Informal changes can often result in a chain of modifications
until a final satisfactory solution is found.
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Risk Analysis5
The Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard describes the objec-
tives of risk analysis as the separation of minor acceptable risks from the major
risks, and to provide data to assist in the evaluation and treatment of risks.  Risk
analysis is the process to determine the remoteness of identified hazards and
the possible consequences should they happen.  Often a preliminary analysis is
carried out so that similar or low-impact risks are excluded from a detailed
study.  The Standard emphasises that excluded risks should, wherever possible,
be listed to demonstrate the completeness of the risk analysis.
At its most elementary form, the analysis may be a qualitative estimate in terms
of verbal descriptors such as “likely” or “improbable”. However, if appropriate
data are available, it can involve sophisticated calculations to follow fault-propa-
gation pathways and computer-aided modelling for various scenarios of spe-
cific realised hazards.  Such calculations are desirable in cases where realised
hazards are perceived to have a high impact, such as the high-pressure storage
of flammable liquids.  In general, engineers will invariably need to carry out
risk analyses in more detail than many other professions, as reflected in the
analytical methods developed for engineering use such as fault-tree analysis.
Such calculations are subject to significant uncertainties.  One aspect of this
uncertainty is the need, at times, to make subjective engineering judgments
about the behaviour of equipment and people in emergencies and when failures
arise.  Such subjective judgments incorporated in ostensibly objective calcula-
tions are highlighted by the occasional (and embarrassing) attempts to compare
predictions of technical experts.  Hynes and Vanmarche1 asked seven interna-
tionally known geotechnical engineers to estimate the height of an embank-
ment that would cause failure in a clay foundation.  They were asked to set
confidence limits on their estimate wide enough to have a 50% chance of en-
closing the true height,  None of the engineers, it was reported, were able to
establish limits that enclosed the true height!
Dunster and Vinck2, in weighing up the value of risk analyses in the nuclear
industry, have commented:
“Uncertainties in estimates of probabilities of events by factors of
less than two or three can hardly be expected, and uncertainties
by a factor of ten or more may well occur, even in carefully con-
ducted studies.  The estimation of the magnitude of the conse-
quences in human terms almost always involves environmental
modelling and similar factors of uncertainty are to be expected.”
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Although such uncertainties have cast serious doubt in lay minds about the
value of these numerical estimates, risk calculations do provide a basis for rank-
ing alternatives and comparison against risk-target levels when often order-of-
magnitude estimates are good enough.  Moreover, in determining the impact of
far-reaching accidents, an order-of-magnitude uncertainty in incidence may
correspond to a much smaller uncertainty in the hazard, as the effects of many
mishaps (such as fires) dwindle rapidly with distance.  Careful use of group
judgments, with professional consultants when appropriate, can in many cases
achieve worthwhile results and amplify limited or missing historical data.
Risk analysis is a tool, but like all tools, must be used appropriately and with
skill.  Occasionally practitioners have been carried away by the methodology.
The Comptroller-General’s 1978 report to the US Congress drew attention to
one study of risks in the handling of liquefied natural gas in which an estimate
of an annual probability of 5 x 10-50 was given for a particular event that might
kill 100 000 people!  In one New Zealand study aimed at setting town planning
guidelines for the siting of industries with a perceived high hazard potential,
the maximum number of offsite fatalities from material-related hazards at the
edge of an industrial zone was estimated to be 8 for an event of frequency of 1
in 10 million years3.  One suspects that there may have been other hazards
arising from such industrial activity which were of greater concern to the neigh-
bouring residential area, subject to significant seismic risks with a high prob-
ability of being observed in a person’s lifetime.
Yet “highly improbable” events do occur.  Bond4 tells the story of the unfortu-
nate Major Walter Summerford whose experience with lightning was most ex-
traordinary.  He was struck by lightning on a battlefield in Flanders in 1918,
and was invalided out of the army.  In 1924, while in Canada, he was again
struck by lightning, and yet again in 1930, which left him paralysed.  In death,
he was not left in peace: his gravestone was stuck by lightning and was de-
stroyed.  Doubtless a risk analyst could estimate the very low probability of this
sequence of events!
Early failures
Experience with the reliability of engineering components and systems leads
us to judge an expected life for these based on some mean time between fail-
ures.  If any failure occurs well within this mean life-span, we tend to say that
the failure is “unexpected”.  However, even if failures occur randomly, there is
always a chance of seeing an “early failure”.  Suppose, for example a compo-
nent has an expected life of 5 years.  Should failures be random over this pe-
riod, the probability of failure Pf  at any time t/ yr is given by the expression5
Pf = 1 - exp(-t/5)
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so that at the end of the first year of operation the probability of seeing a failure
is 9.5%, which is small, but not negligible.  Half-way through its expected life
the failure probability has risen to 39%.
The likelihood of early failure has important implications whenever a high de-
gree of reliability is sought.  The comment that the four electrical cables feed-
ing the central business district of Auckland in early 1998 failed “well within
their reasonable expected lifetimes” was no consolation to the power compa-
ny’s customers who were expecting an unbroken supply of power.  Reliability,
in such circumstances, has to be secured through adequate redundancy and loss-
prevention management.  Modern risk management provides the opportunity
to foresee problems of unreliability and plan to reduce and cope with the likeli-
hood of such failures.
Unfortunately, early failures may not be entirely random events.  Although early
failure of industrial equipment is sometimes perceived as due essentially to the
breakdown of weak or substandard components, there are other factors.  Sherwin
and Lees6, for example, have found early failure prevalent in both process-
plant equipment and hospital autoclaves.  In both cases, problems with mainte-
nance work and a lack of training appeared to be the main cause.  Improve-
ments in maintaining the autoclaves, after certain recommendations had been
made, resulted in a fourfold reduction of the overall failure rate.  This example
cannot be considered to be an isolated case.  Experienced plant engineers, on
diagnosing a defect, will normally ask whether maintenance work had been
recently carried out on the faulty item.
OSH Risk-rating Method
The Occupational Health and Safety Service (1992) has suggested a process to
evaluate each identified hazard in the workplace, so that a decision can be made
on whether
• Injury or illness could result from it; and if so;
• What action need be taken to reduce the risk.
This process is seen as a means of planning, introducing and monitoring risk-
control measures to meet statutory requirements under the 1992 Act.
For each identified hazard, the possibility is considered of injury, illness or
damage which might result from the hazard should it happen.  The next steps
involve setting a potential severity rating (on a five-point scale from negligible
harm to possible death(s)) and a probable frequency rating (on a four-point
scale from “remotely possible” to “happening all the time”).  A risk-rating value
is obtained by multiplying the severity and frequency ratings.
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The method provides an approximate means of ranking hazards in their impact.
It relies on prior experience of the hazards being assessed and is difficult to
apply when new technology is involved.  Furthermore, different combinations
of frequency and consequence can yield the same hazard score, but the risks
may not be equal in significance. It is thus only a guide in ranking.  However, it
can be a very useful tool in a scoping study of possible hazards, as Case Study
5.1 demonstrates.
Case Study 5.1  Harbour Extension31
Because of limitations of the existing facilities in Whangarei harbour, Northland Port
Corporation has considered a possible port extension of 50 ha, of which 32 ha would
be reclaimed land for open storage obtained by dredging a ship-turning basin.  A scoping
study to identify the hazards associated with the proposed development was under-
taken to cover all phases in the operation of the port from construction, working life
and possible final disuse.  Besides the hazards of handling cargoes over the wharf, the
methodology drew attention to the risks of increased road traffic and ship movements
in the harbour, as well as physical hazards to the public.  By looking at the operations
in terms of the three aspects — by process, by work-area and by activity — the chance
of overlooking a particular hazard was minimised by keeping an open mind on the
possible risk factors.
Event Grading
The OSH method is an example of risk assessment by estimating the severity
level of possible consequences arising from a realised hazard.  A more detailed
classification into categories can be obtained by considering a wider range of
effects, including:
• Harm to persons in terms of injury and illness (as in the OSH method);
• Damage to assets and property;
• The effect on the environment;
• The impact on the reputation of the organisation;
• The harm to the business of the organisation.
The Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard gives a useful listing
of sources of information and provides examples of qualitative measures of
risk and likelihood, which can then be used to develop a risk-level matrix.  A
number of similar matrices may be drawn up to fit the circumstances of an
organisation.  One such matrix of impacts is set out in Table 5.1, in which the
effects of a realised hazard on various things and people are assessed qualita-
tively.  Although this table was originally derived with a manufacturing or process
facility in mind, the matrix can be applied to any engineering works.  For a
structure such as a major dam, for example, a class V (“catastrophic”) hazard
might be one which resulted in loss of life, permanent or long-term environ-
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mental damage or the destruction of heritage buildings and sites.
A likelihood rating may be set from experience of witnessing or hearing of the
realised hazard, as illustrated in Table 5.2.  For a facility that may last several
years, the relative frequency might have units of events per year, and thus a
“likely” event is one that is observed in a person’s lifetime.  For activities of
shorter duration, such as a construction project, a correspondingly shorter time
scale would be chosen (say events per week), and higher-frequency events would
be looked at.
Table 5.1:  Effects rating of a realised hazard (after Gillett7, with
modification)
Rating People Assets Offsite Reputation Business
0
Insignificant
none none none none none
I
Slight
minor
injuries
slight
<$5000 none none slight
II
Significant
lost-time
injuries
significant
<$50 000
small
not lasting
Limited
(local news)
perceptible
at unit level
III
Major
some
disabilities
major
<$500 000
localised
onsite
impact
Regional
news
affects
whole
enterprise
IV
Severe
some
fatalities
severe
<$5 million
offsite
impact
National
news
shareholder
concern
V
Catastrophic
many
fatalities
widespread
>$5 million
major offsite
impact
International
news
pressure to
halt
business
Table 5.2:  Likelihood rating of a realised hazard (after Gillett7 , with
modification)
Rating Remoteness Experience Relativefrequency
A
Negligible  
Unlikely Never heard of it 10-4
B
Low  
Seldom Heard of it 10-3
C
Moderate  
Likely Incident hashappened 10
-2
D
High  
Almost certain Happens severaltimes elsewhere 10
-1
E
Serious  
Certain Happens severaltimes here 1
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Some hazard-ranking schemes involve elaborate weighting of various factors
that are believed to be significant in determining some kind of risk score.  In
reviewing the system employed by the Environmental Protection Agency of
the United States to evaluate the risk of hazardous waste facilities, Haness and
Warwick8 note that small amounts of extra information can have a marked in-
fluence on the final score.  There is a trap of adding a safety factor upon safety
factor, with little or no consideration of the effect of cumulative errors.  Such
ultraconservative analyses are probably of little value. It is better to assess each
factor separately within a coarse ranking, as in Table 5.1.
As with the OSH risk-rating method, the categories for impact and frequency
may be combined to obtain an overall assessment of the danger of the realised
hazard.  The various scales in these tables are not linear; they approximate to a
logarithmic scale, as indeed implied by the scale of relative frequency.  Like-
wise, the scale of business impact in Table 5.1 varies from under $5000 for a
level I risk to over $5 million for a level V risk.  The Australian/New Zealand
Risk Management Standard does not make this point clear.
The following Case Study 5.2 describes the use of risk analysis as a means of
allocating resources to determine the most cost-effective way that a public util-
ity could cope with failures and preserve the integrity of the network.  In such a
case, the risk need only be “measured” in comparative terms, and there is no
necessity to evaluate risk levels on some absolute scale.  Significant benefit can
thus be obtained at relatively low cost.
Case Study 5.2  Risk Analysis of  a Pump-Station Network
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy North Shore City Council and Peter
MacKellar of Sinclair Knight Merz))
The Council required a risk analysis of all 84 wastewater pumping stations it owned and
operated.
The study was based on the identification of failure mechanisms that resulted in dry
weather overflows, the analysis of failures and the examination of various risk mitigation
options.  The study took a two-stage approach.
Initially a broad analysis of the 68 ‘local’ stations identified the pumping stations which
presented the highest risk.
Detailed analysis of different failure scenarios at each of the 20 pumping stations identified
as posing a high risk was then undertaken.  The failure scenarios ranged from power
failure, mechanical failure at the station, and rising main failure through to fire within a
station.  A risk model simulated the effect of each of the failures, taking into account
existing contingencies within the system, such as site generators and emergency response
measures.
Expressions were derived for the volume, duration, ecological impact, pubic health
concerns and loss of public amenity, all of which result from an overflow.  Risks were
calculated for each failure scenario and summed to provide a total measure of risk for
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A number of risk-management options were evaluated and costed to assess the
relative reduction in risk and their relative cost.  The results providing guidance
to the  local authority to enable the development of long-term, cost-effective
strategies to reduce the effect of dry weather overflows from their wastewater-
pumping stations and provided a means of improving the Council’s emergency-
planning procedures.
Short-Cut Risk-Analysis Method (SCRAM)
A short-cut risk-analysis method, which Wells9 has evocatively given the acro-
nym “scram”, was developed to provide a quick means of getting an estimate of
the significance of an identified hazard in a Hazop review.  A risk rating RR is
obtained by summing the logarithms of  parameters which reflects the frequency
F, the severity S and the likelihood " of mitigation by strategic or tactical means:
RR = log F + log S + log "
each station.
A number of risk mitigation options were simulated and costed to assess the associated
reduction in risk and their relative cost effectiveness.  The results provided guidance to
the Council to enable the development of long-term and cost-effective strategies to reduce
the risk of dry weather overflows from the wastewater pumping stations.  They also
provided a means to refine and amend the Council’s emergency planning procedures.
This project shows how a risk-based approach can facilitate policy in the allocation of
resources, as well as identify the most cost effective mitigation options.  As studies of
this type are used essentially to allocate resources, risks need only be measured in
comparative terms.  This avoids the often-problematic steps of defining an absolute
measure of risk.  Highly valuable results can therefore be obtained at relatively low cost
systematically improving either network or process integrity.
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Order-of-magnitude estimates are used for the frequency F, based on experi-
ence or generic data.  The severity scale (as log S) may be taken directly from
the risk rating in the first column of Table 5.1.  (For example, a significant
hazard, with a II rating, would be given a value of 2 for log S). The mitigation
factor is often absent, as in a sudden dam failure.  For a manufacturing or proc-
ess facility, with an opportunity for intervention by an operator or a process-
control system, log " may be taken as -2.  Wells9 suggests that risk reduction is
needed if the RR value is zero or greater.
There are a number of variants and developments of this method.  Wood and
Tweeddale10  describe a risk-assessment study of the hazards associated with a
range of industries in the Rosebank Peninsula, Auckland.  A sample of ten in-
stallations was taken covering industries such as chemical manufacturing, light
engineering and metalwork, foundry operations and general engineering con-
tracting.  Three impact scales were considered:
1. The impact to people expressed as fatalities, with injuries and nuisance
defined arbitrarily as fractional fatalities;
2. The impact on property, on a scale of “houses destroyed”;
3. The impact on the environment in terms of an arbitrary scale of toxicity
and persistence.
Since there was incomplete records of event rates, a scale based on verbal
descriptors was devised, ranging from a “very frequent” event, which was given
a frequency of 0.5 per year, to a “barely credible” one of once in 100 000 years.
The study provided a ranking of the industrial hazards and demonstrated that
potential impacts to people living outside the industrial area would be limited
to smoke nuisance from large fires and road accidents involving the movement
of hazardous cargoes.
Except for certain high-hazard occupations, deaths in the workplace are un-
common in New Zealand, and those to the public from industrial activity are
virtually unknown, Keey11 has suggested a criterion based on the “numbers
affected” by the realised hazard.  In regard to the persons at risk, the criterion
would be taken as the maximum number of people likely to be directly affected
by the incident, whether in terms of physical personal harm or through disrup-
tion to normal activity for a stated minimum period (say 1 hour) or by psycho-
logical disturbance.  The latter number reflects the concept of the United King-
dom Health and Safety Executive12 in defining a “dangerous dose”, the quan-
tity of released energy or material that would cause severe distress to almost
everyone in the incident under consideration.  It would include the 6000 who
were evacuated at the time of the Parnell fumes emergency.  The risk rating
then would then have units of the annual probable number of people affected
by the particular realised hazard.
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A measure of effects that reflects public perception of danger is difficult.  One
solution used by engineering consultants Kingston Morrison (now Sinclair
Knight Merz) involves splitting an effect into its duration and its extent, which
may be measured in area, volume or people affected (Bermingham 1999, pers.
comm.).  This approach was used to estimate the risks of extending the
wastewater-treatment plant at Mangere, as described in Case Study 6.1 in Chapter
6. The method is essentially similar to that employed earlier by Wood and
Tweeddale10 in their analysis of impacts from industrial activity, in which the
severity of the environmental impact was rated according to its long-term per-
sistence as well as the physical damage that might ensue.  There is no single
measure of  “effect”.
These various short-cut methods yield a risk rating which is an index of the
hazard potential. A number of these indices have some physical significance,
being related to some averaged impact, and thus provides a conceptual indica-
tor of the extent of possible danger.  Care must be exercised in their interpreta-
tion because of the “soft” nature of the “data” that are used to obtain the rating.
In the case of material-related hazards,  risk indices based on more sophisti-
cated algorithms have been developed based on process industry experience.
These are reviewed briefly in the following section.
Risk Indices
Probably the most widely used risk index is that developed by the Dow Chemi-
cal Company in the United States.  First devised in 1964 as a guide to the
selection of fire-protection methods, the Dow Fire and Explosion Index has run
through seven editions to 1994.  Although devised for assessing onsite process-
plant hazards, the index has been adopted to develop criteria to determine what
operations are acceptable as predominant uses in industrial zones3.  However,
the detail needed for the method renders it unsuitable as a general-purpose tool
for planning applications.  It serves better as an inhouse means of comparing
process options.
The method hinges on determining a material factor MF which reflects the
inherent hazardousness of the principal substance being processed or stored.
The calculation is done for each major process unit or storage facility on the
assumption that there is a minimum inventory of about 2 tonnes of material.
For lesser amounts of material, the Dow index would overstate the hazard po-
tential.  The material factor is modified by two penalty factors, one for general
process hazards (F1) that relates to items like material handling, drainage andspill control and another for special process hazards (F2)  for operation under
intensive conditions such as temperature and pressures away from ambient, the
use of rotating equipment, and the amount of unstable or flammable material
involved.  The fire and explosion index FEI is then calculated as
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FEI = MF x F1 x F2
The FEI value is proportional to an exposure radius from which a damage fac-
tor is obtained.  Various loss-control credit factors are suggested, based on the
site’s and plant’s safety provisions: these enable estimates to be made of the
maximum probable property damage and outage time from the given damage
factor.  Although the procedure is straightforward, the various parameters in the
methodology involve numerous judgmental factors based on industrial experi-
ence which is unlikely to be universal.
There is a separate guide for chemical exposure.
The Mond Index was developed from the 1973 version of the Dow Index by the
then Mond Division of ICI Ltd in the United Kingdom.  It takes into account
certain extra hazard aspects, with offsetting factors for preventive and protec-
tive features, as set out in the later editions of the Dow Index.
The instantaneous fractional annual loss (IFAL) is an index developed by the
Insurance Technical Bureau primarily for insurance-assessment purposes.  The
method, which is described by the Bureau in their IFAL  p Factor Workbook, is
based on modifying a “p-factor”, which is the equivalent of the material factor
in the Dow index, by two parameters that relate respectively to standards of
engineering (e) and of management (m), judged (presumably) on the basis of
the insurance record:
IFAL = p x e x m
In well-engineered and well-managed plants, both e and m are unity, so the
IFAL and the p factors are identical in this situation.
Event-Tree and Fault-Tree Analysis
Event and fault trees are two kinds of logic diagrams that are useful in tracing
fault and mishap pathways leading to unwanted outcomes (accidents).  Event
trees were first developed in the aerospace and nuclear industries as a means of
following the progression of some primary incident through a series of binary
branches representing success or failure of safety features or the presence or
absence of some physical condition.  Thus an event tree traces all the possible
outcomes of the initiating event.
A fault tree, on the other hand, starts with the top event and traces all the branches
from the crown to the root causes of that particular outcome.
Event trees are sometimes used to check whether all the branches have been
incorporated in a fault tree, for which it is easier to overlook a pathway to
failure.
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carpet fire
room fire
house fire
A B C D E
Cigarette falls
on carpet
cigarette
extinguished
carpet
extinguished
room
extinguished
house
extinguished
Y
N Y
YN
YN
N
carpet
soiled
carpet
damaged
carpet
destroyed
room
destroyed
house
destroyed
Figure 5.2:  Event tree for a house fire caused by a burning cigarette
Fault trees are commonly employed in quantitative risk analysis to estimate the
remoteness of a perceived outcome, and qualitatively to demonstrate safety
features and mitigating circumstances that reduce the likelihood of the out-
come being witnessed.
Event-tree analysis.  Figure  5.1 illustrates a simple event tree for a car skid
when the driver loses control: an accident may or may not result.
A B
event: car skids driver loses control
Y
N
accident
no accident
Figure 5.1:  Event tree for a car skid
So the probability of there being no accident P(C) is given by
P (C) P (A)∑P (B)=
where P (B) is the complimentary  probability of seeing event B and equal to
1 - P(B).
Event trees are particularly useful in tracing the escalation of an emergency
into increasingly more dangerous situations, as Figure  5.2 demonstrates.
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Another example of the use of an event tree in risk assessment is the study13 by
Sydney Water of the stability of a dam under both earthquake and rapid
drawdown conditions.  The authors considered the case when a major slip might
have occurred on the upstream shoulder of the dam without causing an imme-
diate breach.  Would there be any remedial response or not?  The analysis in-
volved considerations such as:
• what options could be taken to prevent the failure slip from progressing to
a total breach;
• what was the likelihood of these actions being successful;
• what would be the response time at various stages in a developing breach?
These factors would depend upon the magnitude of the earthquake and its ef-
fect on the infrastructure in the area affected.
An example of this approach has been given by Turner and Shuster14.  As shown
in Figure 5.3, an event tree is developed to choose a method to secure an unsta-
ble slope, whether to install a drainage system or flatten the slope.  The conse-
quence and cost of each outcome are separately assessed.  The consequence of
each pathway is measured in monetary terms as a relative loss.  Conceptually,
the figures might represent thousands of dollars.  The expected cost is the sum
of the various products of path probability and loss.  The event tree, in this case,
suggests that there may be a slight advantage in installing a drain compared
with flattening the slope, but some treatment of the slope would be worthwhile.
Fault-tree analysis.  The construction of a fault tree is also straightforward,
being based on the logic rules for the combinations of events, but there are a
number of pitfalls for the unwary.  If two events happen together, the events are
said to pass through an AND gate.  The probability of seeing this occur, P(T) is
less than the probability of seeing either of the primary events A and B:
P(T) = P(A)•P(B)
On the other hand, if two alternative events can give rise to a secondary event,
the primary events are said to pass through an OR gate, and the likelihood of
seeing the top event is greater than either of the two primary events:
P(T) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A)•P(B)
where the probability P(A)•P(B) represents the chance that the two events A
and B may happen together.  Whenever the incidence of these primary events is
infrequent, the likelihood of them happening simultaneously may be ignored.
A fault tree is a logic diagram and is not a representation of a flow of material or
current as in a process flowsheet or circuit diagram.  Whenever a component
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has more than one operational state, there needs to be an initial condition speci-
fied for that component.  This is treated as a conditional probability through an
AND gate.
The object of a fault-tree analysis is the determination of the minimum number
of  basic or undeveloped faults and mishaps that in combination will give rise to
a particular outcome.  A minimum cut set of events is one that does not contain
another cut set.  The complete number of minimum cut sets represents the prin-
cipal failure modes for the top event.  Failure to determine these sequences,
with the inclusion of duplicated pathways, can lead to grossly false and mis-
leading estimates of the “top-event” rate.
The reduction of a fault tree to the minimum sequence of events may be done
by Boolean algebra or some other systematic method.  Fussell’s algorithm15 is
particularly attractive for this purpose as the methodology can be adapted to a
spreadsheet representation for hand or computer-aided evaluation. The
method is described by Lees16 and is reproduced in Appendix A with a worked
example.
Do nothing
Flatten slope
Install drain
30
19.6
17.9
Alternatives Outcomes Probability Consequence Cost
Landslide 0.3 100
No landslide 0.7 0
Landslide 0.02 100
No landslide 0.98 20
System effective
System ineffective
Landslide
No landslide
Landslide
No landslide
0.04 110
0.77 10
0.04 110
0.16 10
Figure 5.3:  Use of an event tree to estimate a geotechnical risk (Turner and
Schuster14, reproduced in BRANZ Study Report No. 83, 1999, with
modification)
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A simplified fault tree for estimating the probability of a turnover of a railway
train at a sharp bend is illustrated in Figure 5.4.  The numerical values of human
reliability have been based on modified estimates from industrial psychologists
and are included solely for illustrative purposes; the relative magnitudes are
more significant than the absolute values.  The fault tree demonstrates that the
most significant prime cause derives from the train driver entering the curve
too fast by not braking in time, a conclusion not known until the full fault tree
had been developed.
Figure 5.4 also shows that a fault tree contains a mix of AND and OR gates, in
some cases a considerable number.  Extensive fault-tree development demands
significant resources in time and data research.  In most engineering applica-
tions, such a technique would only be used to investigate specific issues of
major concern that have been identified by less rigorous methods.
The various input probabilities are not single-valued, but some kind of mean
within a range.  The best failure data record appropriate range variables.  (The
much-maligned but seminal Rasmussen Report (AEC 1975), for example, gives
tipover at tight curve
5 x 10-6
5 x 10-5 p = 0.1
excessive speed tipover given excessive speed
3.5 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 5 x 10-5
driver errorexternal system failurehardware failure
speedometer
failure
brake
failure
warning board
missing/wrong
driver fails to
adjust speed
brakes
too late
brakes
wrongly
1.5 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 10-3 2 x 10-4 5 x 10-5 10-7
Figure 5.4:  Simplified fault tree for the turnover of a train at a sharp bend
(After Elms 1998, pers. comm., with modification). Probability values are
indicative and do not necessarily refer to actual practice.
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median values and the failure-rate ranges for a large number of process compo-
nents used in the nuclear power industry).  Keey and Smith17 note the variance
(or range) changes as events propagate into higher-order incidents.  The out-
puts from an OR gate shrink in range but increase in frequency: those from an
AND gate spread in range but become more remote.  The effect in a large fault
tree thus depends upon its branching network, and some uncertain input events
may have little impact on the outcome.  The price we pay for remoteness is
uncertainty.
Databases for use in fault trees are of two kinds: either relating to incidents or
to equipment reliability.  For scoping studies, there are some data in the public
domain (e.g. Lees16, Smith18).  Large organisations will normally have aggre-
gated other data from their own experience and maintenance records.  The in-
vestment of effort in creating and updating a useful database is substantial, and
this has led to the development of large databanks by national authorities.  The
United Kingdom’s Safety and Reliability Directorate runs the National Centre
for Systems Reliability and Systems Reliability Service.  Originally the databank
was based on the use of mainframe computers, and contained databases for
generic reliability, events, accidents, human reliability and maloperation, but
now has been modified to be handled on desktop machines.  An incident data-
base known as FACTS is operated by the Netherlands Safety Organisation,
TNO, with data gleaned from the literature, industry and inspectorates in vari-
ous countries.  There is also commercial software containing menus of failure
rates and failure modes suitable for use on desktop computers.
A number of companies offer software for the generation of fault trees them-
selves.  There have also been attempts to enhance informal methods of drawing
up the trees.  Khan and Hunt19, for example, describe a computer-aided method
of developing fault trees, FAULTFINDER, which can be integrated into proc-
ess-design software to generate fault-propagation pathways from information
given in a process flowsheet.
Fault-tree analyses were first used in New Zealand by A D Little Inc. in the
safety assessment of a proposed nationwide bulk LPG distribution and storage
network for Liquigas Ltd, and independently by TNO for the former Liquid
Fuels Trust Board20.  More recently these techniques have been used to inves-
tigate the safety of rail operations for Tranz Rail Ltd21.  The methodology is
also suitable for looking at the behaviour of smaller systems.  Powell22 has
used fault-tree methods for determining the explosion risk of valve-vented, do-
mestic water-storage heaters.
Enhanced Reliability
In a number of instances, a failure of an engineering component or a loss of
engineering services can lead to a disaster or gross inconvenience.  In such
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cases, a very high degree of reliability is demanded for security.  Informally, we
regard the absence of a prior failure as providing some assurance that there will
not be a failure in the future.  This experience, however, only provides a limited
assurance.  For instance, if an engineering component has not failed in the first
five years of its life, we can only say that the likely failure rate is no greater than
once in five years (the component may fail tomorrow!).  With a failure rate of
this magnitude, the chance of failure in the next year is still significant (it is
9.5%), and thus there is no great confidence in the component’s future reliabil-
ity over this period.
It is possible to enhance the reliability of an engineering system by providing
redundancy.  The redundancy may be active, in which case all subsytems in use
are in parallel, and the system as a whole only fails when a given number or all
of the components fail.  Suppose our engineering component was duplicated to
provide active redundancy.  If there had been no failures in the first five years,
then the chance of failure in the next has now been reduced to 0.9%, a tenfold
reduction.  Active redundancy may be partial. An aircraft that can fly on two of
its four engines is an example of this.  Alternatively, the redundancy may be
passive, and a standby item is switched into service only when the primary unit
has failed.  While this is a useful arrangement in an industrial location where
the failed unit can be immediately repaired and replaced, the benefit of standby
is only achieved if the switchover is reliable and the auxiliary unit will work
when called upon.
A recent example of standby failure has been cited by the Chemical Engineer23.
The supply of electricity to the fuel-cycle area of the Dunreay nuclear plant in
Scotland was cut off when an excavator hit power lines.  The site’s emergency
diesel generators did not start up, causing the ventilation system to shut down.
Fortunately, the system that monitored the discharges from the plant was pow-
ered by a separate battery-backed supply, so that no abnormal discharge from
the plant was thought to have taken place.  (One may note, in passing, that the
prime cause of this accident was loss of management control in allowing the
digger to strike the cables!)
Thus reliance on standby systems can sometimes be misplaced.  The expected
reliability will only be achieved whenever the standby is of equal performance
as the primary unit, implying regular testing to ensure that it is operable when
called upon, and the switchover at the time of the primary failure is flawless.
There may be a temptation to rely on systems of lesser performance for backup
equipment on the assumption that they will be rarely, if ever needed, and the
diminished performance can be tolerated over the repair period.
Sensors that are reliable at detecting fault conditions may give spurious trip
signals or have “fail-safe” faults that cause disruptions (such as premature burst-
ing-disk failures protecting high-pressure vessels).  The reliability for the given
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purpose may be called the responsibility of the system.  A way of achieving
enhanced responsibility is the use of voting systems.  Voting arrangements en-
able false signals to be discarded on the assumption that the reading of the
majority is correct.
One should be wary of claims of very high reliability unless the system has
been carefully designed.  A system of apparently very high integrity can be
compromised if all of its supposedly independent control features can be sub-
ject to a common-mode fault, such as a power failure.  There are practical lim-
its.  Kletz24 cites the example of a protective system with a fractional deadtime
of 0.01 (to take account of the time needed to test the system for continuing
operability).  If the system were triplicated, the fractional deadtime would ap-
parently be reduced to 10-6 if the testing were staggered.  This implies that the
deadtime of the whole system is less than one minute per year which hardly
seems possible if  manual checking  and inspection are demanded.
Hazard Warnings
Fault-tree analyses were developed in the aerospace and nuclear-power indus-
tries, where their effectiveness came under criticism after a period of use.
Bryan25 noted that the traditional method of assigning historical probabilities
to events had led to overly optimistic conclusions in the light of unexpected test
and operational failures.  Some of these had been considered to be incredible
previously, while others had been overlooked in the initial analysis.  Moreover,
fault-tree methods are based on classifying conditions into discrete states of
success or failure, whereas normally operational conditions are more likely to
reflect a range of partial success.  Thus, fault trees do not serve as infallible
guides to the remoteness of a hazard, despite their apparent mathematical rig-
our.  Their power lies in comparing alternative strategies, checking safety con-
cepts and discovering weak points in a system’s reliability.
A fault tree illustrates that an accident arises whenever some kind of mishap
can escalate into a more serious incident should there be a failure of some block-
ing measure or mitigating circumstance.  In most cases, some or all of these
features will be present to stop the accident happening.  The primary mishap
thus acts as a warning that something more serious might have occurred.  Some
industries regularly investigate all incidents regardless of size to determine
whether further safety features or procedures are needed.
More serious accidents are thus less frequently witnessed than those of lesser
consequence.  This observation has often been demonstrated by drawing an
accident triangle: for every fatal accident there are some lost-time injury acci-
dents, more minor injury accidents, and so on, as shown in Figure 5.5.  The
seemingly inconsequential mishaps serve as warnings.  Monitor these, and one
has some idea of the remoteness of more dangerous accidents, but also an in-
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sight into the means of preventing them happening.  Likewise, an indicator of
changing levels of safety on a manufacturing facility would be a monthly audit
of things such as: the number of leaking seals and flanges, the number of instru-
ments out of working order and being repaired, and general equipment and
plant tidiness.
The probability of seeing the top event of a fault tree, P(T), is much less than
that, P(W), for seeing a warning by a factor p:
P(T) = p•P(W)
In an illustrative example, Lees16 considers the case where the top-event fre-
quency is 0.001 yr-1 and warnings are expected to appear at two-yearly inter-
vals.  (The p factor is 0.002).  Over a ten-year period, the probability of seeing
the top event is 1%, but the probability than there will be a failure of witnessing
two hazard warnings in that time is only 0.04%.  There is thus a useful degree
of warning.  If more warnings take place than expected, then the system can be
examined to determine whether there are any previously unsuspected weak-
nesses.  If there are fewer warnings, then the system may be safer than origi-
nally thought.  This is a very powerful tool that is not limited to plant-related
risks.  The concept of hazard warnings is generic, and can be applied to all
kinds of safety and health issues.
Fault trees can be recast as hazard-warning trees to determine the various levels
1
fatal accident
50-100
lost-time injury accidents
500-1000
minor injury accidents
5000-10,000
near-miss accidents
50,000-100,000
unsafe conditions/unsafe practices
Figure 5.5:  The triangle of industrial accidents. (The numbers are indicative
and vary with the occupation).
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of safeguards fitted to a system and the possible mitigating circumstances which
might be present.  The presence of multiple attenuation factors (yielding a very
small p factor) is perhaps more significant in the assurance of safety than a very
low calculated value of the top-event frequency itself.  For example, an above-
ground storage tank for liquefied hydrocarbons under pressure will only be torn
apart in a boiling-liquid expanding-vapour explosion (“bleve”) when a leak is
not stemmed and the accumulated liquid catches fire under the tank, the flames
play on the vessel for many minutes, the water-deluge system fails, and the
combined efforts of staff and the fire-brigade are unable to cope with the blaze.
Notwithstanding the high hazard potential of  hydrocarbon liquids held under
pressure, the storage is regarded as “safe” because of the multiple safeguards in
preventing the final outbreak.
Evaluation of Consequences
In some cases, the consequences of a hazard being realised are determinate: the
outcome is known.  This is the situation with mechanical breakdowns of equip-
ment which do not trigger secondary failures.  In other instances, when there is
a release of hazardous material or energy, the impacts may be far-reaching and
the effects are more indeterminate.
In the case of geotechnical hazards, Finlay et al.26 summarise the vulnerability
of persons in open spaces, vehicle and in buildings from historical data based
on experience in Hong Kong with landslips.  Some values are reproduced in
Table 5.3.
In general, the consequence of an accident is related to the generated force or
released quantity of excess material or energy.  Since only a small amount may
have a perceptible effect on a person or property, and a full impact may require
a considerable amount, the likelihood of a given effect is normally given in
probabilistic terms.  One measure that is sometimes used is the probit (prob-
Table 5.3:  Vulnerability ranges to persons from landslide debris. Prob-
ability of death from the given event.
Case  Range in Data Recommended
Value
Effects
If struck by rockfall 0.1-0.7 0.5 May be injured
If buried by debris 0.8-1.0 1.0 Death by asphyxia
If not buried 0.1-0.5 0.1 High chance of survival
If vehicle is damaged
only 0-0.3 0.3 High chance of survival
If building collapses 0.9-1.0 1.0 Death is almost certain
If debris strikes
building only 0-0.1 0.05 Virtually no danger
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ability unit).  It is a random variable with a mean of 5 and variance 1.  A prob-
ability of 95% corresponds to a probit of 6.64.  A transformation of probability
percentages to probits is found in a number of texts (e.g. Lees16).  The probit
variable Y is a linear function of a parameter X, which is a measure of the inten-
sity of the causative factor producing the harm:
Y = k1 + k2X
where k1 and k2 are constants that depend upon the specified level of harm
(such as the extent of burns to an onlooker from a fierce fire).  Eisenberg et al.27
give some values for these constants for personal injury and structural damage.
The advantage of using the probit is that this expression for harm is linear, and
reduces the difficulty of assessing extreme events with the underlying sigmoid
dose-effect curve.
For an explosion, the parameter X is taken as the peak local overpressure.  In
the case of fires, X is interpreted as a thermal dose defined by I4/3t, where I is
the local intensity of radiation from the fire and t  is the exposure time.  With a
release of a toxic gas, X is also taken to be the integral dose #cn dt, where c is the
concentration of the toxic substance in the gas and n is an exponent that nor-
mally lies between 1 and 3.
The spread of gases is usually calculated on the basis of diffusion theory, with
the “diffusion” or dispersion coefficients obtained from empirical experience
under particular meteorological conditions.  While such calculations are reli-
able under the specified conditions over flat ground, they may lead to uncertain
or inaccurate predictions in actual situations of uneven terrain and in the pres-
ence of tall obstacles such as buildings and other structures. One commonly
used model in Australia and New Zealand is AUSPLUME, which is based on
the premise that cross-sections through elevated plumes from point sources of a
substance have a Gaussian or normal distribution of concentration.  The model
contains a subroutine to allow for the influence of wakes from buildings on the
dispersion from a stack.  There are also suggestions to correct for a change in
terrain elevation.  Details may be found in the Victorian EPA Publication, number
264.
There are commercial software packages, such as WHAZAM-II and SAFETI,
which incorporate consequence calculations.
The extension of these methods to evaluate environmental risks poses formida-
ble difficulties in modelling, particularly in assessing the long-term impacts of
a number of releases which individually may be considered to be minor or
negligible28,29.  Such modelling requires knowledge of the history of the re-
leases, and the mechanisms of dispersion and accumulation at sensitive sites, as
well as ecotoxicity data.
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There are also problems in assessing effects at very low doses.  Cothern et al.30
note that disparities of several orders of magnitude are found in trying to deter-
mine the risk from the presence of extremely small concentrations of trichlo-
roethylene (TCE) in groundwater by extrapolating data for the effect at much
higher concentrations, depending on the method used.
Clearly any extrapolation of data demands the use of an appropriate model of
the effect mechanism, rather than relying on an arbitrary extension of any cor-
relation beyond its tested range.  The choice of such a model may be a matter of
contention.
Despite many years of research, the effect of low doses of ionising radiation,
for example, is still the subject of much debate.  A somewhat similar argument
has arisen more recently around the effects of electromagnetic radiation from
cell-phone towers and high-voltage transmission lines.  Current safety stand-
ards are based on the thermal effects of this radiation, with significant derating
from these levels to give a safety margin, but there are still worries expressed
from laboratory studies that athermal effects to body cells may be present also.
Case Study 5.3  Risk Analysis of a Wastewater Treatment Plant
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy Anchor Products Ltd)
The plant is located at Te Rapa, near Hamilton, and the cultural and environmental sen-
sitivity of the surrounding environment together with the technically advanced nature of
the process being employed led to uncertainty over the response of the site’s waste treat-
ment plant under certain conditions. The site owner wished to gain a better understand-
ing of the plant’s behaviour under such conditions and, if necessary,  implement design
changes.
As a number of different incidents were possible, a “bottom-up” approach was adopted
for the analysis.  Additional probability simulations were employed to analyse the load-
ing on specific elements of the design.
The main elements of the plant were investigated in turn to identify all credible fault
conditions.  For each one, the effect of these upsets on the process effluent was recorded
together with the anticipated likelihood of failure.  The consequential effects on the
environment and on site production were classified against a previously defined scale.
As the results of the initial analysis demonstrated that the stormwater basin would be-
come overloaded under some conditions, a separate probability-based simulation was
carried out.  This demonstrated that the design may not be able to act as an effective
contingency volume under some fault conditions.  The simulation was therefore ex-
tended to identify the optimum volume for separate contingency storage.
The risk analysis demonstrated that the fitting of the additional storage tank would lead
to a five- to six-fold lowering of environmental risk and a significant reduction in re-
sources required to cover for process fault and high load incidents.
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Risk Evaluation6
Risk evaluation is concerned with deciding whether a risk is tolerable or not. It
is the next step of a full risk assessment (see Figure 2.3). The evaluation is used
to determine policies for managing the identified hazards by evaluating and
comparing levels of risk against predetermined standards, risk-target levels or
other criteria of safety.  These decisions hinge on judgements regarding the
acceptability of risk.  Strictly, no level of additional risk is acceptable, and often
those who make such judgments do not face the imposed risks directly.  Rather
than speak of  “acceptable risk” we talk of tolerable risk, the risk that can be
borne in the meantime because of collateral benefits until the time we can do
something better.  A starting point for the search for tolerable risk levels has
been the analysis of existing risks that society faces in various ways.
Subjective judgements, whether by engineers or others, are a major component
of any risk assessment.  If such judgements are faulty, then risk-management
efforts are likely to be misdirected.  An American study1 in which respondents
of various backgrounds were asked to rank thirty different kinds of hazards
produced a wide range of viewpoints.  A significant factor in making a judge-
ment was the perceived potential for disaster rather than a particular risk posed.
The use of quantitative methods of estimating both the remoteness of an identi-
fied hazard and the potential consequence should it be realised provides a basis
for making a judgement with the minimum of subjectivity.
Many authorities, including the Australian/New Zealand Standard, consider risk
assessment to include both the analysis and evaluation of risks.  This chapter is
concerned with the latter aspects, such as the tolerability of identified risks as a
basis for the selection of options and defining risk-management policies.
A major risk assessment is expensive, costing several hundreds of thousands of
dollars, and in some instances the cost can run into millions.  It is not an under-
taking entered into lightly.  In almost every case, it is worthwhile to do a pre-
liminary scoping and pilot study.  This prior work is analogous to commission-
ing sketch plans or flowsheets before deciding to proceed to a detailed design
and full working drawings.  In some cases, this initial study could provide enough
information for a risk-management decision without the need for a further, more
detailed assessment.
Accepted and Imposed Risks
It is often claimed that people perceive a risk to be less serious if it has been
accepted voluntarily rather than imposed.  However, the correlation between
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voluntariness and personal safety is only moderate.  There are instances of in-
voluntary risks that involve threats to personal safety, as in wartime, while it is
debatable whether workplace hazards represent voluntary or involuntary risks.
Voluntariness has to do with whether you blame yourself or others2.  If the
cause of an accident is human, we tend to attribute blame in proportion to the
various agents.  This process is seen in its most ritualised form in public inquir-
ies and court proceedings that follow major incidents.
If we are already ill-disposed towards an agent because of perceived authority
to control events which have been unilaterally imposed on us, then much stronger
blame is attributed in the case of an accident than if we had willingly been
involved in the decision-making in the first place.  This reaction illustrates that
a feature in distinguishing imposed and voluntary risks is the sense of personal
control  whenever risks are willingly undertaken.  We believe, perhaps mistak-
enly, that we are now masters of our fate and not potential helpless victims of
the rashness or callousness of others.
Individual and Societal Risks
Risks can be viewed in two ways: as threats to one’s person, or threats to the
wider community.  These risks are rarely the same, and both aspects must be
assessed.  A person may be engaged in a hazardous activity at work which
affects no-one else.  The risk to society from this activity may be negligible
compared with the other hazards of life, and indeed may bring societal benefits,
but from the individual’s viewpoint the hazard is far from slight.  Conversely, a
public health risk may be community-wide, resulting in significant healthcare
and other costs, but the threat to any one individual could be very small indeed.
Other examples include accidents involved many simultaneous deaths such as
aircraft crashes.
Society is averse to the trauma of multiple-fatality accidents (often triggering
public inquiries to determine cause) even though the individual risk might be
shown to have been small.  There is normally  a call to make “things safer”.
The response of the Department of Conservation to the collapse of a viewing
platform at Cave Creek, with its tragic loss of young lives, has been a thorough
examination of facilities in the conservation estate, with the strengthening or
withdrawal of structures not meeting safety standards.  There is pressure to
“remove accident backspots”, despite evidence that improved roadworks may,
in most cases, only have a minor effect on accident rates.  Sabey and Taylor 3
report that the United Kingdom’s Transport and Road Research Laboratory had
found that in 65% of all accidents the road-user solely contributed to the acci-
dent, while a further 24% could be attributed to both the user and the road
environment.
An individual risk may be defined as the annual probability of harm (injury or
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death) to a given person in a particular place from a specified incident.  This
risk is the probability P(C|F) of a particular consequence C following a failure
or accident F, and the vulnerability P(V|C) of a particular person given that
outcome:
P P P =  (C | F) (V | C)∑
The vulnerability is likely to vary over a range of values for a particular conse-
quence, as noted in the previous chapter for far-reaching effects.
The societal or group risk is the annual probability that a specified number of
persons or more will be harmed to a given extent from a particular incident.
Frequently, societal risks are displayed on terms of risk profiles, which are plots
of probable incident frequency against the outcome (normally measured as fa-
talities per event).
Farmer4 has plotted the annual frequency of events resulting in death from both
natural and humanly-caused events to illustrate that, as risks becomes more
severe in their consequence, so they become less common.  These risk profiles
of societal risk are reproduced in Figure 6.1.  He noted that, while severe natu-
ral events may kill many thousands in a single event, even the largest of indus-
trial accidents would be unlikely to kill more than a thousand.  However, the
differences in slopes, he added, might be due to limitations of data.  Further, he
remarked that it was difficult to ascribe a weight  to a  predicted  event  causing
say 10 000 casualties  at  an  estimated  probability of  1 in 10 000 per year,
which is not the same as a probable casualty rate of 1 per year for a relatively
common accident!  Other authorities have been less cautious.  The Rasmussen
report confidently predicted that accidents to nuclear-power stations involving
1000 or more deaths (based on a group of 100 reactors) was equivalent to the
risk of a meteor striking a major city in the United States at an annual probabil-
ity of 1 in a million.
Risk Criteria
Early attempts to derive criteria for the acceptability of risks tried to assess risk
levels that society appeared to tolerate in everyday living.  Rothchild5 set an
acceptable risk level as 1 in 7500 per year of exposure based on the number of
car accidents in the United Kingdom in 1974.  In the Netherlands, a waterways
authority, Provincial Waterstaat Groningen6, drew up criteria from earlier Dutch
experience with flooding of low-lying land when sea-dykes were breached in a
severe North Sea storm.  A single fatality once every hundred years was consid-
ered to be on the borderline of acceptability (a hundred years being of order of
a human lifespan), while incidents involving more than 1000 simultaneous deaths
were deemed to be unacceptable.  The scale of impacts was also related to a
qualitative one for environmental damage, ranging from a local impact from
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the use of pesticides to a major disaster rendering a wide area unfit for human
habitation for a long time (such as the impact arising from a major nuclear
radiation release).
Earlier, the Delta Act of the Netherlands had prescribed that the water defences
should be sufficient to withstand flooding of the “heart of Holland” with a fail-
ure probability of 1 in 10 000 per year.  The Dutch Parliament set an individual
fatality risk criterion of 10-5 (1 in 100 000) per year for existing risks involun-
tarily imposed  on the basis that no risk of human origin should increase the
individual risk of a young person, dying of natural causes, by more than 10
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Figure 6.1:  Risk profiles for (a) multiple-fatality accidents occurring world-
wide from natural causes and (b) extrapolation of data on accidents occur-
ring within the British Isles. (After Farmer4)
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percent.  For 12 to 16-year old youths, this health risk was estimated to be 10-4
(1 in 10 000) per year.  With new projects, the limit was set one order lower, at
1% of the risk from natural causes (VROM 1985).
Farmer’s curves have been used as a basis for risk-level bands of acceptability.
The United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Commission7 has produced limits
for intolerable societal risk in a report on the major hazard aspects of the trans-
port of dangerous materials.  An upper limit of  “local tolerability” was based
on the assessed risks from petrochemical facilities to the surrounding popula-
tion on Canvey island in the Thames estuary when a risk of 1 in 500 years from
an accident involving 500 deaths was considered “just tolerable” (Figure 6.2).
The lower limit, representing risks that were deemed “negligible”, was set at
three orders of magnitude lower.  A third line, one order below the upper line, is
called the local-scrutiny line, and represents the bound for the particular neigh-
bourhood of the associated road, rail or marine transport routes.  The region
between the upper and lower bands represents risks that are subject to improve-
ment according to the principle that they should be “as low as reasonably prac-
ticable” (ALARP).
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Figure 6.2:  Societal risk tolerability. (After the UK Health
and Safety Commission7)
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These risk limits were adopted without modification by the New Zealand Gov-
ernment’s Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion8 to demonstrate its find-
ing that the visits of nuclear-powered vessels to ports in New Zealand would be
safe.  The concept of upper and lower bands of tolerability, with a broad region
where risks are treated to be as low as practical, has been adopted by the Envi-
ronmental Risk Management Authority9 as guidelines for assessing risks posed
by hazardous substances and new organisms.  The Authority, however, has not
put quantitative values on these risk limits at the time of writing.
Case Study 6.1 describes another way of setting an acceptable risk boundary in
terms of the extent of accident and its impact on people.
Case Study 6.1 Environmental Risk Assessment of a Proposed Wastewater
Treatment Plant
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy, Watercare Services Ltd)
Watercare Services Ltd, Auckland, wished to quantify the risks associated with the
operation of the proposed plant at Mangere.  In addition, some basis for developing
Emergency Response Procedures was required.
Owing to the wide range of ways that the environment can be affected, a “bottom up”
event-tree approach was taken, combined with an environmental consequence model,
to evaluate possible incidents.
The waste treatment plant process was first split into discrete stages that represented
the major process steps and plant services.  A standard list of hazards was developed
and applied to each stage.  Wherever applicable, the consequence of each hazard, and
the expected frequency of occurrence was considered and the resulting faults noted.
The effect of mitigation and contingencies was factored in and the estimated environ-
mental effects listed.
The effect on the environment was measured in terms of public perception and simpli-
fied by describing effects in terms of discrete measures of duration of effect and the
extent (area/number of people affected).  Each step in consequence was assigned a
Severity Index.  A proposed Resource Consent limit, expressed as a percentage time
that limits could be exceeded, allowed an acceptable risk boundary to be set.
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The information derived from the study was available to the process designers
thus enabling the design to be refined to the point were environmental risks
could be reduced to an acceptable level by the most efficient means.
Society’s aversion to multiple-fatality accidents has sometimes been translated
into formal criteria such as those adopted by the Danish and Dutch authorities
(Stallen et al.10).  In the Netherlands, for example, it is proposed that the societal
risk shall be less than the limit given by
f CN$ 2
where f is the  accident frequency, N is the number killed in a given accident
and C is a coefficient which represents society’s accident tolerance.  The Dutch
have chosen 0.001 for the value of the coefficient, whereas a taskforce of Dan-
ish engineers have recommended a value of 0.01 in respect to the siting of
chemical plants (Taylor et al.11).  Pikaar and Seaman12 report that a number of
major European chemical companies now apply societal risk criteria in the in-
ternal self-regulation of their activities.
As in the United Kingdom, risk-tolerance limits have been proposed in the
Netherlands for town-planning purposes in the neighbourhood of the transport
routes for hazardous materials (Stallen et al.10).  However, an attempt to formu-
late a similar limit in connection with the development of a fifth runway for the
country’s major international airport failed because of differences in the nature
of the hazards and the areas of exposure between airports and fixed process
installations.
The Anglo-Dutch risk-assessment developments have been applied in other
countries, usually on an ad-hoc basis; but in New South Wales, the Department
of Environment and Planning has adopted criteria specifying a variety of maxi-
mum allowable risk levels not to be exceeded for individual risk from a limit of
10-6 per year in residential areas and a limit five times higher in industrial
zones13.  Similar attempts to set risk guidelines for the siting of LPG facilities
did not gain acceptance in New Zealand.
For geotechnical hazards, Fell and Hartford14 provide suggested tolerable fa-
Outputs of the study were:
• Identification and ranking of the fault sequences that represented highest risk.
• Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) criteria for critical process elements.
• Graphical representation of the plant’s risk profile
• Identification of unacceptable risks in terms of the incident type.
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tality-risk criteria for the individual risk from landslips involving engineered
slopes.  These values, set out in Table 6.1, appear to have been based on other
criteria for existing, new and upgraded dams (ANCOLD 1997).  The situation
for natural slopes is less clear.  Fell and Hartford14 speculate that the general
public will tolerate much higher individual risks from unmodified slopes and
suggest a criterion of order 10-3.  While the public may be more tolerant of
failures on unmodified land, such failures are less likely to have human impact
in many cases.  If valuable, non-human resources (such as infrastructure) are
mainly at risk, then a much higher probability would seem to be more appropri-
ate, or a cost-based criterion chosen.
Table 6.1: Criteria for tolerable individual fatality risk from landsliding
(after Fell and Hartford14)
Situation Tolerable risk for loss of life
Existing slopes 10
-4 for person most at risk
10-6 average of persons at risk
New slopes 10
-5 for person most at risk
10-6 average of persons at risk
Farmer’s risk profiles are given in terms of risk of death.  There are reasons for
choosing fatality criteria.  Data on fatalities are recorded by law, but informa-
tion on levels of injury is more difficult to interpret even when available.  How-
ever, in any given occupation, there is generally a correlation between lost-time
and injury accidents and those which result in death.  The triangle of accidents,
Figure 5.5, illustrates this principle.  Measures to reduce the incidence of fatal
accidents will also reduce the likelihood of accidents of lesser gravity being
witnessed.
There is clearly a limit to the extent of reliability, even with best engineering
practice, and also the degree of confidence in estimates put on that reliability.
Bowen15 quotes a limiting figure of 1 event in 100 000 years is the failure
probability to which plants can be engineered on the basis of experience in the
nuclear power industry.  Lees16, in commenting on this figure, notes that a
distinction should be made between an estimate of 10-5 per year, as a single
figure, and one that has been made as a compound of two separate events, with
risks of 10-2 and 10-3 per year respectively, for which a greater certainty may
be put on the values.  The point is acknowledged, but often a very small engi-
neering probability is a compound of many more likely (and thus more certain)
events.
Even more uncertain is the reliability that can be put on health risks obtained by
extrapolating data from relatively high exposure levels to animal species or
from the interpretation of accidental exposures.  Unless there is a sound physi-
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Figure 6.3:  An example of an individual-risk contour plot or risk map
(after Slater et al.19)
ological model of harm, or reliable epidemiological data, the method of ex-
trapolation and the prudent safety factors to be embedded are essentially mat-
ters of professional judgement.  As noted in Chapter 4, the extrapolation of
bioassay data for ingestion of trichloroethylene in drinking water becomes very
uncertain at low concentration levels17.  For example, the range of estimated
lifetime risks extends over four orders of magnitude at a concentration of 0.1
µg per litre.  Nevertheless, even when the uncertainty is so high, as in this case,
a risk-management decision based on data is likely to be sounder than one that
has no physical basis whatsoever.
Risk Maps
Whenever a hazard potential is far-reaching, liable to affect many people, and
the hazardous items are sufficiently separated that their individual contribu-
tions can be distinguished, the individual risks can be conveniently illustrated
by superimposing contours of these risks (normally as annual probable fatali-
ties) on a map of the area of concern.  This is known as a risk map.  An example
for offsite risks is given in Figure 6.3, but risk maps may be used to pinpoint
onsite hazardous zones18.
A risk map only shows individual risk profiles.  The whole picture of societal
risk depends upon the population distribution as well.  An individual fatal risk
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of 2 x 10-6 (2 in a million) per year in a single detached house may be consid-
ered to be less serious than one of 0.5 x 10-6 (1 in 500 000) per year in a high-
rise block of flats.  Risk maps are thus used in conjunction with population
distributions to represent risks to communities.
European planning authorities, notably in the Netherlands, have found risk
maps to be a useful tool to assess the hazard potential of major industrial activ-
ity in densely populated areas, sometimes embarrassingly so.  Gardenier (1998,
priv. comm.) tells the story of one Dutch mayor who was proudly opening a
new urban subdivision at the same time his officials were declaring that the
land in question was in a zone above the limiting tolerable value for individual
risk!
A risk map was first used in New Zealand by the Netherlands Safety Organisa-
tion, TNO, to show the risks associated with running an LPG pipeline through
New Plymouth20.  The surrounding area was divided into blocks of 100m size,
and the effects of each unwanted event, such as a pipe rupture, were evaluated
at every 100m along the length of the proposed pipeline.  The societal risk was
determined by assigning to each square a population on the basis that it was
uniformly distributed throughout the residential area.  The use of risk maps was
found to be helpful by Stewart21 in her comparison of natural and industrial
hazards faced by a hypothetical New Zealand small town, but the risks from
natural hazards were found to far outweigh those of industrial origin.  Less
detailed are generalised maps depicting natural hazard zones, such as those
presented by the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group22 in their study of
the vulnerability of lifelines to natural hazards in the Christchurch metropolitan
area.  The zonal boundaries were drawn from geological information derived
largely from numerous borelog tests.
Fatality Criteria
As noted earlier, fatality criteria have been frequently used as basis for compar-
ing risks of various kinds.  The fatal accident rate (FAR) is defined as the
number of deaths per 10 million exposed hours, which is roughly equivalent to
a workforce of 1000 being exposed over the whole of their working lives.  De-
spite qualms about the equivalence of various kinds of risks23, the use of fatal
accident rates enables various risks to be compared on an equal contact-time
basis.  Such comparisons have proved to be useful means of eliminating the
more risky activities and improving safety in the process industries overseas as
well as in New Zealand.
The following Case Study 6.2 given by Kletz24 illustrates the technique of us-
ing FAR values to assess safety levels.
Some FAR values for compensated accidents at work in New Zealand in 1981
are shown in Table 6.2.  Although the data are fairly old, the relative ranking is
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still likely to hold.  These data may be compared with others for non-occupa-
tional activities listed in Table 6.3.
The notable thing about these data is that many everyday activities appear to be
riskier  than some occupations that are considered be quite hazardous (such as
high-rise construction) when activities are compared on a equal contact-time
basis.  One explanation may be that most of us only undertake our riskier ven-
tures in bursts of activity.  This point is illustrated by a speculative example of
a person’s possible weekly spread of activities (Table 6.4).  The risks associated
with everyday activities are “shared” so that the relative risk for each is about
the same.  This principle of risk aversion can be used in regard to occupational
hazards, in which working practices are regulated so that high-risk activities
are moderated by the minimisation of contact time in the hazard zone.
Case Study 6.2  Safety of Hydrocarbon-Storage Tanks
Maintenance records for 100 fixed-roof tanks for the storage of volatile hydrocarbons
had shown that a total of 20 explosions or fires had taken place over a 20-year period.
Four of these accidents had occurred when a worker was on a roof.  The frequency of
either fire or explosion per tank is thus given by 20 events / [1000 tanks x 20 years] =
0.001 yr-1.  The average aggregated contact hours between each incident is the ratio of
the working hours per year to the number of incidents per year multiplied by the frac-
tional exposure time (0.01).  This gives a value of 2000 / [0.001 x 0.01] = 2 x 108 hours
for this averaged period.  Since the unit value of FAR corresponds to a contact time of
108 hours, the FAR value is 1/2.  This is small compared with the mean value for the
industrial hazards in the chemical industries, and might be regarded as indicating a
tolerable risk.  However, the presence of a worker on the roof may lead to a greater
chance of an outbreak of fire or explosion due to that worker’s activities there.  The
conditional probability for a fatality given an accident is 4/20 = 0.2, whereas the condi-
tional probability for a worker to be on the roof is only 0.01.  Clearly, the presence of a
worker on the roof had increased the chance of an accident twentyfold (0.2/0.01), and
the risk now appears unacceptable.  On the basis of this calculation, the tanks were
fitted with nitrogen blanketing to reduce the hazard.
Table 6.2:  Compensated fatal accidents at work in New Zealand in 1981
(after Keey25). A FAR index of 1 corresponds to 1 death in 108 (100
million) hours exposure
Occupation FAR index Occupation FAR index
Consumer and
tourist services 3.4 Construction 8.2
Finance, banking
and insurance 3.5
Transport, storage
and communication 13.9
Manufacturing 3.8 Agriculture, forestryand fishing 16.4
Community and
social services 4.5
Mining and
quarrying 23.1
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It follows that there is a danger in comparing averaged work-related risks with
those of recreational activities which are enjoyed only for brief periods for the
element of danger that are associated therewith.  Averaged data can obscure the
hazards of particular jobs, as such data mask the hazards of the things we do
after work.  Nevertheless, industrial health risks of certain trades can be high.
Carson and Mumford27 report FAR rates varying from 3 for cancer of the scro-
tum for turners with cutting oils, 35 for nasal cancer for wood machinists, and
325 for cancer of the bladder with rubber-mill workers.  About 8% of all can-
cers reported in 1980 in the United Kingdom were attributed to exposures at
work.
Injury Criteria
While the use of fatal-risk criteria seems straightforward and relatively easy to
compare with other hazards in life, there are still a number of problems in to-
Table 6.4 :  Risks of everyday living, a speculative example
Activity/Exposure FAR Contact hours
per week
Weighted
FAR
Sleeping 0 56 0
Activities at home 3 63 1.1
Activities at work 7 40 1.8
Driving 60 5 1.8
Recreation 50 4 1.2
Total 5.9
Table 6.3: FAR index for non-occupational activities (adapted from
Kletz24 and Smith26)
Activity FAR index
Staying at home (8h/day) 3
Travelling by bus 4
Travelling by train 5
Travelling by motor-car 50-60
Riding a pedal bike 100
Travelling by air 100-250
Riding a motor bike 500-1000
Canoeing 1000
Swimming 1300
Mountaineering (rock-climbing) 4000
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tally relying on these criteria alone.  The United Kingdom’s Health and Safety
Executive7 notes that:
• Society is concerned about risks of serious injury or other damage as well
as death;
• There are technical difficulties in calculating the risks of death from a
hazard to which individual members of a population may have widely dif-
ferent vulnerabilities;
and one might add:
• In New Zealand, the number of fatal accidents attributed to engineering
failures are rare, and work-related deaths are less common than traffic ac-
cidents (by an order of magnitude).
The Health and Safety Executive7 suggests that an injury criterion might be
based on the concept of an excessive dose, which might be a “dose” of excess
heat from a fire, an overpressure from an explosion or exposure to a toxic ma-
terial, giving all of the following effects:
• severe distress to everyone;
• a substantial fraction requiring medical attention;
• some people being seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment;
• any highly susceptible people being killed.
Keey28 also adds serious disruption to lifestyle, including an evacuation lasting
for more than 1 hour.  With this approach, a quoted risk level (such as 1 in a
million per year) would represent the likelihood of receiving a “dose” from a
one of a wide range of possible events.  Some events may give doses within a
risk target, while others may yield a worse dose.  In analysing these risks, as-
sumptions have to made regarding typical occupancy of areas under threat.
Individual and societal risks differ whenever buildings are used continually by
the same people (as in workplaces) rather than intermittently (by shoppers in
supermarkets, for example).
A figure of 1 in a million per year was proposed as the lower bound of tolerabil-
ity in relation to the risk of receiving a dangerous dose or worse for a typical
pattern of user behaviour in a proposed development.  (The Health and Safety
Commission7 added that this bound corresponds to a risk of about one-third in
a million per year death, estimated on the basis of the risk of getting a some-
what higher dose which would result in the death of one-half of the exposed
population).  For developments where there would be clearly a large proportion
of highly susceptible people, such as rest-homes for the elderly, a lower bound
of one-third of a million per year was suggested as the tolerable limit for getting
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a dangerous dose.
Injury accidents are reported as the number per 100 000 exposed hours, corre-
sponding roughly to a single working lifetime, or as an annual rate per 1000
persons, as listed in Table 6.5.  The number of injury accidents of varying se-
verity seen for every fatal accident ranges approximately between 50 and 1000,
depending upon the nature of the hazardous activity or situation.
Table 6.5: Compensated  accidents at work in New Zealand in 1981
(Keey25)
Occupation Rate per thousand Injury/fatal
accident ratio
Fatal Non-fatal
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing 0.304 25.7 84.5
Mining & quarrying 0.430 85.3 198
Manufacturing 0.071 59.9 844
Utilities 0 51.2 -
Construction  0.152 39.8 262
Transport, storage,
communication 0.260 40.7 157
Organisational Factors
Deficiencies in management can lead to degradation of safety levels though
poor management policies and deficient feed-back of information about work-
ing conditions, as shown in Figure 6.4.  This failure may be due to inadequate
auditing or reporting of accidents, but could also derive from the absence of
local checks and strategic controls.
There have been attempts, therefore, to account for management-related pa-
rameters in quantitative risk assessments.  For example, Bennet30 suggests the
use of a management factor as a multiplier to calculated hazard indices to take
account of four elements in a safety-management system which influence a
worker’s ability to do a job: the training procedures, the standard of equipment
and instrument maintenance, the standard of control-system hardware and the
quality of safety management.  These elements are then graded against verbal
descriptors ranging from 0 for “poor” to 1 for “excellent”.  The management
factor MF is then given by
MF
w R
=
%
=
1
1
j j
j
m
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where wj is a weighting and Rj is the rating of the jth management element.
Bennet suggests a uniform value of 0.5 for the weighting factor, so that an
“average” management factor based on an “average” rating of 0.5 yields a unit
value for MF.  “Fair” ratings result in a value of 2.5 for MF, which is consistent
with Kletz’s observation31 that a management factor range of at least 3 is needed
to account for normal differences in management skill.  A more elaborate scheme
has been proposed by Keey25 based on a ten-point evaluation with differences
in weightings.
The concept of a management factor is embedded in the evaluation of the in-
stantaneous annual fractional loss developed by the Insurance Technical Bu-
reau noted in Chapter 5.  However, while insurance companies may be able to
devise a scale based upon the loss history of their clients, it is generally more
difficult to estimate numerical values of an adjustment factor on published fail-
ure and accident data which presumably correspond to some average standard
of management.  Further, Tweeddale32 argues that it is unsound to multiply
generic failure rates by some overall management factor.  The cause of any
failure or accident is due to particular circumstances, usually involving abnor-
malities and lack of mitigation.  Although Tweeddale tentatively suggests the
hardware and human failures might be separately estimated, with different
management factors for each kind of failure, he concludes that failures due to
human causes are so indeterminate that the risk assessment becomes essen-
tially unquantifiable in this way.  He recommends that the integrity of a quanti-
tative risk analysis should be preserved, with the hardware-related failures esti-
mated quantitatively and the rest of the risk assessment being treated qualita-
tively.
Failure types Failure tokens
Source
types
Function
types
Fallible
decisions
Line
management
deficiencies
Loop 1
Loop 2
Loop 3
Loop 4
Condition
tokens
Unsafe act
tokens
Psychological
precursors
of unsafe acts
Unsafe
acts
Accidents
and
incidents
Local checks
upon
adequacy
of existing
defences
Figure 6.4:  Influence of organisational factors in the degradation of engi-
neering safety (after Tuli and Aplostolkalis29)
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The problem cannot be so simply resolved, because recorded hardware-related
failures contain other embedded factors.  In a pioneering survey of process-
plant maintenance records, students33 from Loughborough University in the
United Kingdom tried to determine basic failure rates for control and measure-
ment instruments by estimating a so-called “environment factor”, which varied
from 1 in clean, well-managed conditions to 4 in the worst cases.  Rarely have
subsequent workers attempted to copy this approach, and the published data
represent some kind of average of past practice.
Risk-evaluation Case Studies
The following case studies illustrate examples of risk evaluation of varying
complexity.
Case Study 6.3(a)  Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage and Distribution
Facilities
Vocal concern about the possible widespread introduction of bulk liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) into New Zealand resulted in the proponent company, Liquigas Ltd, commis-
sioning a series of site-specific reports for the proposed storage and distribution facili-
ties from A D Little Inc. whose work was subject to an independent academic audit.
Separately, the former Liquid Fuels Trust Board20 commissioned its own report from
the Industrial Safety Department of the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific
Research, TNO.  This study, besides assessing the risks and town-planning implications
of LPG use, also reviewed the safety record in countries with long-standing experience
with the fuel.  The work relied heavily on a much larger risk assessment undertaken for
the Netherlands government to provide guidelines for planners and other officials in
defining requirements for the siting, design and construction of LPG facilities.  It was a
major study, costing some NZ$2.5 million, and described in a 27-volume, 4000-page
report.
This detailed risk analysis enabled the safety aspects of various alternative systems to
be considered such as:
• the comparison of above-ground storage with mounded or underground storage;
• the comparison of alternative transport options, such as the use of pipelines or move-
ment by coastal tanker;
• the comparison of alternative road-transport routes, such as a shorter route though a
shopping area with a longer route through a more residential area.
These comparisons led to the choice on safety grounds for mounded tanks at storage
depots rather than above-ground cylindrical or spherical vessels.
The various risk analyses differed in their numerical estimates of the impact of rare, far-
reaching effects, due to possible differences in the embedded pessimism in the effects
models chosen, but all agreed that major incidents were most unlikely given the design
criteria to be adopted and the assumption of high standards for maintenance of the pro-
posed system.  Inevitably with such large studies, critics were able to point to some
inconsistencies, and one assiduous witness at the hearing for the proposed develop-
ments in Christchurch pointed to an order of magnitude error in the calculations for the
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safety of the tankship when berthing in Lyttelton harbour.  In the end, the multiple safe-
guards illustrated in the various fault trees were more persuasive of safety than the nu-
merical estimates of top-event frequencies.
Case Study 6.3(b)  Petroleum Transportation Hazards in the Wellington Region
(Brabhaharan, P and Gnana Bharathy, Opus International Consultants, 2000, pers.
comm.; courtesy, Wellington Regional Council)
The aim of this study was to determine the nature and spatial distribution of risks asso-
ciated with the transportation of petroleum products in the Wellington Region, by sea,
road, rail and pipelines.  The adequacy of existing controls and response systems was to
be considered, to assist in planning for risk mitigation and emergency management.
Simplified event trees were used to combine the probabilities of related contributory
events, with traffic analyses to determine accident potential.  The spatial distribution of
risk was assessed using a Geographical Information System (GIS) for combining the
hazards with the consequences, and for presenting the risks.
This risk study enabled an objective assessment of the risks to the community and the
natural environment from petroleum transportation, and presentation of the risks spa-
tially using a GIS.  This will enable the use of these risk maps in planning for risk
management, including mitigation at critical areas and emergency preparedness.
Case Study 6.3(c) Rosebank Industrial Area
In 1988, Auckland City Council commissioned an investigation into the levels of risk
from industrial activity in the Rosebank Peninsula.  The study was a response to a grow-
ing concern about the use of hazardous materials, particularly those close to residential
developments and sensitive areas of the natural environment.  The industrial area is
confined into a narrow landmass which extends into the intertidal waters of the Waitemata
Harbour and has limited access by road.  Because of the large number of industries in
the area, the scope of the study34 was limited to ten representative installations, includ-
ing chemical and paint manufacturing and warehousing, foundry, light engineering and
metalworking plants.
Following a detailed site inspection, a list of potential incidents was drawn up and the
possible severity and likelihood of each were estimated.  The incidents were ranked and
sorted according to type of impact, with judgemental scales of the effect on people,
property and the environment.  A fatality scale was used for the effect on people, with
injuries and nuisance evaluated as fractional deaths.  The effect on property was meas-
ured as the equivalent number of houses destroyed, while that on the environment in
terms of the area affected and the persistence of the impact.  While these scales were
highly subjective, they enabled the various possible incidents to be ranked using the
index:
risk index = (frequency) x (severity) x (chance of mitigation).
From this analysis, Wood and Tweeddale34 concluded from the study that the hazards
presented by the various industries were relatively small compared with industry world-
wide.  However, the likelihood of small-to-medium incidents, such as fires, was thought
to be too high: some industries exhibited low safety standards and major deficiencies in
safety management.  The study illustrated the usefulness of what was essentially a scoping
review in pinpointing those aspects which had the greatest need for improvement.
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Case Study 6.3(d)  Nuclear-powered Warship Visits
The New Zealand Government commissioned a special committee to report on the haz-
ards should a nuclear-powered warship be present in one of the country’s ports.  The
Special Committee8 set out by considering the safety record of navies with nuclear-
powered ships and comparing the safety standards of naval with land-based reactors.  It
consulted widely, and reported in considerable detail, including providing data on
radionuclides in the environment and dose estimates from postulated accidents.  It em-
phasised the importance of quality assurance for safety assessment, and was impressed
by the safety-management regimes of both the British and United States navies.  The
Committee stated:
“When the likelihood of harm is so remote that it can occasion no rational apprehension,
an activity may be regarded as safe.”
In regard to a warship’s presence in port, the Committee considered that the likelihood
of harm was indeed extremely remote, and thus apprehension of harm was irrational.  As
Gardenier35 in his review of the Report points out, the Committee did not explain at
what level of risk apprehension becomes rational.  He prefers the alternative statement:
“When the likelihood of harm is so remote that, in the light of its potential magnitude,
it does occasion no apprehension, an activity may be regarded as safe”.
This difference of opinion highlights the need to separate the  expert assessment of  haz-
ards from a judgement on their tolerability by society.
Case Study 6.3(e)  Tranz Rail Network Study
As noted in Case Study 2.4, Peet and Ryan36 discuss the application of risk-assessment
techniques to the operation of New Zealand’s rail network.  Their paper examines vari-
ous methods used to evaluate the hazards of train collisions, such as those between trains,
those involving road vehicles at level crossings, those with and obstruction such as slip
or washout and a tipover at a tight curve.  The past history of such incidents provided a
benchmark for a  risk matrix, with a five-point scale for frequency and severity.  The
matrix gave some indication of the relative significance of the risks, but was unable to
provide any information on the influence of controls such as signalling systems on the
levels of risk. To gain such information, fault and event-tree methods were invoked.
Peet and Ryan36 note that development for a particular failure by means of a fault tree,
which incorporates human, technical and operational features, leads to a better under-
standing of the quality of the system under investigation.
Other aspects of the network’s operations which were considered included the transport
of hazardous goods and the safety in the single manning of trains.  Hazardous transport
was evaluated using six-point scales of frequency and severity to yield hazard scores
ranging from 0 to 36 as a basis for ranking the risks.  Train-driver safety was assessed
through fault-tree methods and comparing the evaluated risks with other industrial occu-
pations using FAR criteria.  However, safety for the locomotive engineer when dismount-
ing from the cab in an emergency was assessed by a joint union/company working party
without doing a detailed analysis.
The company, Tranz Rail Ltd, has gained a number of lessons from a decade of formal
risk assessment.  Since the development of fault trees requires considerable thought and
investigation to ensure all possible sources of risks are accounted for, the methodology
forces a deeper understanding of the way accidents happen.  Quantitative risk assess-
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7
Risks cannot be treated properly unless they are communicated.  Lord Cullen1,
after the public inquiry into the disaster that destroyed the oil platform, Piper
Alpha, wrote:
“The top men in Occidental were not hard-nosed and uncaring peo-
ple interested only in profit and unconcerned about safety.  They
said and believed all the right things, (but) they did not get involved
in the precise actions required, see that they were carried out and
monitor progress.”
Senior technical managers, who may not be qualified engineers, have a major
influence on the management of engineering risk, and there is a professional re-
sponsibility on engineers to ensure that the levels of engineering risk  associated
with their work are fully communicated.
In the case of the Challenger disaster described in Case Study 2.2, senior manage-
ment were not well enough informed to appreciate the significance of the con-
cerns being expressed by the technicians and engineers.  Good communication
demands a clear speaker and a willing listener.
Another example of the harmful effect of poor internal communication was the
loss of a North Sea ferry, when senior management ignored earlier and repeated
representations about hazards.  The background to this disaster is briefly described
in Case Study 7.1.  The need for safety awareness at senior levels is the concern of
the IPENZ policy statement entitled Risk and Prudence on engineering govern-
ance that has been mentioned in Chapter 1 and reproduced in Appendix B.
Besides internal communication of risk, external communication is becoming cru-
cial.  Over recent years the public has become more aware of and concerned about
technical hazards, and recent, well-publicised failures in New Zealand and Aus-
tralia mentioned in the Preface have raised questions regarding the reliability of
engineering systems.  Part of this concern has arisen because of hardening public
attitudes to safety and the protection of the environment with a mistrust of techni-
cal solutions.  Engineers, in exercising their profession, now need to be fully aware
of these issues.
The purpose of risk communication in any risk-management policy is to make
sure that all stakeholders and parties involved understand the risks and associated
benefits, the options for treating risk, and the requirements to implement them.
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Effective risk communication is a multiple dialogue  in the search for solutions.
Case Study 7.1   The Loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise
In June 1985, the master of one North Sea roll-on/roll-off vessel wrote to the directors
of the ferry company, pointing out the absence of indicators to show the position of the
doors on the car-deck.  The deck was kept weather-tight by having both pairs of bow-
doors and the single stern doors closed, the two sets of doors being closed manually
from the car-deck.  Small leaks, such as those from pipework and fire-fighting equip-
ment, were removed by pumps.  The master suggested that indicator lights should be
fitted so that the positions of the car-doors could be confirmed on the bridge.  The
suggestion was rejected.  In 1986, the master of a sister ship sent another request for
door indicators, a request supported by the other master.  The response from the direc-
tors remained negative.  Prior to March 1987, the ferries sailed regularly with an excess
load, with passenger numbers exceeding the licensed limit by several hundred people
on many occasions during the summer.  The ships’ masters could only attempt to count
passengers as they embarked or disembarked. The level of freight loading was also
unknown to the ships’ masters.  This was a significant hazard because it affected the
ship’s trim and stability.  Remote-reading draught gauges were not fitted, and it was
alleged that draught measurements were falsified for the ship’s log.  When the issue of
overloading was put to the directors, they did not respond.
On 6 March 1987, the Herald of Free Enterprise was loaded with 81 cars and 47 freight
vehicles at Zeebrugge.  The assistant bosun, who was responsible for closing the doors
on the car-deck, had fallen asleep in his bunk after supervising maintenance operations.
The ferry left the harbour with both the inner and outer bow-doors open.  The bosun did
not see it as his job to ensure that the doors were closed, even though he knew they were
open.  As the ship left the harbour under increasing speed, sea flowed into the car-deck
and the pumps were quickly overwhelmed.  The ship listed, the free movement of water
causing it to capsize within four minutes, with the vessel coming to rest on her port side
on a sandbank. While many persons were saved, 150 passengers and 38 crew died in
the disaster.
Organisational Learning
Wells2 notes that most organisations gather extensive amounts of information,
much of it relating to safety.  Such records include accident reports, data on
lost-time injuries, comments on “near misses” and observations on dangerous
procedures and practices.  This data collection should enable organisations to
learn from the past to do better in the future.
In a workplace, where permit-to-work systems are used for safety in mainte-
nance, Iliffe et al.3 recommend a computer-based system of issuing permits
which could be linked to a database of incidents.  Thus a user could be re-
minded of any special hazards associated with the equipment to be maintained,
any earlier fault diagnosis (through a failure modes-and-effects analysis or other
risk-identification tool), and have access to a parts inventory.  The accident
database might be structured within a hierarchy of causes, so that a person
unfamiliar with a hazard can be prompted.  For example, equipment cause might
lead to identification of electrical equipment for which there has been cases of
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short-circuiting or lack of earthing or overheating.
Investigation of major incidents, such as those described in Case Studies 2.2
and 7.1, reveal that organisations sometimes have a culture of not wanting to
know.  An organisation can respond to hazards by either denial or reform.  An
adequate and effective two-way channel of communication between all levels
of management is essential to reduce the likelihood of significant risks being
left untreated.  Such communication can only work when appropriately quali-
fied persons with technical insight have positions at all levels in an organisa-
tion, so that messages and information can be put into the correct context and
appreciated.  Violations of regulations should not be permitted or condoned,
even if these rules are thought at the time to be impractical or burdensome in
the pursuit of production and efficiency.
The Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360:1999 recommends that
each stage of the risk-management process should be documented, including
assumptions, methods, data sources and results.  Such documentation demon-
strates that the process has been properly conducted and provides a record to
develop an organisation’s database of knowledge that facilitates ongoing moni-
toring and review. It is a means whereby information can be shared and stored.
Communicating Risk
In reviewing conceptual approaches to risk communication, Pidgeon et al.4
comment: “At first sight, the task of communication might appear trivial given
that most of us have little difficulty in conducting day-to-day interaction with
colleagues, friends and associates”.  However, these observers note that risk
communication involves talking with a number of audiences, who possibly hold
diverse values within different frames of reference, and possibly have conflict-
ing hidden agendas.  Thus, at the outset, all groups and individuals who might
be expected to be involved should be identified, and appropriate channels of
communication arranged.
When a risk is established, the credibility of the chosen message-bearers is
important, since all parties to the process bring their own biases.  An apparent
inventory loss of 170 kg of enriched uranium at a Scottish nuclear fuel-reproc-
essing plant appeared to have been dismissed by the management as an “ac-
counting error”, but this message was undoubtedly one factor in the decision
announced by the United Kingdom’s energy minister to close down the facility.
Pidgeon et al.4 note that there are at least four overlapping conceptual approaches
to risk communication:
• The top-down transmission of expert opinion to a non-expert audience;
• An interactive exchange of information and opinion among individuals,
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groups or organisations;
• An exchange of information within a wider cultural or institutional con-
text;
• A political process of empowering risk-bearing groups in society.
Whatever the view of risk communication, its effectiveness hinges on trust.
Trust is hard to gain, but easy to lose.  If the source of communication is not
trusted, perhaps because the present evidence contradicts past messages, then it
is unlikely that the new message will be trusted.
General criteria for good communication are set out in the Environmental Risk
Management Handbook being prepared by an Australian / New Zealand Stand-
ards Committee, available in draft form in 1999.  The objectives of good com-
munication are: clarity, objectivity, timeliness and regularity.  Although these
objectives are sound in principle, they are difficult to achieve in practice.
Some of the basic rules of communication include:
• Write clearly and simply;
• Avoid hiding adverse information and be open;
• Take the initiative, especially when one has negative information;
• Avoid “killer words” such as perfectly safe and risk-free (which are never
true) ;
• Quantify risk as far as possible;
• Acknowledge that there are no “dumb” questions;
• Be frank when dealing with the media;
• Be aware of factors that inspire trust;
• Put data in context and choose risk comparisons carefully;
• Remember that others will decide what is acceptable to them.
Particularly with major engineering projects, it is easy to provide information
overload in the attempt to be complete.  Normally, there are a limited number of
matters of public concern.  If these are seen to have been addressed appropri-
ately, then the proponent organisation is more likely to be trusted that the whole
project will be well-managed.
The legal obligation to consult with the public on engineering projects is dis-
cussed in Chapter 9.
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Risk Treatment
Once any unacceptable risk associated with an engineering venture or process
has been established with an adequate level of confidence, the various risk-
treatment options should be identified and the appropriate strategy to bring the
risk within target levels worked out.  The Australian/New Zealand Risk Man-
agement Standard lists the treatment options as follows:
(a)Avoid exposure to the hazard.  In manufacturing and processing activities,
exposure to a hazard might be eliminated by introducing remote opera-
tion, or by replacing a dangerous facility with something that is more be-
nign, or through using a less hazardous process involving less dangerous
materials or operated under less arduous conditions.  With existing facili-
ties, such modifications can become expensive and deemed “uneconomic”.
Ultimately, poor technology is overtaken by something better.  Costly ret-
rofitting to meet safety standards can be avoided through adequate risk
identification and consideration of alternatives at the start of an engineer-
ing project.  It will always be cheaper to mitigate risks at an early stage of
a project, and ideally at the conceptual stage.
(b)Mitigate the impact.  The impact of a hazard may be mitigated by either
reducing its likelihood (say, through the introduction of some control sys-
tem to trip when a parameter reaches a critical value), or reducing its con-
sequence should the hazard be realised by the installation of a protective
shield.  Any subsequent change to equipment or workplace practices must
be scrutinised to check that the proposed change does not cause other risks
by aborting or compromising the built-in safety features already installed.
(c) Adapt to the hazard.  In dangerous work environments, such as high-rise
construction, practices can be devised to reduce personal risk.  In the case
of handling dangerous materials, protective clothing can be worn and pro-
cedures changed to acknowledge the inherent dangers.  Adaptation, in this
sense, is a form of mitigation or minimisation of the hazard.
(d)Duplicate resources.  Duplication of equipment enhances reliability by
introducing redundancy.  This is probably the commonest approach in many
cases, and is a very effective option.  The likelihood of experiencing the
risk is thereby reduced, provided any standby or backup unit does not share
a common element with the main unit.
(e) Transfer the obligation.  Risk transfer is a contractual or financial instru-
ment whereby responsibilities are transferred or an insurance policy is pur-
chased, so that there is recompense in the event of an adverse effect.  There
is no change in the physical risk level, and normally this method of treat-
ing an engineering risk is used in conjunction with other measures to re-
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duce the level itself.  Risk transfer can ultimately be an expensive option if
the transfer has been made to a wrong party or becomes burdensome.
(f) Transform the risk.  This is another form of mitigation in which the risky
process is transformed into one that poses less of a threat or may be more
easily treated.  Such procedures are sometimes adopted in treating envi-
ronmental hazards generated by discharging waste streams containing con-
taminants: the hazardous material is captured in a form that can be more
readily processed to less harmful products or recycled to the main process.
(g)Retain the risk.  After risks have be reduced or transferred, there may be
residual risks, which are retained by the organisation.  Plans should be put
in place to manage the consequence of the risk if they should occur, in-
cluding a means of financing the risk.  Risks commonly are retained inad-
vertently or by default as a result of a failure to identify or treat them
properly.
Case Study 7.2  Risk Analysis of the Unintended Carriage of Dangerous Goods
by Post  (Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.; courtesy, New Zealand Post Ltd)
The company was aware of the risks associated with the unintended carriage of danger-
ous goods by post.  It needed to quantify the risk and to consider a range of possible risk
mitigation options.
A model that simulated the factors that influenced the flow of mail was constructed.
Limited quantitative data was compiled together with qualitative assessments of the ef-
fect of a range of mitigation options.  This was applied to a systems model to compare
the cost for implementation to the risk reduction achieved by each option.
The postal system was split into its essential parts following the flow of postal items and
the sources of dangerous goods.  A range practical mitigation options was identified
following interviews with departmental managers.  The experience of a range of em-
ployees was accessed through workshops to assess the probable effect of the mitigation
options.
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Risk Control
The Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard uses the term risk
control to cover policies, procedures and physical changes that reduce the like-
lihood and consequences of risks.  Risk control involves determining the rela-
tive benefit of new controls in the light of the effectiveness of existing controls.
In general, the alternative strategies for controlling risks would be evaluated in
terms of their effectiveness in meeting safety targets, the costs to implement the
various options and the impact of these control measures on stakeholders’ ob-
jectives.  The extent of this analysis will depend upon the magnitude of the
hazard under review and the extent of its impact on the organisation or third
parties.  In some cases, the issue will be clear-cut, and the risk-control measures
can be introduced as part of an engineer’s normal responsibility in carrying out
his or her work.  In other cases, a risk assessment may have far-reaching impli-
cations for an organisation, and the various risk-treatment options would be
documented and recommendations made for decision-making at a senior level.
Major risk-treatment plans would involve setting a timetable of implementa-
tion, the allocation of resources, detailing the staffing requirements and the
development of a monitoring programme.  Such monitoring would involve both
periodic independent safety audits as well as reports of progress compared with
budget and other project milestones.
As the Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standard notes, it is unlikely
that any one risk-treatment option will be a complete solution for a particular
problem.  Often an organisation will benefit substantially by adopting a combi-
nation of options, such as reducing the likelihood of risks, reducing their im-
pact should they happen, and transferring them, retaining only the residual risks.
An example of the latter is the effective use of contracts, with risk financing
supported by a risk-reduction programme.
Mitigation costs were estimated separately.  These data were combined with information
on postal item flows to analyse the effect of the mitigation options.
The absolute numbers of dangerous good predicted by the study and the effectiveness of
a number of the options were subsequently confirmed by trials and sampling of the mail
flows.
Cost and mitigation information was plotted on a common grid to aid identification and
implementation of the preferred options based upon the cost-effectiveness of risk reduc-
tion achieved.
The analysis demonstrated that the mitigation option chosen by some other postal serv-
ices may not, despite the high associated cost, be achieving the intended reduction in risk
exposure.
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Project-Risk Treatment
Large engineering projects often involve financing transactions that involve a
number of participants.  Lenders rely for security principally on the assets of
the project. As Gordon5 points out, lenders are inherently concerned with the
success of the project that they are financing and its ability to generate the
planned revenue to repay its loan, they will seek to ensure that the project’s
financial risk to themselves is minimised and allocated, as far as possible, to
other parties.  The lenders will want assurances regarding the reliability of the
engineering associated with the project, that the project will proceed smoothly
to completion, on time and within cost, and the project will meet performance
specifications.
The professional engineer (or engineering firm) may be expected to bear some
risk in terms of liquidated damages and performance guarantees, which may be
balanced by performance bonuses, giving the engineer (or firm) some incentive
to bear the added risk.  These risks, however, may in turn be spread to some
extent to third parties, such as the suppliers or manufacturers of materials.
Risk Recovery
Risk treatment may be regarded as a preventative measure.  It has the object of
preventing a risk occurring, or reducing its likelihood of happening, or if it
does, reducing its impact.  On the other hand, risk recovery relates to the cor-
rective measures that would be needed, should a risk eventuate, to bring the
organisation’s activity back to its former state.  After a major event, the recov-
ery would include reconstruction of damaged facilities and equipment and pos-
sible organisational changes.  Risk recovery is carried out within a predefined
strategy should the risk eventuate.  By their nature, recovery strategies tend to
be expensive, particularly when considerations of the potential loss of revenue
are included.  Moreover, reliance on risk recovery, rather than risk treatment,
may involve questions of ethics.
Engineering Ethics and Professional Responsibility
The responsibilities of a professional engineer in regard to the treatment of
risks is set out in the IPENZ Code of Ethics.  He or she is expected to give
priority to the safety and wellbeing of the community and have regard to this
principle in assessing his or her duty to clients or colleagues.  This ethic is not
without its critics.  While safety is an obligation placed on all engineers, not
everyone agrees that it is foremost: at times, meeting a deadline or staying
within budget may be given higher priority by some. However, the Code of
Ethics is clear about professional engineering responsibility to give priority to
the wellbeing and safety of the community.
Pinkus and her colleagues6 note that all engineering decisions involve trade-
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offs amongst  performance, cost and  schedules.  Deciding what the nature of
these trade-offs will be results from the tacit value judgments of the profes-
sional engineer.  Because some degree of risk is inherent in all engineering
work, an engineer is always striving to minimise that risk and maximise per-
formance within the set schedule and permissible costs.  Whenever a higher
risk than that which is reasonably possible is accepted, defensible reasons are
required to justify this action.  That is an ethical decision.  In this context,
Pinkus et al6 comment that NASA’s decisions regarding how the space shuttle
would be built, with cut-rate budgets, introduced pressures that led to an ac-
ceptance of a high-risk testing strategy into the programme.  That strategy led
to a degradation of reliability with a tragic and very costly outcome.
The acceptance of a high-risk factor may not of itself constitute a moral wrong.
Two defensible reasons may be put forward for taking extra risks.  First, those
persons most immediately affected have been informed and have agreed to bear
the risks.  Secondly, the ultimate benefits of taking such risks are substantial
and cannot be achieved in any other known way.  The counter-arguments nor-
mally point out that those who would carry the risk are rarely those who would
benefit.
Professional engineers are expected to be competent and responsible.  A com-
petent engineer is obliged, as far as it is reasonably possible, to be familiar with
and understand the technology that is being used or is to be adopted.  No one is
expected to be omniscient in every aspect.  The principle of individual compe-
tency extends to requiring persons to acknowledge areas where they are not
competent or lack knowledge.  However, it is reasonable to expect that large
engineering organisations can have within their ranks, or can acquire, all needed
competency.  In this regard, the downsizing of in-house engineering expertise
and added reliance on external consultants may cause some concern in main-
taining levels of engineering competency within an organisation.
The responsibility of engineers extends to an obligation to voice their concern
when an ethical dilemma has been identified.  This may not be easy, particu-
larly if voicing such concern can put an engineer at risk of losing his or her
position, with major implications for the support of dependants.
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8
Background
Over the centuries the workplace has been a dangerous place.  The hazards at
work have spawned many gruesome tales of enfeebled, maimed and killed
workers.  Occasionally there has been a happy ending, as in the tale told of a
worker who, splashed with acid, jumped into the nearest emergency water-
bath, which was solid with ice, it being mid-winter, skidded and broke his leg,
but his fellow workers managed to wash him down before seeking medical
help.  Fortunately, he recovered from his serious burns and the broken leg, and
afterwards married the attractive occupational heath nurse who had treated him!
Despite considerable improvements in occupational safety from the days of
unfenced machinery and unventilated workrooms, there is continuing concern
in New Zealand at the number of accidents in the workplace, particularly on
construction sites.  One response has been the industry-led initiative, Worksafe,
to raise the awareness of hazards at work.  There have also been calls for the
Occupational Health and Safety Service of the Department of Labour to be
more vigorous in prosecuting owner-occupiers in cases when accidents have
revealed serious deficiencies in management and practice.
Examples of such deficiencies are revealed in three cases heard in early 1999
that are summarised in the Case Study 8.1.
Workplace health and safety  is governed by the provisions of the Health and
Safety in Employment Act 1992.  At the time the bill was enacted, the total
annual cost of occupational injuries, illness and disease was estimated at be-
tween $1 billion and $1.5 billion (OSH 1992). The Act places a duty of care on
employers to ensure the safety and health of employees, and a responsibility
was placed on employees to use safe working practices and ensure that their
actions did not harm anyone else.
The method of managing workplace hazards associated with engineering activ-
ity is no different in principle from the generic process of risk management as
set out in the Australian/New Zealand Risk Management  Standard.  This simi-
larity is illustrated in Figure 8.1.
To assist in the development of an action plan in enhancing workplace safety,
and meet the practical requirements in places of work, the Occupational Safety
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Generic risk management
Define context
Identify hazards
Analyse risk
Evaluate risk against target levels
Treat or accept risks
Ongoing monitoring and review
Workplace-risk management
Classify work activities
Identify hazards
Determine risk
Decide if risk is tolerable
Change working practice if needed
Ongoing monitoring and review
Communicate
Figure 8.1: Chain of generic and workplace-risk management
(after Bermingham 1999, pers. comm., with modification)
Case Study 8.1   Three Examples of the Lack of Workplace Safety
• In the construction of a road viaduct, a worker was trying to disconnect a 400kg
pump, which was suspended from a crane, when there was a failure of a link in the
chain that was welded on to the top of its lifting point.  The pump unit fell on to the
worker, who received fatal injuries.  The judge commented that the worker’s em-
ployers should have spotted the visible flaws in the chain through their internal haz-
ard-identification scheme, and the company was fined for not taking all practicable
steps to ensure  safety  (The Christchurch Press, 31 March 1999).
• A worker was killed while undertaking maintenance in a steel-rolling mill.  Access-
gate switches, which would have turned off the machinery, had been replaced by
warning signs and a register to be signed before working on the equipment.  A com-
pany spokesman admitted that the arrangement was “an inexcusable failure of our
safety practices” (loc.cit.), and the company was fined $35000, the highest penalty
to that date for a single company under the Health and Safety in Employment Act
1992 (The Christchurch Press, 31 March 1999).
• A worker was operating a pelt-processing machine, when a pelt became stuck in it.
To release the pelt, the worker removed the machine’s protective guard. In the proc-
ess, the worker slipped on a wet piece of plywood, accidentally depressing a foot-
pedal which activated the machine, causing severe injuries to the worker’s hand.
The pedal had not been identified as a hazard by a consultant who had been commis-
sioned to do an independent safety audit.  The judge commented that such machines
were “inherently dangerous” and, although the worker was partially to be at blame
for the accident, the company ought to have taken steps to avoid it.  On fining the
company, the judge said that “he had to send a message to others in the industry that
they must be proactive in avoiding accidents.” (The Christchurch Press, 1 April 1999).
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and Health Service has produced four booklets under the general heading of
Safety and Health is Good Business 1992-4 as follows:
1. A Guide to the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992;
2. How to Identify and Control Hazards;
3. A Guide to Managing Health and Safety;
4. Guidelines for the Provision of Facilities and General Safety in Commer-
cial and Industrial Premises.
The Guide to Managing Health and Safety (3 above) emphasises the need for
management to be committed to having an effective programme.  Such com-
mitment is reflected in the management’s knowledge of the organisation’s par-
ticular needs in safety and health, their conviction that high standards are at-
tainable and the allocation of adequate resources to achieve those standards.
This policy is enhanced by active employee involvement in the development of
safe working conditions, since workers have both knowledge of the hazards at
their place of work and are exposed to them daily.
Hazards that are assessed as “significant” present such a degree of risk that the
Health and Safety in Employment Act requires a formal approach in dealing
with them.  A significant hazard is one that is an actual or potential source of
harm:
1. That is serious (as defined in the first schedule of the Act), including per-
manent loss of bodily function, amputation, burns requiring referral to spe-
cialist medical services, loss of consciousness due to lack of oxygen, or
accidents requiring a person to be hospitalised for more than 48 hours;
2. That increases with each exposure or with duration of the exposure to the
hazards, such as noise-induced hearing loss;
3. That does not manifest itself or is not easily detected until a significant
time after the exposure, such as asbestosis.
Methods of identifying, analysing and evaluating risks have been considered in
greater detail in the earlier chapters of the book.  The assessed likelihood and
consequence of the identified hazards then leads to an action plan for treatment.
In extreme cases, work should not be started or continued until the risk has
been reduced.  If that is impossible, the work has to be forbidden and aban-
doned.  In less extreme cases, risk-reduction measures should be implemented
within a set period of time.  Whenever risks are considered tolerable, ongoing
monitoring must be undertaken to ensure that safety standards and controls are
maintained.
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More recently, Standards New Zealand has issued an interim Standard (NZS
4801(Int):1999) to assist organisations in developing or adopting a manage-
ment system for occupational health and safety (OSH).  This provides a generic
framework that can be easily integrated with other management systems as
well as economic and other organisational goals.
Requirements for an OSH Management System
The fundamental requirement is that there should be an OSH policy authorised
by the organisation’s top management that clearly states the overall objectives
of the policy and  a commitment to ongoing improvement of safety.  The interim
Standard lists a number of features of such a policy.  It shall:
1. Be appropriate to the nature and scale of the organisation’s hazards;
2. Includes a commitment to continual improvement of the management sys-
tem;
3. Includes a commitment to comply with relevant legislation and other re-
quirements;
4. Be documented, implemented, maintained and communicated to all em-
ployees;
5. Be available to interested parties; and
6.  Be reviewed periodically to ensure that it remains relevant.
A management plan for occupational health and safety defines those who are
responsible for achieving the plan’s objectives and targets and outlines the means
by which these are to be achieved and the timeframe.  All management person-
nel should be held responsible for occupational health and safety within the
work areas under their control.  The organisation, in consultation with the em-
ployees, should identify any training needs in regard to workplace safety and
ways of performing work activities competently.  Documents and data required
should be readily located and updated, with obsolete documents removed or
archived (with identification), as appropriate.
The implementation path involves commitment, planning and action, as set out
in Figure 8.2.
The OSH method for workplace-risk assessment is a stepwise process:
1. The selection of the areas, tasks and processes associated with the places
of work, and identifying hazards associated therewith (as outlined in Chapter
4);
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2. Determining whether any injury, illness or damage could result from each
identified hazard; and
3. Determine a potential severity and frequency rating;
4. Compile a risk-rating number (as explained below);
• Commitment to active
management of health and safety
• Set clear goals and areas of
responsibility
• Information gathering
• Team approach
• Outside expertise
• OSH advice
• Comprehensive
hazard identification
• Hazard assessment
• Appropriate control
measures and management
strategies determined
Control measures and
management strategies implemented
• Information
• Training and supervision
• Workplace/work activity monitoring
• Emergency procedures
• Accident reporting and investigation
• Principal/contractors/subcontractors
Commitment
Planning
Action
Figure 8.2:  Implementation path for managing health and safety in the
workplace (adapted from “A Guide to Managing Health and Safety”, OSH,
Wellington, 1993)
120
Management of Engineering Risk
5. From the list of identified hazards and the risk-rating matrix separate the
significant hazards from the others.
The risk-rating matrix is developed in a manner analogous to Gillett’s scheme
(Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  The frequency is rated on a five-point scale:
1 Remotely possible.
2 Known to have happened in the past.
3 Strong likelihood of happening.
4 Happened previously within the organisation.
5 Happens frequently.
A four-point scale is used to rate the potential severity:
1 Negligible injuries or illness would occur.
2 Minor injuries or illness might occur.
3 Major injuries or illness would follow, including possible long-term disa-
bling effects.
4 A fatality was likely.
These scores are then multiplied to get a risk rating on a scale from 1 to 20.
This scale is not linear, but serves to rank hazards.  The rating matrix is illus-
trated in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: A risk-ranking matrix (OSH 1992)
Probable
frequency Estimated severity
4 3 2 1
5 20 15 10 5
4 16 12 8 4
3 12 9 6 3
2 10 6 4 2
1 4 3 2 1
This table should be interpreted with some caution, as it implies that a remotely
possible hazard that might cause a death is to be viewed as being as serious as
one of the lowest severity that has caused injury in the organisation at some
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time in the past (since both have a risk index of 4).  However, the risk scores
provide some kind of rational basis to allocate resources in risk reduction by
indicating those hazards that are of greatest concern. Alternative matrices, such
as those given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, can be adapted to rate workplace risks,
and may be more useful than the values given in Table 8.1.
Based on the established level of risk, priorities for control are set, and the
control mechanisms implemented, in a preferred hierarchy based on “reason-
able practicality”.  Elimination is the first control method to be considered,
followed by isolation and minimising the effects of the identified hazard.  The
use of guards to fence machinery has been the traditional method of isolating
mechanical hazards at places of work. Chemical hazards can often be elimi-
nated by using materials with more benign properties. If elimination is not pos-
sible, the risk should be reduced, such as the use of an electrical appliance of
lower voltage or isolating or enclosing a hazardous appliance.
Case Study 8.2  Health and Safety Analysis for a Manufacturer
(Bermingham, 1999, pers. comm.)
A pharmaceutical manufacturer had been contracted to produce a new and highly toxic
drug for an important international customer.
Due to the potential for harm to employees, the manufacturer had set up a safety com-
mittee and carried out a hazard identification study.  A quantitative analysis was deemed
necessary to allow a fuller understanding and assessment of the identified risks.
The safety concern was compounded by the uncertainties surrounding the health effects
of the product to both normal and sensitised persons, as well as the complexity of the
advanced process.  It was considered that a quantitative study would allow both a better
understanding of the true level of risk as well as a more structured identification of the
appropriate mitigation options and their effectiveness.
The quantitative approach allowed the process’s risk profile to be quantified and viewed
in graphical form. The sources of risk were also displayed to focus further mitigation
400.00
350.00
300.00
250.00
200.00
150.00
100.00
50.00
Ef Eq Hd Hp In Ml Mf Mr Ue
Risk per Hazard Type
Hazard Type
0.00
Hd = Human error, drop
Hp = Error, procedures
Mf = Mechanical failure
Ml = Mechanical leak
Eq = earthquake
Mr = Mechanical rupture
In = Inherent
Ef = Electrical failure
Ue = Unauthorised entry
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Overall, a blend of technical and procedural controls is usually necessary.  A
decision tree for the control of hazards is illustrated in Figure 8.3.  The control
processes that are finally adopted are monitored by a documented evaluation of
their effectiveness, and modified as necessary in the light of experience.
Can the
hazard be
eliminated?
Can the
contacts with hazards
be isolated?
Can the
contacts with hazards
be minimised?
What
equipment and protective
clothing are needed to protect
employees from
harm?
List options
List options
List options
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
Figure 8.3: A hazard-control decision tree.
(After  Bermingham 1999,  pers. comm.)
efforts and ensure underlying trends were understood (shown above).  In addition, the
risk per employee was also derived and shown in graphical form to ensure that risks
were spread and that no individual was exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.
Significant and highly cost effective reductions in risk were achieved as a result of the
use of this quantitative technique.
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Reducing Unsafe Acts
A large number of accidents in the workplace stem from unsafe behaviour rather
than breakdowns of plant and machinery. The accident triangle, as noted in
Figure 5.5, has at its lowest level the presence of unsafe conditions and prac-
tices. If such unsafe behaviour can be reduced, the accident rate will fall also.
This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 8.4.
1
major injury
5 - 10
minor injuries
10 - 100
non-injury accidents
500 - 1000
unsafe acts reducing unsafe behaviour
will reduce accidents/injuries
&
Note: Numbers are indicative to illustrate relative frequency and may not apply
to a given workplace
Figure 8.4: Accident/unsafe behaviour triangle
Three industrial psychologists1 report that an analysis of earlier accidents in
one company led to a clearly-defined list describing both safe and unsafe be-
haviour and, wherever possible, the outcome of the particular behaviour wit-
nessed. Baseline examples of safe behaviour were observed and documented.
These examples were then used in thirty-minute training sessions, when em-
ployees were shown slides demonstrating both the best and worst behaviour in
various situations. The employees agreed to strive toward a goal of meeting
baseline-safe behaviour for 90% of the time. Over succeeding weeks, behav-
ioural safety improved and, over the first year of implementation of the policy,
the injury rate dropped fivefold.
There is perhaps a natural desire to punish bad behaviour, perhaps as an exam-
ple to others to do better. However, longer-lasting improvements are more likely
to derive from safety self-awareness and the management’s active promotion
of a safety culture within an organisation.
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Emergency Plans
When an organisation is confronted by an emergency, it is too late to then de-
cide who needs to do what, the assistance that is available, and the response
desirable.  Emergency plans must be developed beforehand.  They are, in fact,
required under Section 6 of the Act, while Section 14 requires employees to be
involved in their development.
All likely emergency conditions should be identified with the full involvement of
employees.  Such conditions may arise, for example, from severe natural events
(high winds, floods, seismic and volcanic activity), or equipment failure or struc-
tural collapse, or loss of containment of hazardous substances.  An emergency
co-ordinator should be appointed in advance to take control in any emergency,
and the actions established that should be undertaken in the event of specific
cases occurring, such as a chemical spill.  Back-up systems for light, power and
telecommunications may need to be provided.  Alarm signals, where appropri-
ate, need to be established and means of communication identified.  The plan
should specify which emergency services need notifying in any given case, and
by whom.  Procedures to account for all people on site, including visitors, need
to be put in place; search-and rescue plans determined; and shut-down proce-
dures for processes, plant and machinery worked out.
In the event of a major emergency, a nominated person should be responsible
for the release of information to the media and the public.  There should be a
pre-arranged means of giving an all-clear signal, with re-entry procedures and
plans developed to enable a speedy return to normal operations as soon as pos-
sible.
The emergency plans should be reviewed periodically (at least once a year) by
management with the involvement of employees.  As part of this review, it
would be considered whether the plans meet the objectives set earlier, the prac-
tice drills have revealed any deficiencies and whether the emergency services
are satisfied with the arrangements.
High Hazard-Potential Worksites
On large sites where there is a high hazard potential, inadequate risk manage-
ment and the lack of appropriate emergency procedures should things go wrong
can lead to far-reaching consequences.  The incident described in Case Study
8.2 led to an inquiry by an Australian Royal Commission, which called for
major changes in the regulation of facilities with a high hazard potential.  The
Commission’s main recommendation was that the operating company must un-
dertake a safety case or report approval under the Australian National Code for
the Control of Major Hazardous Facilities 1996, to identify, monitor, audit and
review safety systems against Australian and international standards.  Operat-
ing standards would need to be reviewed periodically, including start-up, shut-
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down and emergency shut-down procedures, as well as deviations from normal
working conditions.  A fire-risk analysis and emergency-response plan should
also be made.
At the time of writing this book (late 1999), the Victorian WorkCover Authority
Case Study 8.3 The Longford Gas Explosion
On 25 September 1998, a series of massive explosions and fires destroyed much of the
gas-treatment facility at Longford, Victoria, which supplies natural gas to the State’s
grid, and gases including liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Long Island.  The explo-
sions continued for over an hour, and the fires for 53 hours, with the result the most of
the State of Victoria went without gas and hot water for two weeks.
Difficulties in getting a circulating pump for warm lean oil to work led to a sudden
pressure surge, which caused a weld failure on a very cold heat exchanger, releasing
10 tonnes of gas and oil in a matters of seconds.  This exchanger had been operating
for some time with broken tubes, which was causing process difficulties in other parts
of the plant.  The escaping hydrocarbons formed a large vapour cloud, which ignited
on reaching gas-fired heaters still working some 130m away.  The vapour cloud burnt
back rapidly, igniting the original source of the emission, which led to a sequence of
further explosions and prolonged fires.
The Commission’s Report recommended that the site’s training procedures should be
improved so that all plant operators can readily understand the plant’s hazards and
process operations, and that such training must be able to assess the operators’ ability
to retain information taught.  The Commission also recommended that an incident-
reporting procedure be introduced, not only when injury or damage occurs, but also
for process upsets, which may lead to useful knowledge of the plant’s operational
behaviour.  The Company owning the site should be required to show that adequate
operating and maintenance expertise is on site at all times, and operating practices are
reviewed periodically.  It must dedicate an office with a manager in charge of the safe
operation of the plant.
Although the Commission did not comment on the safety implications of production
pressures, these may have been a factor that led to the various maintenance deficien-
cies noted in their Report.  For processes that cannot be readily shut down without
causing substantial disruption to output affecting numerous customers, there is strong
pressure from senior management to keep the plant going and tolerate apparently
minor malfunctions.  Moreover, pressure on operators had increased by management’s
decision to relocate all professional engineering staff to Melbourne, with shift-super-
visor responsibilities reallocated to operators, and supervisors downgraded.  Between
1993 and 1998, the number of supervisors had been reduced by one-third, and mainte-
nance staff cut from 67 to 58.  The Australian newspaper, The Age, reported a staff
survey carried out before the blast revealed concerns about overwork affecting safety.
Plant drawings had not been kept up-to-date and did not show a number of plant modi-
fications made after start-up.
Clearly these various management decisions had cumulatively increased the chance
of a minor mishap escalating into a major disaster, with the lack of adequate training
and an insufficiency of supervision.
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(VCA) is proceeding to draft regulations for the control of facilities of high
hazard potential, with the setting-up of a major hazards unit.  In New Zealand,
a similar unit foreshadowed under legislation has yet to be formed.
Accident Reporting
The Department of Labour has for a number of years received notification of
accidents occurring in places of work.  This information has been used to moni-
tor compliance with regulations and establish a database to determine trends in
occupational safety.
Under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, employers are required
to keep a register of all accidents where someone was or might have been harmed.
Where serious harm has occurred, an employer must notify the Occupational
Health and Safety (OSH) Service as soon as possible after its occurrence.  In
some industries of high hazard potential, the Service must be notified whether
or not serious harm has happened.
Whenever there has been an accident involving serious harm to any person, no-
one may alter the scene of the accident without the permission of an OSH in-
spector.  There are certain exceptions to this rule, including:
• the need to save life and prevent further harm and suffering;
• to prevent serious damage or loss of property; and
• where the accident involves a motor vehicle on a public highway.
The reporting of accidents, including so-called “near-misses”, leads to the iden-
tification and thus elimination or control of dangerous situations and work prac-
tices that also affect production and quality of work.  The literature on acci-
dents backs up the need to report all incidents.  Minor accidents and near-misses
provide hazard warnings of more serious incidents.  If these smaller failures
can be controlled, then the larger ones will be controlled in turn. Prevention is
better than cure.
The record of failures and unreliability also provides a database to evaluate the
risk of new ventures.  For example, the likely safety levels of the then (early
1980s) proposed nationwide scheme for storing and transporting LPG in bulk
was estimated on the basis of historic data gleaned from experience in the pe-
troleum and other industries.
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Legal Responsibilities9
From the earliest of times, the law has taken a magisterial interest in accidents
and those who cause them.  Legislation has been enacted to prescribe ways of
avoiding such mishaps.  Bond1 notes that the Code of Hammurabi (1700 BC)
laid down a duty of care for builders:
No. 229.  If a builder builds a house for a man and do not make its
construction firm and the house he has built collapse and cause
the death of the owner of the house - that builder will be put to
death.
Bond comments that the effect of this legislation on the accident rate is not
recorded, but he assumes that it must have jolted senior management into look-
ing at fresh work practices in the building industry of the times!
In medieval English law, any chattel that caused death was forfeit, and had to
be offered to God as a deodand (deo dandum, gift to God). The last time it was
invoked was in 1841 at a coroner’s inquest inquiring into the deaths of eight
passengers on a train that had ploughed into a mound of earth dislodged from
an excavated cutting after heavy rain.  The jury declared a deodand of one
thousand pounds on the unfortunate railway engine, payable to the Lord of the
Manor where the accident happened.
Development of Industrial Safety Law
New Zealand Law is based on English Common Law, and health and safety
legislation has often tracked British developments.  These may be seen as a
continuous regulatory process over the past 200 years to mitigate and control
the adverse impacts of industrial activity.  The appalling working conditions of
children in some of the Lancashire cotton-mills led to the first Factories Act,
the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802.  This was followed by a suc-
cession of acts which regulated workplace and technical hazards.  In 1863, the
Alkali Act was passed to control the emissions from chemical factories supply-
ing bleaches, detergents and dyestuffs to the textile industry.  This legislation
set up an Alkali Inspectorate, the forerunner of the present-day Health and Safety
Executive.  The growth of law over the years led to fragmentation, with five
separate Government departments, various local authorities and seven separate
inspectorates involved by the mid-twentieth century.  Further, the Law could
not keep pace with technological change.  Robens2, in a far-reaching inquiry on
health and safety at work, recommended sweeping changes: there should be a
more unified framework of control based on better self-regulation, with both
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employees and employers having responsibility for safety.
At that time, New Zealand had its own mosaic of safety law including: the
Machinery Act 1950, the Construction Act 1959, the Explosives Act 1957, the
Dangerous Goods Act 1974, the Boilers, Lifts and Cranes Act 1950 (a histori-
cal collection of legislative requirements from the days of steamship travel),
the Electricity Act 1968 (and the subsequent wiring and supply regulations),
the Health Act 1956, the Poisons Act 1960 and the Radiation Protection Act
1965.  New ventures could fall under the provisions of the Town and Country
Planning Act 1953.
A review of this disconnected set of New Zealand legislation and correspond-
ing number of statutory agencies to administer it, often without the need to
consult with each other, led Walker3 to propose a somewhat similar philosophy
to that recommended by Robens in the United Kingdom.  The Government
responded cautiously: after various methods of co-ordination were tried out,
the Health and Safety in Employment Act was passed in 1992, to become effec-
tive from 1 April 1993, nearly twenty years after the equivalent statute had been
passed in Britain.
However, the various building regulations had already been revised in a new
Building Act 1991 and its Regulations 1992, which were outcome-driven, rather
than prescriptive of the methods to achieve satisfactory performance.  It intro-
duced the requirement of a warrant of fitness for a public building, a concept
that echoes the requirement under the Consumer Act that an article must be fit
for its specified purpose.  Moreover, the Health and Safety Act was seen to be
subservient to the overarching provisions of the earlier Resource Management
Act 1991 with its demands that effects must be eliminated if possible, and if not
eliminated, mitigated or reduced.  “Effects”, in this context, covered adverse
impacts of all kinds, whether of short or long duration, whether infrequent but
major in consequence, or frequent but of lesser magnitude.  Resource consents
would progressively replace the older permits for emissions to air and discharges
to waterways.
The latest element in the new legislative order was the passing of the Hazard-
ous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 to protect the environment and
public health and safety by managing the adverse effects of dangerous sub-
stances including those of biological origin.  Under this Act, an Environmental
Risk Management Authority was set up in 1998 to decide whether hazardous
substances and new organisms should be introduced into New Zealand and, if
so, under what conditions.
Duty of Care
MacKenzie4, in reviewing the legal responsibilities of engineers, notes that the
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Law imposes on everyone an obligation to practice her or his profession with a
proper degree of care and skill.  He quotes a judgement from the last century
(Badgley v. Dickson, 1886):
“As an architect, he is in the same position as any other profes-
sional or skilled person, and whether it be in the preparation of
professional plans and specifications, or the doing of any other
professional work for reward, is responsible if he omits to do it
with an ordinary and reasonable degree of care and skill.”
To determine what is a reasonable degree of care and skill, one has to compare
what is usual and customary for a fellow professional person to know and do
under the same circumstances.  Failure to comply with generally accepted prac-
tice, and the use of codes if applicable, may be taken to imply negligence.
MacKenzie4 quotes another judgement to illustrate this point (Bevan v. Blackhall
& Struthers, 1973):
“I am of the view that bearing in mind the function of codes, a
design which departs substantially from them is prima facie a faulty
design, unless it can be demonstrated that it conforms to accepted
engineering practice by rational analysis.”
With less prescriptive legislation than hitherto, the defence of rational analysis
would seem to take on greater importance.
The general standards and practice of the profession are not the sole test of the
standard of care.  The general practice of the profession may be deemed to be
inadequate; that is, the Court may determine that the general practice of the
profession does not meet the test of what a reasonable and prudent person would
do.  In such a case, the Court may maintain that there has been negligence, even
when usual engineering practice has been observed.
The exact standard of care imposed by the Law will be affected by the degree of
expertise in the particular field that the engineer claims to have.  If an engineer
claims expertise in structural engineering, for example, that person will be judged
by the general standard of competence of structural engineers.  Thus it is im-
portant for engineers in their work to make others aware of areas in which they
are not competent, as well as informing them of areas of expertise.
In design, an engineer would normally be held responsible for any technical
defects.  However, an engineer may be required by an employer or client to use
an untried method or new technology to meet particular schedule or cost crite-
ria.  MacKenzie4 advises that the proper course for an engineer, where there is
a choice between a design which conforms with conventional  codes and tech-
nology  and another which is untried and cheaper and holds risks, is to advise
the employer or client of the greater risk, and leave the commercial decision to
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that person.  It is the employer or client, not the engineer, who will gain the
commercial benefit.  Nevertheless, if the risk is too great, then the engineer
may be under a moral duty to others to ensure that the high-risk option is not
taken.
This moral imperative would also seem to apply to subcontractors.  The public
good should hold precedence over the contractor’s obligation to build to a speci-
fication should this be perceived to be faulty.  It is within the realm of compe-
tence of both the client and the contractor to seek alternative lower-risk de-
signs.
When a design includes the likely cost of the work within a specified timeframe,
it is normally an implied condition that the project should be capable of being
completed within a reasonable range of those estimates.  The engineer is re-
sponsible for any lack of care in preparing these.  In the case of construction
work, an engineer may be required to make reasonable enquires regarding the
solvency and capability of any firm submitting a tender, and so advise an em-
ployer, although it is not expected that any guarantee can be provided.  In pre-
paring any contract, the engineer is usually required to ensure that the specifi-
cations are drawn with sufficient clarity, and the general conditions of contract
are appropriate.  The engineer is also under a duty of care to see that all neces-
sary drawings and instructions are given to a contractor within a reasonable
time.
As far as supervision of contracts for civil engineering work is concerned, the
engineer must properly supervise the works and inspect sufficiently frequently
to ensure that the materials and workmanship conform to the contract.  While
the engineer cannot be expected to be on site all the time, there are normally
critical phases in the work when the supervisory duty can only be undertaken
by a personal visit.  In general, the duty of the engineer is to be able to certify
that the work has been carried out according to the contract, particularly in
respect of progress payments.
In the case of supervision of other work, such as the fabrication of process
plants or the assembly of machines, the design engineer is expected to have
frequent interaction with workshop staff or contractors involved in the manu-
facture to ensure that the design intentions are carried out.  Often, with complex
or novel work, the design engineer will be asked to interpret his or her inten-
tions, with further instructions to carry out the work, and this discussion may
lead to the consideration of alternatives or substitution of components.  The
design engineer will not normally be liable for such changes if these were made
in good faith with sound engineering judgement.
Legal Liability
An engineer’s failure to fulfil the standard and care required by law may fall
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under either of two legal heads of liability:
1. Contract. The duty to exercise the requisite duty of care to the client arises
from the terms of the contract, expressed or implied, between the engineer
and the client.  The exact extent of that obligation owed will be interpreted
in the light of that contract.
2. Tort.  The responsibility of an engineer to a client is not the sole one.  The
engineer may also be liable to third parties with whom he has no contract.
The basis of this liability in law is tort of negligence, which happens when
a person commits a negligent act or omission, thereby causing harm to
another person whom the negligent person ought reasonably to have con-
templated as being likely to be affected by that act or omission.
A professional engineer is negligent if he or she fails to observe the standards of
a  prudent fellow professional person.  So, the standard of care in negligence is
similar to that owed in contract, but it is owed to the world at large, and without
the benefit of any particular limitation or exception which may be contained in
the contract.
An extension of liability in tort to third parties has arisen as a result of a particu-
lar case, Hedley Byrne v. Heller & Partners (1963).  That case established that
there can be liability for negligent statements, as distinct from negligent acts or
omissions.  This has an important effect, so far as engineers are concerned, in
extending possible liability.  An example might be where an engineer is re-
quired to furnish some kind of certificate of performance or warranty which, if
negligently given, would render the engineer liable should any loss be incurred
as a result of reliance being placed on the certificate.
The fact that liability in tort runs alongside liability in contract has some impor-
tant consequences.  While a consulting engineer may have, in his contract with
his client, specifically limited the degree of responsibility that he or she is un-
dertaking, that limitation may not apply to third parties.  Woodhouse, in a judge-
ment in the case, Bowen v. Paramount Builders Ltd 1977, said:
“I do not regard a private contractual arrangement for an ineffi-
cient design or for an unworkmanlike or inadequate type of con-
struction as any sort of ‘justification or valid explanation’ for re-
leasing the builder from his duty to those who otherwise could
look to him for relief.”
Woodhouse’s comment reflects the blunt observation of Pavolic5:
“If an engineer is troubled because he believes that the product
that he is working on poses a threat to the public health, safety,
and welfare, he does not need to be told that he is to hold para-
mount public health, safety, and welfare.”
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If applied to consulting engineering practice, this ruling would mean that, even
if an engineer had specifically limited the extent of reliability to the client,
because the client was not prepared, for example to pay to have the job done as
thoroughly as might be required, the engineer might still be liable in tort for
any damage suffered by other persons whom he or she ought to have contem-
plated as being likely to be affected.
There is another consequence of the distinction between tort and contract.  Under
the Limitation Act 1950, the law provides that any claim, in contract or in tort,
must be brought within six years from the time when the cause of action arose.
However, there is a distinction between contract and tort regarding when the
cause of action arises.  A cause of action in contract arises as soon as there is a
breach of the duty of skill, whether or not any damage has been apparent.  A
cause of action in tort arises only when there is both a breach of the duty of skill
and damage.  Accordingly, where there is negligence, but its effects do not
become manifest for some years, claims in tort will not be barred by statute
until six years after the damage has become apparent.  In the case of deficient
building work, a case was argued through to the House of Lords,  who ruled in
1983 that a cause of action in tort for negligence in the design and workman-
ship accrued at the date when the physical damage occurred, whether or not the
damage could have been discovered with reasonable diligence at that date.  In
New Zealand, it is also important to note the “long-stop” provision contained in
Section 91(2) of the Building Act 1991, which prevents civil proceedings that
relate to any building work being brought against any person ten years or more
after the date of the act or omission on which the proceedings are based.
Limitation of Liability
There are two ways in which self-employed and consulting engineers may be
able to limit their liability for professional negligence.  These are by inserting
suitable terms in the contract of engagement and through the formation of a
limited liability company.
1 Contract terms
It is possible to define, by appropriate terms in the contract, the liability of the
parties for a breach of that contract.  Common Law generally recognises the
principle of freedom of parties to strike contracts on such terms as they wish,
and there is no general rule of law by which Courts can refuse to give effect to
exclusion clauses.  However, the Courts have, where appropriate, applied a
number of general rules in the law of contract in such a way as to control the
possibilities of abuse which are inherent in having complete freedom of con-
tract in setting exclusion clauses.
MacKenzie4 notes, in particular:
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• Anyone seeking to rely on an exclusion clause must show that it was in-
corporated in a term of the contract, and that reasonable steps were taken
to bring the clause to the notice of the other party at the time the contract
was being drawn up.
• An exclusion clause is to be construed strictly against the party who intro-
duced it and seeks to rely on it.
• The exclusion clause will be binding only upon the parties to the contract
and will not offer protection against claims by third parties; moreover, it
may not protect others who have been engaged by the engineer and who
sought the limitation of liability.
2 Limited liability company
An engineering consultancy may limit its total liability for a claim by incorpo-
rating the firm as a limited liability company.  If a judgement is made against
the firm, then the total amount of the firm’s liability will be the assets of the
company.  However, the limitation of liability does not protect individuals who
have been negligent, against whom an action for liability in tort can still be
brought.
For this reason, it is normal practice for consulting engineers, and a condition
of membership of their professional association in New Zealand, to take out
professional indemnity insurance against claims.  As with all insurance, the
purpose is to spread the risk of calamity among many to avoid ruinous loss for
the individual.  Risk insurance is considered further in Chapter 10, including
legislation that affects insurance in New Zealand.
Standards and Compliance
Standards represent widely recognised benchmarks of industrial safety and per-
formance, and thus a means of managing risk. Although the use of appropriate
Standards in engineering work is prudent, and is normally regarded as “best
practice”, only a very small proportion of published Standards (approximately
5%) are mandatory. At a national level, Standards become mandatory when
they are incorporated into specific acts or regulations. Local authorities, such
as city and district councils, can create bylaws, which incorporate standards,
such as NZS9201: Model general bylaws.
For the construction industry, the Building Act 1991 and the Building Regula-
tions provide the framework for legal compliance. The regulations contain the
New Zealand Building Code, which sets minimum standards for building work.
To meet the requirements under this Code, the Building Industry Authority pro-
vides prescriptive Approved Documents of two kinds: acceptable solutions and
verification methods. Both types of document may refer to specific Standards.
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Standard conditions of contract for building and construction may be found in
NZS3910:1998 Conditions of contract for building and civil engineering con-
struction. The Standard provides a mechanism for resolving disputes, which
might otherwise have ended up in court, to be resolved. NZS:3910 has provi-
sions that require any dispute, which cannot be resolved by agreement between
the two parties, to be resolved by mediation, if both parties agree, or otherwise
determined by arbitration.
At the time of writing (1999), only four standards that relate to product safety
are cited in legislation under Section 29 of the Fair Trading Act. These concern
products for children and cigarette lighters, rather than engineering appliances.
Disputes that come before the courts may use Standards as evidence. For exam-
ple, in 1998, the Environment Court in Christchurch rejected a school’s appeal
against a cellphone tower being built next to the school, drawing on an interim
radiofrequency standard, now NZS2772:Part 1:1999, Radiofrequency fields -
maximum levels, to support its decision.
Statutory Obligations
Resource Management Act 1991
Under Section 17 of this Act, there is a general duty on every person to avoid,
remedy or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment arising from any
activity carried on by, or on behalf of that person, whether or not permitted by
a plan or by a resource consent or existing rights.  The meaning of “effect” in
the Act is very broad.  It covers any past, present or future effect and any cumu-
lative effect which arises over time in combination with other effects regardless
of scale, intensity, duration, or frequency of the effect, and also includes any
potential effect of high probability as well as one of low probability which has
a high potential impact.  Clearly, much engineering activity has an effect in
these terms.
The provisions of the Act can unwittingly expose an engineer to unforeseen
legal risks.  For example, an engineer may decide, as a matter of urgency, that
certain emergency work is needed on a building site to stabilise a landslip which
was threatening to overwhelm the construction.  He might order that a retaining
wall be built at once to stem the hazard.  Such work, however, would be a
violation of the Act insofar that no resource consent had been obtained for the
emergency work.  While the engineer might have a defence, if it could be ar-
gued that there was risk to life and limb, the legal exposure remains.
Another example of exposure under the Act is provided by the failure of the
Opuha Dam while under construction, which resulted in a considerable amount
of debris being borne downstream in a flood of water.  The dam builders and
the project manager were charged under the Act with the unlawful discharge of
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contaminants.  Case Study 9.1 gives a more detailed account of the circum-
stances and court proceedings.
Case Study 9.1  The Opuha Dam Collapse (taken from newspaper reports)
An earth dam was being erected on the Opuha River, South Canterbury, to enable the sur-
rounding area to be irrigated and with some electricity generation.  On 6 February 1997
(Waitangi Day - appropriately named weeping waters), following a severe rainstorm, the
almost-completed dam collapsed unleashing a major flood of about 13 million cubic me-
tres of water and about 200 000 cubic metres of silt, gravel and rocks. Recorded river flows
at Skipton bridge rose eightfold in a day  before the measuring station was swept away.  The
bed of the river at this bridge was estimated to have been raised permanently by 1m.  Farm-
land for several kilometres downstream was devastated, and almost all fish and insect life
on the river was killed.  One farmer lost 257 sheep and had to replace 8 km of fences.
Repairs to the river’s flood-protection system cost almost $600,000.
Subsequently, Canterbury Regional Council prosecuted the dam builders and the project
manager in the Environment Court for allowing the unauthorised discharge of contami-
nants, the water and the earth-dam construction material, into the river.  The builders, it was
said, were required by their insurers to build the dam in such a way that it could withstand
a one in ten-year flood during construction.  In October of the previous year, so that they
could use the full width of the dam for filling purposes, the builders had diverted the river
though a 1.8-m diameter pipe which, it was claimed, could not cope with a one in ten-year
flood. During this period, the estimated height at which the dam was considered to be
capable of holding back such a flood, as advised by the builders’ consulting engineers, was
reduced by 5m.  This lower estimate implied a reduction in the dam’s flood capacity of
some 3.2 million cubic metres.
When heavy rain at the beginning of February 1997 overwhelmed the pipe and caused
water to accumulate behind the dam, there was no specially-formed channel which could
be unplugged to help take the increased flow of water. On 5 February, the project manager
arranged for bulldozers to create a channel on the side of the dam to release the accumulat-
ing water.  The water going through this new channel began to scour the downstream face
of the dam, which was not designed to cope with the swirling mass of water.  Eventually, a
major break in the dam occurred, causing a huge release of water and debris downstream.
The Court was told that it was not necessary to prove either intent or negligence on the part
of defendants who would assert that their actions were necessary to prevent serious damage
to the dam structure and to properties downstream.  Defence lawyers argued that the dam
had been built in compliance with the resource consents, and this state of affairs had been
certified in a letter from the Council’s chief executive officer during the construction as a
result of monitoring the work.
The Court found that an illegal discharge had taken place which made the defendants liable
to a $200 000 fine and/or a two-year term of imprisonment.  In his reserved judgment, the
judge said that there had been an intention to leave a 10m-wide channel in case of flooding
during construction, but when such a channel was needed, there was none.  Both defend-
ants knew that the dam could be overtopped in the event of a flood, but took no reasonable
steps to prevent it: that made the defendants responsible for causing the collapse of the dam
construction material into the river when they dug an emergency channel in the dam face to
prevent floodwaters overtopping it.
The case went to Appeal, on the grounds that the judge had made an error in regarding the
loss of material as a “discharge”.  The High Court, however, found that the judge was
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This judgement is an important decision, since the defendants had not deliber-
ately set out to circumvent the law and had acted under engineering advice.  It
is also important since the action was taken in terms of a breach of environmen-
tal law under the Resource Management Act rather than one of tort for negli-
gence.
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
As noted in Chapter 8, this Act places a duty of care on all employers to ensure
the safety and health of their employees.  Sections 7 and 10 of the Act set out in
detail the steps an employer must take to provide a safe working environment.
Employers must identify hazards in their place of work, and regularly review
them to see if they are significant and require further action to control them.
Whenever an accident or serious harm occurs, an employer must register it on a
prescribed form.  An employer must ensure that employees are sufficiently
trained to do their work safely or supervised by an experienced person.  More-
over, an employer is responsible for ensuring that an employee does not harm
any other person while at work, including members of the public and visitors.
Since effective safety management requires the involvement of everyone in a
workplace, employees also have responsibilities to look after themselves.  For
example, if an operator removed a machine guard to give better access to the
machine (as described in Case Study 8.1), despite the best intentions of the
employer, both the employer and employee would share liability.  However, if
the employer could show that all practical steps had been taken to comply with
the Act, the employer might be found innocent.
Under Section 16 of the Act, any person, even if not the employer, who controls
a place of work, has the responsibility for ensuring that people in or near the
workplace are not harmed.  Likewise, self-employed people must ensure their
action, or inaction, does not harm anyone, including themselves.  Any princi-
pal, a person or company who hires any contractor or subcontractor, must take
all practicable steps to ensure that they or their employees are not harmed at
work.
That there is a duty owed by principals to their contractors has been confirmed
in a decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Central Cranes Limited vs
Department of Labour  1997.  While a principal may promote the safety of his
entitled to construe the loss of the dam’s material as a discharge, provided the appellants
could be causatively linked to it.  “We have no difficulty with the notion that where an earth
dam is under construction, those responsible for it must ensure that the dam materials are
not at risk of being washed away, as happened here,” the appeal judges concluded.  The
Appeal was dismissed.
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or her employees, the obligations to a contractor called to a workplace to under-
take various tasks must also be considered.  The principal cannot assume that,
if a person is employed by another company, then the responsibility for health
and safety rests solely on the shoulders of the employer.  The issue before the
Appeal Court is summarised in Case Study 9.2.
Case Study 9.2  Principal’s Liability
A principal had been prosecuted under the Act in the case where a contractor’s em-
ployee had been seen working 41m above a construction site without a helmet or pro-
tective harness.  The principal argued that it was the worker’s employer, not the princi-
pal, who should be responsible for the safety of the worker.  The Court of Appeal
rejected this argument by finding that, although the responsibility rests primarily with
the employer, the principal’s own responsibilities in securing a safe workplace are not
thereby diminished.  Moreover, the Court observed that under the Act a principal is
required to take all practicable steps to ensure workplace safety.  A principal cannot
distance him or herself from what is happening in a workplace simply because contrac-
tors are involved who, in turn, have a more direct responsibility towards their own
employees.
Thus a principal must put in place appropriate procedures to ensure that con-
tractors and subcontractors are meeting their obligations to their employees
who are working onsite.  In the engagement of a contractor or subcontractor, a
principal is advised to make it a term of the contract that the contractor com-
plies with the principal’s health and safety policies and codes of practice as
well as the contractor’s own policies and codes.
The Act specifies two kinds of offences.  The first and more serious kind relates
to an action or inaction taken despite the knowledge that death or serious harm
is likely to be caused thereby and the action or inaction is contrary to  a provi-
sion of the Act.  The second kind relates to failure to comply with the provi-
sions of the Act, or regulations under the Act.  A person, if convicted of the first
kind of offence, could be fined up to $100 000 or face up to one year in prison
or both.  Offences of the second kind could result in penalties up to $50 000.
Consultation
Although it is prudent to be open with neighbouring parties about proposed
developments, there are a number of instances where notification or consulta-
tion is a legal requirement.  Such a requirement does not, however, imply a
requirement to gain unanimous consent.
The requirement to notify or consult may be set out directly, as in the Resource
Management Act 1991.  It may also be imposed by case law as, for example,
the Court of Appeal had held that consultation by Crown agencies with Maori
to be a recognised principle of the Treaty of Waitangi.  In addition, there are a
number of statutes that require the principles of the Treaty to be taken into
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account, such as the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Hazardous Sub-
stances and New Organisms Act 1996.
Watson6 lists six criteria that the Court of Appeal has recognised in respect of
the duty to consult:
• Meetings must be held with parties who are required to be consulted;
• Parties must be provided with relevant information;
• Parties must be provided with further information if requested;
• The meetings must be entered with an open mind;
• Due notice must be taken of what was said at such meetings;
• Parties must have their say before a decision is made.
The Planning Tribunal noted in the case, Ngati Kahu v. Tauranga District Coun-
cil, that the Council could not be bound to consult for as long as it took to reach
consensus. The Council was obliged to consult for a reasonable time in the
spirit of goodwill and open-mindedness, enabling all reasonable options to be
considered carefully and explored.  In determining whether appropriate consul-
tation has taken place, the Planning Tribunal emphasised that consultation is a
two-way process, with each party having a responsibility to work in good faith.
If such consultation has taken place, and despite efforts to find a mutually ac-
ceptable solution there is still disagreement, then this situation must be accepted
as the outcome.  The Council was free to make the decision it did, having fully
met its obligation to consult.
Although the legal answer is that the courts will uphold the validity of such a
decision, and the project from a legal viewpoint may go ahead, a project may
founder, however, because of objectors’ other tactics, such as withholding ac-
cess to land.  The hardest part of any major engineering project is not the tech-
nical solution but the gaining of public support.  If people have been invited to
give their opinions and be listened to, then they are much less likely to obstruct
the final decision even if they disagree with it.
Registration of Professional Engineers
Newnham7, on reviewing engineering history in New Zealand, noted that statu-
tory registration of engineers arose out of a concern for competency in work
undertaken by persons, who called themselves “engineers”, for which work
they were unfitted.  This concern emphasised the need for a proper system of
education and training for professional engineers and the desirability of regis-
tration of engineers, or some other form of control, so that persons requiring the
services of professional engineers could be reasonably sure that the engineers
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were properly qualified to carry out the work for which they had been engaged.
In various Australian States by 1920, legislation had been in place for several
years requiring local authority engineers to be properly qualified.  The New
Zealand Society of Civil Engineers (the forerunner of IPENZ) presented a bill
to the Government of the day based on the 1911 Queensland Act.  Because of
conflicting views, a revised bill did not become law until 1924.  From 1946
onwards, corporate membership of the New Zealand Institution of Engineers
(now IPENZ) was accepted as a recognised qualifications certificate for the
purpose of registration.
The Engineers Registration Act 1924, amended in 1944, is still in force in 1999.
The essential purpose of the Act is the requirement that engineers with control
of expediture of public money be registered (with certain minor exceptions).
However, for some time there has been a measure of disquiet that this Act now
only covers a section of the Profession.  Whereas in 1920 most engineers were
employed in government or local body service, some seventy-five years later a
majority were employed elsewhere.  In 1994, the then Minister of Commerce
wrote to the Engineers Registration Board formally to ask whether the 1924
Act should be replaced or done away with altogether.  The Board consulted
widely, seeking views from registered engineers, professional institutions such
as IPENZ, ACENZ (consulting engineers) and ALGENZ (local government
engineers) and the Consumers’ Institute.  It also looked at the experiences of
the Medical Council and the Society of Accountants.  The general agreement
was that a register is still needed, but will have to be a considerably tighter
arrangement than the one now currently operated.  Registration Certificates
should reflect a knowledge of relevant New Zealand codes, while all engineers
need to demonstrate ongoing competence to maintain their registered status.
By operating a system of identifying professional engineers who have met cer-
tain minimum standards, the community would be given a level of protection
from the outset of any engineering work, since engineering failures impact heav-
ily on the health and safety of the community. At the time of writing (1999),
draft legislation is being prepared to give effect to these ideas.
Some engineers in New Zealand have sought and gained recognition from over-
seas authorities, such as the Engineering Council of the United Kingdom, which
grants Chartered Engineer status to engineers by virtue of approved academic
qualification, training and experience.
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Risk Insurance*10
Insurance is a form of risk transfer.  It does not alter the technical risk in any
way, but eases the financial risk by distributing the loss among others in the
community.  Insurance is inherently a risk-sharing tool for the community, with
the insurers in the market acting as the funding mechanism for the pooling of
such risks.
In effect, insured parties gain access to the pooled funds of the insurers as an
added security against those losses that when, or indeed if, they occur and they
cannot adequately fund the loss for themselves.
It is a basic premise that the purchase of insurance for most risks, apart from the
major ones, is a financial transaction similar in form to a loan.  The question
that should always arise is: will the insurance be effective in reducing the total
cost of risk more than other possible risk-management options?
All insurance contracts contain certain terms, conditions, exceptions and limi-
tations and therefore only cover what they are intended to cover. There are
certain risks for which insurers will make their resources and capital available
but there are other risks they do not wish to contemplate, or alternatively will
only accept under special conditions with limitations and restrictions.
An insurance policy will normally have an excess or deductible amount that the
insured will pay in the event of any claim.  This is a reasonable proposition as it
involves a commonality of interest between the insurer and insured in sharing
some of the risk.  Above this amount the underwriters may provide a primary
layer to provide the cover for a sum up to the maximum limit of indemnity
available.
Risk Management and Insurance
The management of any capital project represents a challenge and risks which
begin with the conceptual stages, continue through the life of the project and
beyond completion during future permanent occupation.
It does require the co-ordination of a wide range of skills and disciplines to
ensure the risk issues are properly identified, measured, managed and financed.
Too often the traditional approach has simply been to address the design, con-
struction and observation issues and risks by the utilisation of standard condi-
tions of contract, arrange some fairly standardised insurance contracts; then
to trust that the project will be completed satisfactorily.
* based on text provided by Don Houchen
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In fact, an integrated approach is essential having regard for not only the de-
sign, construction and supervisory functions and risks but also an appropriate
specification needed for the insurances of those risks which can reasonably be
insured.
Risk management practice makes extremely good sense whatever insurance
regime may ultimately be in place. Not all of the project risks can be catered for
by insurance and it should never be regarded as a substitute for an adequate
risk management programme.
As discussed earlier in this book, the first stage in the risk-management proc-
ess is to identify and measure the risks and having done so, to examine them
and the ways and means of avoiding, reducing or minimising them.
The task of formulating a programme for managing the risk should be viewed
as the minimisation of the total cost of risk coupled with an assessment of alter-
native risk-financing methods.
Self-funded programmes which require a major contribution from the partici-
pants themselves in the event of a major disaster present a real problem.  In
many instances, it is often a better strategy to place the individual risks in the
insurance market.
There is the potential for failure in such a scenario.  If a regime of self-insur-
ance is under-funded, then the reality is that the participants themselves, having
suffered significant losses, may be responsible for any shortfall.
The next stage in the process is risk control.  Risk control is the active manage-
ment of and monitoring of risks in order to minimise their frequency or sever-
ity.  As noted before, it facilitates the most appropriate means of funding the
risk and may even reduce the cost of insurance.
The final option is risk transfer.  The means by which risks can be regulated or
transferred appropriately are by way of suitable provisions in contracts. There
are recognised standard documents that can appropriately regulate and share
the responsibilities between the parties involved in various activities, in par-
ticular construction projects.
In any capital project it should be recognised no project can be successfully
completed without the various parties assuming their proper share of the re-
sponsibilities and risks.
Simply shifting responsibilities and risks from one party to another, which the
other party or parties are not qualified to assume, or are not financially able to
accept or can even insure, can be a fruitless exercise.
From a financial point of view, one of the important aspects of risk transfer will
be the arranging of the insurance programme.  The cost of insurance for a project
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may be significant, but a major part of this cost may not be identifiable at the
outset.
Insurability
The process of dealing with the selection and pricing of insurance risks is com-
monly known as underwriting.
The acceptability of a risk to an underwriter depends upon the presence of a
number of criteria to ensure the viability of the insurance contract.  The item to
be insured may be a thing or an activity.  Hammond2 lists these criteria as
follows:
1 A large number of similar items exposed to loss.  This criterion provides a
database from which the risk can be evaluated and a premium set.
2 A loss definite in time and place.  The estimate of risk and settlement of a
claim are greatly enhanced if the time and place of the loss-making event
can be identified; it would be difficult to arrange insurance for the slow
physical deterioration of a building, for example.
3 Accidental loss. A highly likely loss is not attractive, as the economics of
insurance are based on the principle of risk-spreading among others the
costs of random events beyond the normal control of the insured.  Insur-
ance may be more difficult and normally more expensive to arrange after a
substantial loss.
4 Minimal catastrophic hazard. Catastrophes can produce instabilities in the
insurance market, and financial ruin of particular underwriters.
Ultimately, insurability involves both actuarial and other business factors.  As
Hammond2 notes, the actuarial factors of homogeneity, large numbers, definite
and accidental losses and minimal catastrophic hazard are seldom met perfectly;
one or more of them are likely to be compromised in establishing an underwrit-
ing decision for a client.
Insurance Classes
The number of policies that could apply to a construction contract, or indeed
permanent insurance, are quite considerable.  The various broad categories of
insurance are listed by Adam1 in the IPENZ publication Engineering Risk as
marine insurance, material damage insurance, liability insurances and insurances
of the person. These categories  can be expanded as follows:
• Material Damage insurance.
• Business Interruption insurance against loss of production and profits.
• Marine and Aviation Cargo insurance against the perils of transportation.
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• Marine or Aviation insurance for the vessels or craft and the legal liabilities
to third parties arising from their use (including any charterers’ liabilities).
• General Liability insurance in respect of legal liabilities that may be in-
curred to third parties for property damage and bodily injury.
• Motor Vehicle insurance in respect of vehicle damage and liabilities
• Personal insurances, such as life, accident and sickness insurance.
• Professional Indemnity insurance against claims regarding the competence
of work or advice.
• Directors’ and Officers’ insurance to cover liability for wrongful acts in
the management of the affairs of a corporate entity.
• Statutory Liability insurance to cover certain fines or penalties for inad-
vertent and unintentional breach of a range of statutes.
• Employers Liability insurance to cover common law claims by employees
that fall outside of the scope of the Accident Insurance Act 1998.
• Accident Compensation insurance to cover accidental workplace bodily
injury in terms of the Accident Insurance Act 1998 (note the Act was
amended on 1 April 2000 by the introduction of the Accident Insurance
(Transitional Provisions) Act 2000, with further reforms to be introduced
by 1 July 2000).
Table 10.1 illustrates the number of policies that may be involved on a con-
struction contract. (Note that this list is not necessarily exhaustive).
Alternative Risk Financing
Some alternative risk financing techniques have evolved to become the “stand-
ard” rather than the alternative for the risk managers of many major corporate
entities and for many associations of entities who have bonded together to form
collective risk financing systems.  The essential elements are to cut insurance
expenditure by retaining a greater degree of self-retained risk.
There is a wide range of self-funding concepts which can be considered:
• simple self-insurance by accepting higher levels of deductibles or excesses
to reduce premium levels;
• utilisation of accommodating insurers to provide claims administration
services for a negotiated fee;
• more sophisticated structures as employed by some professional associa-
tions and others who establish risk management societies,  such as the
Consulting Engineers Advancement Society Incorporated;
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• expansion of the degree of self-funding utilising the capacity of the group
to retain risk,  facilitating the claims administration to be controlled and
managed under collaborative agreements with accommodating Insurers;
• the formation of captive or mutual insurance companies,  which may be
categorised into national, international, limited membership, wider mem-
bership or professional or trade association related entities.
The cost advantage of economy of scale is often negligible in a disaster pro-
gramme because it does require the accommodation of specialist insurers to
complete such a programme.
The Nature of Insurance Contracts
A contract of insurance is inherently one whereby one party, the insurer, agrees
in return for the consideration, the premium, to pay a sum of money or its
equivalent to the other party, the insured, upon the occurrence of a specified
event or contingency that affects an interest the insured has in the subject mat-
ter of the insurance.
The requirements follow the law of contract: and there must be binding agree-
ment that complies with the general principles of contract law including an
offer, acceptance and consideration. There must also be an “insurable interest”
Table 10.1: A range of insurance policies that may apply to a
construction contract
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with the object of the insured subject matter being a legal activity and not against
the public interest.
However, these general principles are modified by a number of common law
rules and through various provisions in the statutes that have special applica-
tion to insurance contracts.
Most contracts generally are governed by the common law principle of caveat
emptor “let the buyer beware”. This does not apply to an insurance contract,
which departs from this principle and it is a contract of utmost good faith.
The insurance contract has attached to it special obligations on one party “the
proposer” to disclose certain material information that may not be fully avail-
able to the other party, “the insurer”, when entering into the contract. This re-
quirement of utmost good faith forbids either party to conceal from the other
any material thing which may have a bearing on the risk to be insured that is
only privately known to them.
This obligation is not confined to the insured. The insurer must also observe
utmost good faith in dealings with the insured relative to the contract.
Co-insurance and Re-insurance
The insurance of larger risks is often undertaken by a combination of co-insur-
ance and re-insurance.  In co-insurance, the insurers take direct responsibility for
providing a specified proportion of the cover, with the prime responsibility for
assessing the risk being taken by a lead company.  In re-insurance, the co-insur-
ers lay off their risk with other insurers.  For very large risks, the re-insurers may
themselves re-insure further.  In this way, such large risks are spread around
financial institutions to minimise the individual impact of very large claims.
The availability of re-insurance can influence the insurability of an asset.
Hammond2 recounts an incident when a large commercial property, located
below a dam, was declined insurance by a primary underwriter, largely because
re-insurance was not available.  Later, re-insurance capacity increased and be-
came available to the underwriter who then accepted the risk.
The Classification of Insurance Contracts
One relatively simple method of classification of insurance contracts is into
those that may be personal in nature; those that cover property losses; or alter-
natively those that cover losses arising from legal liabilities, depending upon
the nature of interest insured:
• Personal insurance is concerned with covering the person or some other
person for bodily injury, illness or death.
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• Property insurance is concerned with the loss of, or damage to property.
• Liability insurance is concerned with losses arising from legal liabilities
requiring the payment of compensation for damages to other parties.
A further distinction between various types of insurance contracts is between
those providing an indemnity, as distinct from those providing for other contin-
gencies to be covered.
The Principle of Indemnity
One of the controlling principles of insurance law for many insurance contracts
is the principle of indemnity. According to this principle, the insured must be
restored to a financial position that was enjoyed by him or her immediately
prior to the event insured
This means, within the limits of the insurance, the measure of the loss is also
the measure of any payment by the insurer.
The object of the principle of indemnity is to make certain the insured does not
suffer financial loss, but may not make a profit from the insurance.
The Significance of Time of Claim
Most types of insurance contracts insure the consequences of accidental occur-
rences that take place during the currency of the policy.
Primarily, because it is difficult to pinpoint an exact moment in time when a
professional act, error or omission occurs, Professional Indemnity, Directors
& Officers, Statutory Liability and some other forms of liability insurance are
underwritten on a basis of “Claims Made and Notified”.
“Occurrence-based” policies
“Occurrence-based ” policies of insurance, such as general liability insurance,
are linked to a period in time. What is insured is loss resulting from a legal
liability to pay compensation to a client or other third party that has actually
occurred during the period of the insurance.
The simplest analogy for the application of an “occurrence-based” policy of
liability insurance is a motor vehicle third-party liability insurance. If, for ex-
ample, the insured negligently causes damage to a third party’s motor vehicle at
a time that fell within the period of the insurance, then any subsequent claim for
damages by the affected third party will fall to be indemnified by the insurer
that provided the insurance cover at the time of the accident.
This is the case, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff may notify the matter
to the insured and then commences the action against the insured after the pe-
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riod of the policy has elapsed. (There may be, of course, claim-reporting condi-
tions in the policy that may affect any ultimate entitlement of the insured to the
indemnity.)
“Claims Made & Notified” policy
Under a “Claims Made & Notified” policy of insurance, a different rule  ap-
plies. The policy responds only to those circumstances, of which the insured
first becomes aware may lead to a claim or possible claim during its currency
and then reports such circumstances to the current insurer before the expiry
date of that insurance.
It does not matter at all when the act, error or omission that may have given rise
to the claim or potential claim may have occurred; only that the Insured had no
prior knowledge of the circumstances before taking up the cover. This rule is
subject to the provision that there is no retroactive date limitation in the policy.
If there is, then the policy will not respond to acts, errors or omissions that
occurred prior to the date the insurance commenced.
The Legislation Affecting Insurance in New Zealand
There are a number of statutes and regulations that regulate the New Zealand
insurance industry and touch on engineering activity.  Some of the more sig-
nificant acts are as follows:
• The Insurance Companies’ Deposits Act 1953 requires every company or
person carrying on any class of insurance business to deposit $500,000 as
a security with the Public Trustee.
• The Insurance Law Reform Acts 1977 and 1985 improve the position of
the insured under any contract of insurance and are intended to improve
the balance and bargaining power between the insurer and insured.
• The Earthquake Commission Act 1993 provides compulsory earthquake
and certain natural disaster coverage for residential homes and their con-
tents that are otherwise insured for fire up to maximum limits.
• The Insurance Companies’ (Ratings & Inspections) Act 1994 requires in-
surers (other than certain exempted insurers who do not underwrite disas-
ter or general insurance) to obtain a rating from an approved rating agency
to be disclosed at the time of entering into or renewing a contract of insur-
ance.
• The Accident Insurance Act 1998 provides for compulsory private insur-
ance in respect of accidental bodily injury. The Act has since been amended
to remove private insurance competition with effect from 1 July 2000 and
to reintroduce a single statutory compulsory regime.
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Insurance Requirements
The law requires an insured to act as a reasonable and prudent uninsured person
and to mitigate the circumstances of any loss.  This precept excludes reckless
salvage claims in the case of a material damage claim, or recklessly compro-
mising the insured’s, and thus the insurer’s position in a liability claim.
In the case of liability policies, the point is further emphasised by spelling out
in the policy that the insured must make no admission of liability, even if the
insured believes that they are liable in any event for which insurance cover has
been taken.
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Development
The reduction of a fault tree to the minimum sequence of events may be done
by  Fusell’s algorithmn, which is particularly attractive for this purpose, as the
methodology can be adapted to a spreadsheet representation for hand or com-
puter-aided evaluation.
The rules can be stated as follows:
AND-gate rule
•  The first input replaces the higher-order event.
•  Other inputs are inserted in the next available column, one input per  column.
OR-gate rule
•  The first input replaces the higher-order event.
•  The other inputs are inserted into the next available row, one input per row.
•  If there are other entries in the row where the OR gate appears, these must
be entered into the next row.
This procedure is illustrated for the simple fault tree for the overheating of an
electric motor, which may be due to either a primary motor failure or to exces-
sive current (Figure A1).
Figure A1: Fault tree for a
motor-system failure (after
Fussell, 1976)
A
B
C
Motor overheats
Primary motor failure Excessive current
to motora
Excessive current
in circuit
Fuse failed
b
Wire short Power surge
c d
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The steps are:
Step 1. Insert the top-event gate:
A
Step 2. Replace A (an OR gate) with its inputs, a and B:
a
B
Step 3. Replace B (an AND gate) with its inputs, C and b:
a
C  b
Step 4.  Replace C (an AND gate) with its inputs c and d:
a
c  b
d  b
The minimum cut sets are thus: a; c b; and d b.
Fussell’s method may also be used to eliminate unnecessary sets in an unre-
duced fault tree.   Consider the fault tree shown in Figure A2(a), in which the
same event b, say the failure of manual intervention, is found in separate
branches.  The final spreadsheet would have the sets:
a  b  b
a  d  b
a  b  c
a  d  c
In the first row, there is a repeated event b which can be deleted.  The second
and third rows can be deleted since these are supersets of a,b.   The minimum
cut sets are thus a,b and a,d,c.  This leads to the reduced fault-tree depicted in
Figure A2(b).
Boolean reduction gives A = a•b + a•c•d, revealing that the minimum cut sets
are indeed a,b and a,d,c.
By inserting values for the primary probabilities it can be shown that the unre-
duced fault tree substantially underestimates the outcome probability.
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A
B D
+
C
a b d
b c
+
Boolean reduction
A = B•D
= (a•C) • (b + d)
= (a•(b + c)) • (b + d)
= a • (b + c) •b + a•(b + c) •d
= {[(a + b) + (a•b)•c] + {a•b]•d} + a•c•d
= {[a•b] + [a•b]•d} + a•c•d
= a•b + a•c•d
a.b + a.c.d
b + c.d
a
b
c d
+
(a) (b)
Figure A2: (a) Unreduced (b) reduced fault tree
For example, let a = 0.2, b = 0.1, c = 0.05 and d = 0.1. The unreduced fault tree,
Figure A2(a) yields:
C = b + c = 0.1 + 0.05 = 0.15
B = a•c = 0.2 x 0.15 = 0.03
D = b + d = 0.1 + 0.1 = 0.2
A = B•D = 0.03 x 0.2 = 0.006
Whereas the reduced fault tree, Figure A2(b), gives:
A = a•b + a•c•d
    = (0.2 x 0.1) + (0.2 x 0.05 x 0.1) = 0.021
which is 3.5 times greater! For simplicity, the small probabilities of simultane-
ous inputs to OR-gates have been neglected.
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Appendix B: Risk and
Prudence
Engineering Governance in Public and Private
Organisations
IPENZ Recommendations for the Prudent Management of Engineering
Activities in Public Companies, Local Authorities and Crown Agencies.
Introduction
The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) is the profes-
sional body representing engineers and technologists in New Zealand.  It has
produced these guidelines to assist directors, councillors, and executive man-
agers in public companies, crown agencies and territorial local authorities with
the prudent management of their engineering assets and operations.
Rationale
Adherence with this policy will assist directors and executive management,
and those with statutory responsibilities for compliance with the legislative re-
quirements1,  to show that they have acted prudently and have followed “best
practice” in setting up appropriate processes and accountabilities.  Compliance
with this policy will also assist in ensuring that engineering activities are man-
aged in support of the broader business activities.
Applicability
These guidelines are designed for public companies, crown entities, govern-
ment bodies and territorial local authorities which either
(i) Rely intensively on engineering and technology to deliver or produce
their services and products;
or
(ii) Engineering-related risks are a significant proportion of the total busi-
ness risk.
Board Positions
Organisations should ideally have at least one Board Member with a recog-
nised professional engineering background2.  That person will, in addition to
their normal Board responsibilities, be expected to add an engineering and tech-
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nology perspective to Board policy making.  The Board should also recognise
that it may need to take advice on engineering matters from both within the
company and from external sources.
Executive Management
Such organisations should have:-
(i) A person or persons (as appropriate) with clear responsibility and ac-
countability for engineering and technology matters.  This person should
be eligible for professional membership of a recognised engineering in-
stitution.
The position description should include responsibility for ensuring that:-
(i) The engineering and technology policies are embodied within the busi-
ness policy and strategies.
(ii) Engineering risks are properly evaluated and considered in evaluating
business risk.
(iii) The engineering and technology applied in the businesses meet ‘best prac-
tice’ guidelines.
Business Processes
The organisation should have within its strategic business processes:-
(i) A regular performance audit of its engineering policies (including hu-
man resource policies applying to engineering personnel) against indus-
try ‘best practice’.
(ii) An engineering risk evaluation programme
Conclusion
Adherence to this policy will assist those with governance responsibilities to
show that they have acted prudently in managing the engineering resources
entrusted to them.
R P Carter KNZM
President
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References
1 Commerce Act, Health and Safety in Employment Act
2 Professional Engineering Background
For purposes of this document a person described as having a professional
engineering background is one who is eligible for membership of a recog-
nised professional engineering institution.  Such people are required to
have a tertiary qualification (Bachelor of Engineering (BE) or equivalent)
and at least four years post graduation experience.  This experience is as-
sessed by senior engineers through interviews, submitted work and ref-
erees reports before entry into the class of Member (M.IPENZ) is granted.
Engineering Institutions recognised in New Zealand are; IPENZ (Institu-
tion of Professional Engineers New Zealand), IE Aust (Institution of Engi-
neers Australia), IEE (Institution of Electrical Engineers), IMechE (Insti-
tution of Mechanical Engineers), IChemE (Institution of Chemical Engi-
neers), ICE (Institution of Civil Engineers), IStructE (Institution of Struc-
tural Engineers), and HKIE (the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers).
These people are generally identified by a post-nominal, e.g. M.IPENZ
and F.IPENZ.
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CAE, the Centre for Advanced Engineering, was established in May 1987, as a
centre for the promotion of innovation and excellence in engineering and tech-
nology, to commemorate the centenary of the School of Engineering at the
University of Canterbury.
Vision Statement
To benefit New Zealand through promoting and encouraging the application of
advanced engineering and technology.
Objective
CAE aims to enhance engineering knowledge within New Zealand by technol-
ogy transfer and the application of New Zealand and overseas research to engi-
neering-related issues of national importance.
Key Activities
• CAE undertakes major projects that bring together selected groups of
practising and research engineers and other experts from industry, research
organisations, local and central government, tertiary institutions, and the
engineering profession.
• CAE also carries out smaller projects and organises seminars, workshops
and conferences as opportunities arise.
CAE projects aim to:
• Be of national importance with wide public appeal and with tangible re-
sults.
• Facilitate technological co-operation amongst commercial and government
organisations, tertiary institutions and the engineering profession.
• Identify deficiencies in New Zealand’s technological capability and take
action to promote the addressing of these deficiencies.
• Undertake technology transfer rather than original research.
Funding
CAE is an independent, non-profit organisation, financed mainly from the earn-
ings of its trust fund. This fund, which currently stands at approximately $2.3
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million, consists of monies donated initially by 150 corporate donors and 750
individual donors during the 1987 Centennial Appeal, and more recently sup-
plemented by further donations during the 10th Anniversary Appeal. Other in-
come is derived from sponsorship for specific projects, book sales and semi-
nars. The University of Canterbury continues to make a major contribution to
CAE by providing accommodation and financial services.
Administration
CAE is controlled by a Board of Directors comprising representatives from
industry and commerce (including government and consulting engineers), the
University of Canterbury and other tertiary educational institutions. The present
Chairman is Dr Francis Small of Wellington. The Trust Fund is currently ad-
ministered by the University of Canterbury under the direction of four trustees.
CAE has two executive staff and three other staff engaged on publications and
secretarial duties.
Executive Director John Blakeley has overall responsibility for CAE activities
and Projects Director John Lumsden co-ordinates CAE projects. From 1 May
2000, Dr George Hooper succeeds John Blakeley as Executive Director.
Principal Corporate Donors
Founders:
BHP New Zealand Steel Limited
Earthquake Commission
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand
Fisher & Paykel Industries Limited
Mainzeal Property and Construction Limited
McDonnell Dowell Constructors Limited
Opus International Consultants Limited
TransAlta New Zealand Limited
10th Anniversary Appeal:
Transpower New Zealand Limited
Contact:
CAE
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch, New Zealand
Street Address:
39 Creyke Road
Christchurch 8004
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Telephone: +64-3-364-2478
Fax: +64-3-364-2069
e-mail: cae@cae.canterbury.ac.nz
http://www.cae.canterbury.ac.nz
Executive Director: John P Blakeley (to 30 April 2000)
Dr George Hooper (from 1 May 2000)
Projects Director: John L Lumsden
Publications Editor: Charles A Hendtlass
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The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand sets the standards for
professional engineering in New Zealand.  It does this through accrediting un-
dergraduate engineering degrees and assessing practice competency of indi-
viduals through professional review.  By participating in international engi-
neering agreements, IPENZ ensures that New Zealand professional engineer-
ing qualifications are recognised throughout the world.
The Institution’s Code of Ethics imposes standards of conduct covering profes-
sionalism and integrity, society and community wellbeing, sustainable man-
agement and promotion of engineering knowledge.  The Code, which is backed
up by a disciplinary process gives assurance to the public and clients that mem-
bers will act in a competent and professional manner.
IPENZ recognises the duty of the profession to promote engineering to the
young generation of New Zealanders.  To achieve this it has developed its Neigh-
bourhood Engineers Programme which brings together engineers and schools
as part of the new Technology Curriculum.
By advocating and promoting engineering to the government, industry and the
community,  IPENZ assists in providing an environment where engineers can
practice their profession with identity, respect and rewards.
The Institution offers its members:
• Various awards and scholarships that recognise engineering excellence and
innovation.
• Quality brand identification through the use of post nominals M.IPENZ,
T.IPENZ.
• A weekly e-mail magazine that provides members with up-to-the-minute
news and events.
• A web site provides comprehensive information on activities, resources and
information.
• The peer-reviewed Transactions of the best technical papers on engineering
in New Zealand.
• Status and recognition as someone who meets strict codes of competency
and ethics. Increasingly sought by employers, this improves employment or
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career advancement prospects.
• Assistance in keeping up to date via “e.nz” delivered to all members every
second month. This magazine provides a blend of news and feature stories
of interest to engineers practising across a broad spectrum of disciplines,
together with the latest on what IPENZ is doing for its members.
• Mutual Recognition Agreements with numerous engineering bodies over-
seas assist in obtaining recognition for work overseas or to operate in a com-
pany which provides international services.
• An annual remuneration survey provides information on salary packages
for engineers and technologists in a wide range of disciplines, locations,
jobs and speciality areas.
• Over twenty special interest groups provide a range of services including
meetings, publications and practice standards.
• A network of professional contacts through local Branch and Technical Group
meetings and activities with opportunities to meet and exchange informa-
tion, experience and ideas.
• An employment advisory service providing information on employment con-
ditions and contracts.
• Through an e-mail system, members can access a job search list where job
vacancies are advertised.  Students can also use a similar system for identi-
fying those organisations offering holiday employment.
• Assistance and monitoring of Continuing Professional Development to main-
tain skills.  This is supported by IPENZ in being the link for the Deakin
University MBA programme, listing available conferences and courses in
the “e.nz” magazine, collating lists of relevant programmes, evaluating and
endorsing courses, arranging mentors, giving career advice, and providing
articulated pathways.
• Career/competency programmes to assist young engineers in planning and
tracking their career development under the guidance of an experienced en-
gineer, with National Office support.
• An employer endorsement programme to recognise organisations that have
systems in place to support young engineers in their career development.
• Assistance from the Benevolent Society in time of need is available to both
members and their families.
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Mission Statement
The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand is dedicated to enhanc-
ing the quality of life by the creative application of engineering and technology.
For the Community we will:
• advance the practice of engineering and technology
• promote sustainable management of the environment
For our Clients we will:
• determine and encourage high standards
• sustain these with ethics and discipline
• assure the qualifications of our members
• encourage innovative solutions.
For our Colleagues we will:
• facilitate the acquisition and sharing of knowledge
• represent their interests.
We aim to be the organisation which is the first choice for membership by all
people who through study, qualifications, work or general interest share in this
dedication.
To Contact IPENZ
E-mail and Internet
ipenz@ipenz.org.nz
www.ipenz.org.nz
Postal
P O Box 12 241
Wellington 6004
New Zealand
Telephone and Facsimile
(64) 4 473 9444 (phone)
(64) 4 473 2324 (fax)
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Index
Index
A
acceptability (of risks), 85
accident triangle (diagram), 76, 123
accidents
causes of, 45-46
compensated, at work (Table), 96
consequences of, 77-80
error paradigms (Table), 46
grading of, 62-65
injury criteria, 94-96
lost-time and injury, 90, 94-96
multiple-fatality, 86 (graph), 89
reporting of, 126
traffic, 95
Accident Insurance Act 1998, 150
Approved Documents, 135-136
ALARP (as low as reasonably
practicable), 17, 21,87
artificial intelligence, 54
B
bridges, 1,34
Building Code, 135
Building Regulations 1992, 130
Building Act 1991, 4, 130
C
Cave Creek, 35, 84
Challenger disaster, 17-20, 105
Chartered Engineer status, 141
Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group,
92
claim, time of, in insurance, 149-150
Code of Ethics, 3, 112
Code of Hammurabi, 129
co-insurance, 148
computer systems, 34-35
concept hazard analysis, 47-48
contract (law), 133, 134
contracts
supervision of, 132
construction risk analysis, 45
consultation
legal requirements for, 139-140
corporate restructuring
effect of, 44
D
dam failure
after rainstorm (case study), 137-138
in earthquake, 70
dangerous goods, risk of unintended
carriage (case study), 110-111
deodand, 129
Department of Conservation, 84
dose
dangerous, 66
thermal, 78
toxic gas concentration, 78
very low levels, 79
E
earthquake, 48, 70
Earthquake Commission Act 1993, 150
early failures
analysis, 60-61
identification of,  47-48
emergency plans, 124
Engineering Risk (IPENZ book), 38, 145
engineers
Code of Ethics, 3, 112
duty of care, 130-132
legal liability of, 132-134
legal responsibilities of, 129-141
professional responsibility of, 112-113
registration of, 140-141
statutory obligations of, 136-140
Engineers Registration Act 1924/1944, 141
environment factor, 98
environmental risk
assessment, case studies, 28, 88-89
geotechnical, 71
errors
root causes of, 46-47
ethics,  engineering, 112-113
see also Code of Ethics
exposures
acute, 50
chronic, 50
event-tree analysis, 69-71
for geotechnical risk, 71
for house fire, 60
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F
fail-safe incidents, 55
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), 53, 56
Farmer’s curves, 86-87
Fatal Accident Rate (FAR), 92-94
fatality criteria,  92-94
see also risk, limits
fault-tree analysis, 70-73
for motor-system failure, 165
for train turnover, 72
minimum cut sets in, 71
fault-tree development (worked
example), 165-170
flooding, 85, 137-138
G
gas explosion, Longford, 125
gas-to-gasoline plant, 37
geotechnical risk, 71, 77
vulnerability from landslides, 77
Guide to Managing Health and
Safety, 117-120
H
Hazard and operability study (Hazop), 51-53
guidewords in (Table), 53
hazard consequences
evaluation of, 77-80
hazard identification, 47-56
early, 47-49
Hazop, 51-53
OSH method for, 50-51
hazard warnings, 75-77
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms
Act 1996, 130
hazards, 31-32
chemical, 49-50
early identification of, 47-49
effects rating of (Table), 63
likelihood rating of (Table), 63
major, 49-50
of harbour extension, 62
of safety systems, 55-56
perception of, 39,43
process, 51
threats from, 43
workplace, 50-51
worktype, 51
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms
Act 1996, 4, 140
Health and Safety Commission (UK), 87
Health and Safety Executive (UK), 66, 129
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992,
4,50, 115-121, 130, 138-139
principal’s liability under, 139
workplace-safety management under,
115-121
Herald of Free Enterprise, loss of, 106
hydrocarbons, 93
I
indemnity, 149
industrial accidents triangle (diagram), 76,
123
industrial safety law, development of,
129-130
industrial zone, risk assessment of, 66, 99
insurability, 145
insurance
classes, 145-146
contracts
classification of, 148-149
nature of, 147-148
indemnity in, 149
legislation affecting, 150
policies (Table), 146
claims made and notified, 150
occurrence-based, 149
requirements, 150-151
timing of claim, 149-150
see also risk insurance
Insurance Companies’ Deposits Act 1953,
150
Insurance Companies’ (Ratings &
Inspections) Act 1994, 150
Insurance Law Reform Act 1985/1987, 150
injury criteria, see accidents
L
liability
in contract, 133
in tort, 133
limitation of, 134-136
under Health and Safety in Employment
Act, 138-139
lifelines, 92
loss, insurance limitation of, 149
loss prevention, 7, 37
LPG (liquefied petroleum gas), 73, 89, 92,
98-99
M
Major Hazardous Facilities, Australian
National Code for 1996, 124
management, see risk management
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Index
management system, OSH requirements for,
118-122
milk-powder plants, 36
N
New Zealand Building Code, 135
nuclear fuel-reprocessing, 107
nuclear power, 32, 73, 75, 85, 90, 100
O
Occupational Health and Safety Service, 61,
115-117
oil platform, 35, 105
Opuha Dam, failure of 137-138
organisational learning, 106-107
overpressure, 78
P
permit-to-work systems, 106
pesticides, 86
petroleum transport,  99
see also LPG
Piper Alpha, 35, 105
power stations
coal-fired, 36
nuclear, 85
probit (probability unit), 77-78
project risk, treatment of,112
R
rail network, 25-27, 100-101
re-insurance, 148
reliability
enhanced, 73-75
human, 73
of automatic monitoring, 36
of management, 113
see also risk, management-related
of power supply, 10, 61
of systems, 54
Resource Management Act 1991, 4, 130,
136-138, 139, 140
responsibility
of systems, 75
professional, 112-113
risk
acceptability of, 38-39, 40,83-84
analysis, 16-23, 25-28, 45, 59-80
assessment, 10-11, 66, 83, 88
characterisation, 39-40
classification of, 38-39
commercial and business, 37-38
communication, 12, 18-19, 40, 105-108
computer-related, 34-35
context, 14-16, 31, 43
control, 111, 144
criteria, 85-91
see also risk, index
definition of, 31
environmental, see environmental risk
evaluation, 16-23, 83-101
case studies, 98-101
financial, 31
financing, 147
geotechnical, 71, 77
health and safety (case study), 121
identification of, 10-11, 16-23, 43-56,106,
121
levels, maximum allowable, see limits
limits, 87-88, 89, 90, 95
management and insurance, 143-145
management in workplace, 115-127
management-related, 35-36, 96-98
maps, 91-92
nature of, 1, 31-41
objective, 2-3, 43
organisational, see management-related
perception of, 2-3, 39
profiles, 17, 21, 85, 86, 89,90
ranking matrices, 63, 120
recovery, 112
scope, establishment of, 16
severity scale (Tables), 22, 63
societal
limits of tolerability (graph), 87
map, 91-92
sources of (Table), 43
technical, 32-34
tolerability of, 21, 38-39, 83-84, 87, 95,
100
transfer, 109, 143, 144-145
treatment, 10-11, 23-24, 109-110, 111,112
workplace, 39
see also workplace safety
Risk and Prudence, IPENZ policy for, 4-5,
105
risk indices
Dow, 67-68
fatal accident rate (FAR), 92-94
in Rosebank study, 99
instantaneous fractional annual loss
(IFAL), 68, 97
Mond, 68
risk insurance, 143-151
in risk management, 143-145
risk management
business issues, 8-9
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driving forces for, 7-8
information for, 106-107
overview of, 7-29
policy changes, 44
rail network, example of, 25-27
risk analysis in, 25-28
risk profile (diagram), 21
risk rating, 61-68
OSH method, 61-62
risks
accepted, 83-84
health, 90
imposed, 83-84
individual, 84-85, 86
societal, 84-85
voluntary, 84
Rosebank 99
S
safety
definition of, 32
implementation in workplace (diagram),
119
industrial law developments in, 129-130
judgements of (Table), 38
Safety and Health is Good Business, 117
Seaview, 35
short-cut risk-analysis method (SCRAM),
65-67
sneak analysis, 55
Standards, 11-13
AS/NZS 3931:1998, 11
AS/NZS 4360:1995, 5
AS/NZS 4360:1999,5, 11-13, 14-24, 45,
107
AS/NZS 4804:1997, 13
AS/NZS ISO 9001, 13
AS/NZS ISO 14001, 13
NZS 2772 Part 1: 1999, 136
NZS 3910:1998, 136
NZS 4801 (Int):1999, 13, 118
NZS 9201, 135
ISO 14791, 13
Standards and compliance, 135-136
standby failure, 74
stakeholders,
communication with, 40
statutory obligations, 136-140
T
thermal dose, 77
tort, 133
toxic gas release, 77
Treaty of Waitangi, 139
trichloethylene, 91
U
uncertainties
in risk analysis, 59-60, 79-80
underwriting, 145
unsafe acts, reduction of, 123
V
vulnerability
lifelines, 92
persons, 85
W
water heating, domestic, 101
water-supply network, risk analysis of, 64-65
waste management, 37, 79-80
wastewater treatment, risk analysis of, 79-80
what-if analysis, 54
WorkCover Authority, Victorian, 125-126
workplace safety, 39, 50-51, 115-127
health and safety analysis (case study),
121-122
lack of (worked examples), 116
management of, 115-127
OSH requirements for, 118-122
permit-to-work systems for, 106
risk assessment for, 118-122
Worksafe, 115
worksites, high hazard-potential, 124-126
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